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I. JURISDICTION
A. In Personam Jurisdiction
N RE Air Crash Disaster at Gander, Newfoundland on Decem-Iber 12, 19851 involved the 1985 crash in Newfoundland
of an Arrow Air DC-8 enroute from the Middle East to
Fort Campbell, Kentucky.2 Plaintiffs alleged that Arrow
Air Corporation operated the aircraft, and that Batch Air
Corporation and World Air, Inc. serviced and maintained
it.3 The district court held that states may exercise long-
arm jurisdiction over parties acting within a federal en-
clave provided there is no conflict between the federal
government's exercise of territorial sovereignty and the
states' exercise of jurisdiction.4
The court rejected defendants' contention that Ken-
tucky's laws were inapplicable because Fort Campbell, at
which decedents were stationed, was a federal enclave.5
Defendants argued jurisdiction had been ceded to the
United States.6 The court cited Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil
Oil Corp. ,7 for its ruling "that the location of the event giv-
ing rise to suit is an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction
rather than another State, does not introduce any new





Id. at 1207. Fort Campbell is a military enclave located partly in Kentucky and
partly in Tennessee. Id. Jurisdiction over Fort Campbell was ceded to the United
States by Kentucky Statute 2376, now codified as Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.010
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
453 U.S. 473 (1981).
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limitation on the forum State's subject matter
jurisdiction."8
The court also found sufficient minimum contacts be-
tween Arrow and Kentucky to confer personal jurisdic-
tion.9 Arrow, although incorporated and having its
principal place of business in other states, engaged in a
contract with the forum to maintain its facilities at various
state airports.' 0 Arrow also flew flights into the Fort
Campbell military field under a Military Airlift Command
and Military Traffic Management Command (MFO) con-
tract which generated two million dollars for Arrow."
The court asserted pendent jurisdiction over the other
defendants, World and Batch.' 2 World was found to have
operated commercial and military flights through the fo-
rum and to have benefited from financial arrangements
with the other defendants.' 3 The court noted that while
general jurisdiction might be constitutionally permissible
under Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,4 it may
not be permissible under Kentucky's "single act" long
arm statute.'" The court did not reach this issue, how-
ever, because it held it had pendent jurisdiction over
World. 16 The court reached a similar conclusion concern-
ing Batch.' 7 Therefore, it did not address plaintiffs' plea
to the court to "pierce the corporate veil" and attribute
Arrow's actions to Batch because both were owned by the
same person and both shared the same executive vice
In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F. Supp. at 1207-08.
Id. at 1211.
Id. Arrow is incorporated under Delaware laws. Id. Its principal place of
business is within the state of Florida. Id. Arrow hangared aircraft at the Greater
Cincinnati.International Airport in Covington, Kentucky and used these aircraft
for regularly scheduled cargo flights. Id. It also flew out of Louisville, Kentucky
and Lexington, Kentucky. Id.
I d.
12 Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1212.
446 U.S. 408 (1984).
In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F. Supp. at 1212.
Id.
7 Id. at 1213.
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The court then found Arrow had purposefully availed
itself of Kentucky's laws through its transportation busi-
ness.' 9 The court rejected defendant's claim that the fore-
seeability of acting within the jurisdiction of a state is
insufficient alone to grant jurisdiction in that state.20 The
court explained that, while the defendant's claim was
technically accurate, actual knowledge that one is acting
in, or will cause a consequence within, a jurisdiction is an
important factor in assessing the fairness of exercising
personal jurisdiction over that person.2' The MFO con-
tract listed Kentucky as a place of destination; in addition,
Arrow's repeated flights into and maintenance of facilities
in Kentucky made it foreseeable to Arrow that it might be
subject to Kentucky's jurisdiction.22
Finally, the court found relevant other factors outlined
in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,2 3 such as Kentucky's in-
terest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs' interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate ju-
dicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient res-
olution of controversies, the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies, and the burden placed upon the defendants in liti-
gating this case in Kentucky.24 Kentucky was found to
have an interest in actions of military personnel based in a
federal enclave within Kentucky. This interest is evident
due to its statutory facilitation of divorce proceedings for
military personnel and recognition, by its courts, of bene-
fits accruing to personnel stationed in the federal en-
clave.25 In addition, the court found many personnel at
' Id.
19 Id. In order to ensure that a state's exercise of jurisdiction is fair, due pro-
cess requires that the defendant must have "purposely availed himself of the privi-
lege of acting within the state." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
Id.
Id.
471 U.S. 462 (1985).
In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F. Supp. at 1214.
Id. at 1214-15.
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Fort Campbell were or eventually became Kentucky citi-
zens. 26 The court also held it had jurisdiction over Arrow
under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention2 7 as author-
ized by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a). 8
In Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,29 a product liability case,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's "stream of
commerce" analysis and found defendant's contacts with
the forum state insufficient to confer personal jurisdic-
tion.3 0 The court ruled that Beech's nationwide market-
ing campaign from 1980-1985, during which time nearly
$250 million of Beech products flowed to seventeen in-
dependent Texas dealers from sales negotiated and com-
pleted in Kansas, was insufficient to constitute a "general
presence" in Texas. 3' Defendant was a foreign corpora-
tion with its principal place of business outside of Texas. 2
The court found Texas law neither protected nor bene-
fited Beech.33 It neither qualified to do business nor
maintained an agent for service of process in Texas. 4
Beech had no telephone listing in Texas, no warehouse,
manufacturing facilities or bank account in Texas, and did
not own any real estate or pay taxes in Texas. 5 Indeed,
Beech operated in a manner calculated to avoid the laws
of the forum by requiring negotiation, performance, and
completion of all contracts outside the state.36 The court
also noted that Beech's distributors in Texas, who sold
Beech's products for their own account, did not create
26 Id.
27 The formal title of The Warsaw Convention is the Convention for the Unifi-
cation of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, opened for
signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49
U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
2N In re Air Crash Disaster, 660 F.Supp. at 1221.
2' 818 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1987).
I31 ld. at 372.
il Id. at 372, 376.
.12 Id. at 372. Beech is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of busi-
ness in Kansas. Id.





minimum contacts sufficient to warrant general jurisdic-
tion over BeechY.3 The fact that the court would have spe-
cific jurisdiction over a contract dispute between Beech
and a distributor in Texas did not control the inquiry into
general jurisdiction over Beech. 8
Finally, the court noted that even if Beech's connec-
tions with Texas were continuous and systematic, the ex-
ercise of general jurisdiction would be unfair and
unreasonable.3 9 The court relied on the recent Supreme
Court decision, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court 40
which requires evaluation of the following factors in exer-
cising personal jurisdiction:
(1) the burden on the defendant;
(2) the interests of the forum state;
(3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief; and
(4) the interests of the several states.41
The court also found that the plaintiffs, residents of Loui-
siana, did not have a distinct interest in a Texas forum,
rather than another state, since they did not point to wit-
nesses or other evidence located in Texas. Plaintiffs had
filed related suits pending in Kansas and Mississippi. 42
Thompson v. Bellanca Aircraft Corp. ,43 a wrongful death ac-
tion, held that personal jurisdiction could not be asserted
over a corporation that had purchased the assets of the
bankrupt Bellanca Aircraft Corporation (BAC). 44 A Bel-
lanca Super Turbo Viking crashed on October 28, 1983,
in Littleton, Massachusetts, killing the two occupants.
BAC manufactured the aircraft. On March 12, 1982, Vi-
king Aviation, Inc. purchased the assets of BAC, consist-
ing of one model line. Viking then changed its name to
Bellanca, Inc.
.7 Id. at 576.
- Id.
m, Id. at 377.
4" 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
4' Id. at 1034.
Bearry, 818 F.2d at 377.
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,619 (Mass. Dec. 30, 1987).
Id. at 17,623.
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Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction. The contacts between Bellanca, Inc. and Massa-
chusetts were as follows:
(1) Bellanca, Inc. sold $3,000 of spare parts;
(2) Bellanca, Inc. had made some telephone calls to
Massachusetts customers;
(3) Bellanca, Inc. had sent two direct market mailings
to Massachusetts residents.4 5
Plaintiffs argued that Bellanca, Inc. was a mere continua-
tion of BAC. However, the court held that Bellanca, Inc.
was not a mere continuation, although some of Bellanca
Inc.'s employees were formerly employed by BAC and Vi-
king Aviation purchased one model line of BAC.
The plaintiffs then argued, under a corporate successor
theory, that Bellanca, Inc. made a product similar to BAC
and therefore should be liable. The court stated that, for
purposes of jurisdiction, predecessors and successors are
not to be treated as one entity.46 Finally, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that Bellanca breached its duty to adequately warn
all owners of Bellanca Model No. 17-3 1ATC aircraft. The
court found that the warnings issued by BAC and Bel-
lanca, Inc. were adequate.47
Relying on Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,48
the court stated that when the cause of action does not
arise from the business contacts, as was true in this case,
the contacts for personal jurisdiction must be more sub-
stantial. The court held that while the facts indicated
some activity in Massachusetts, it was not enough to con-
stitute a regular solicitation of business.49
41 Id. at 17,621.
46 Id. at 17,622.
47 Id. The court stated that "since almost every products liability case has a
potential issue of failure to warn, grounding jurisdiction solely on allegations of
such omission might remove any limitation upon a state's assertion of personal
jurisdiction and again be beyond traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,623 (citing Walsh v. National
Seating Co., 411 F. Supp. 564 (D. Mass. 1976)).
s Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,623.
49 Hall, 466 U.S. at 408.
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B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Barnett v. Iberia Air Lines of Spain 50 held that the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) 5' provides the exclusive
basis of jurisdiction over an action against a foreign state
and applied the "nexus" approach to reject subject matter
jurisdiction over the defendant airline. 2 The case arose
from a missed connecting-flight in Spain and a subse-
quently ruined vacation. Plaintiffs claimed the FSIA53 was
inapplicable because: (1) the action was based upon com-
mercial activity carried on in the United States by the for-
eign state, or (2)acts were performed in the United States
in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere.54 Relying on an earlier Fifth Circuit case,
Vencedora Oceanica Navigacion v. Compagnie Nationale Alger-
ienne de Navigation5 5 the court applied the "nexus" ap-
proach, finding it superior to more liberal tests adopted
by other circuits. 56 The "nexus" approach requires a con-
nection between the foreign defendant's commercial ac-
tivity in the United States and the act giving rise to the
plaintiff's claims. 7
TWA acted as Iberia's agent by selling the ticket in the
,1 660 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
51 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
.12 Barnett, 660 F. Supp. at 1151.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) contains three exceptions to a foreign state's immu-
nity. The FSIA provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from juridiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case . . . (2) in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
I.5 Barnett, 660 F. Supp. at 1150.
730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.).
5' Barnett, 660 F. Supp. at 1150. The court used the "nexus" test to determine
whether the foreign defendant carried on "commercial activity" in the United
States under section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. Id. at 1150-51. Other tests include a
"literal" approach, a bifurcated "literal and nexus" approach, and a "doing busi-
riess" approach. Id.
57 Id. at 1151.
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United States. The court stated that this may have been
sufficient to confer jurisdiction over Iberia under a "doing
business" test, but not under the preferred nexus ap-
proach.58 Even if a contract with Iberia was formed in Chi-
cago, where the ticket was issued, the acts which formed
the basis of plaintiffs' claims all occurred in Spain and,
therefore, FSIA did not confer jurisdiction over Iberia in
the United States.
In Barkanic v. General Administration of Civil Aviation of the
People's Republic of China,59 the Second Circuit found a suf-
ficient nexus between a foreign national airline's commer-
cial activities in the United States and the crash of its
domestic flight in the foreign country to confer subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.60
Two United States businessmen died in a 1985 CAAC
(the national airline of the People's Republic of China)
crash of a domestic flight in China. The district court dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the
FSIA, finding the only connection between the foreign
airline and the accident was the purchase of two uncon-
firmed tickets through an authorized United States agent
for a domestic flight in China.6' According to customary
practice, the tickets had to be confirmed in China, and the
businessmen, once there, actually changed their flights.
The Second Circuit reversed and found the required
nexus, since CACC's agreement required Pan Am to act
as its agent for the domestic flight.6 2 Its acceptance in the
United States of payment for the flight, even though the
flight was not guaranteed and had to be confirmed in
China, constituted a contract with decedents.6 3
In Gayda v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,64 the court
Id. at 1152.
822 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 453 (1987).
822 F.2d at 13.
Id. at 12.
'1 Id.
- Id. at 13.
- 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,634 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 1987) (1987
Westlaw 6390).
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denied a motion to dismiss on grounds of lack ofjurisdic-
tion because the defendants failed to meet their burden of
establishing immunity under the FSIA.65 The action arose
out of the Warsaw air crash disaster on March 14, 1980.
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, the designers,
manufacturers, and sellers of the aircraft, failed to prop-
erly warn of unsafe defects, failed to take precautions to
correct and repair the defects, and failed to provide the
necessary information for proper crew training and the
safe maintenance and operation of the aircraft.66
The defendants challenged the action on the ground
they were immune from suit under the FSIA. The defend-
ants alleged that:
(1) the Ministry of the Aviation Industry's only connec-
tion to the aircraft was to issue an airworthiness
certificate;
(2) defendant USSR's only connection was overseeing
the Ministry of the Aviation Industry;
(3) defendant Aviaexport's only connection was to con-
tract for the sale of the aircraft and arrange for air-
craft servicing; and
(4) defendant Aeroflot's only connection was that it
made routine inspections of the radio and electrical
equipment in 1974 and 1975.67
The court held that these allegations were insufficient to
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.6 8 The
court noted that the complaint, which stated that the Min-
istry was responsible for regulating the entire airline in-
dustry, alleged sufficient facts to raise a triable issue over
whether these defendants were acting as a principal for
the defendants, Aviaexport and Aeroflot. 69 Affidavits sub-
mitted by Aviaexport and Aeroflot also revealed sufficient
involvement to preclude dismissal.
,Y Id. at 17,635.
-' Id. at 17,634.
67 Id. at 17,636.
- Id. at 17,635.
,, Id. at 17,636-37.
1988]
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In Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 70 a case brought under
the FSIA and the Warsaw Convention,71 the Ninth Circuit
held the FSIA did not require application of a foreign
country's choice-of-law rule to a lawsuit arising from .a
crash in that country. The court reviewed federal com-
mon law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws 72 and found that the foreign law would apply if the
country had at least as significant an interest as the United
States." Plaintiffs, California residents and parents of a
victim of the 1980 Lot crash in Poland, appealed the trial
court's decision to award "lost financial support" under
Polish law in lieu of damages under California law which
allows recovery for loss of care and companionship. 4
The court rejected plaintiff's first contention that the
Warsaw Convention preempted the FSIA, ruling that both
provided jurisdiction in this case.75 The court further
found that both the Warsaw Convention and the FSIA
lacked a provision for choice of law concerning damages.
The choice-of-law rule delineated in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Manufacturing Co. 76 was held inapplicable because
the FSIA precludes diversity jurisdiction over foreign
state defendants by federal courts.77
The district court had avoided ruling on the choice-of-
law issue by regarding the crash itself as the act or omis-
sion giving rise to liability under the FSIA in a Warsaw
Convention case. The district court's analogy to a choice-
of-law provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act was found
unpersuasive because the FSIA lacked a choice-of-law
provision. 78 The court of appeals applied the law of the
place where the negligence occurred, not where the negli-
7o 820 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1987).
71 See supra note 27.
72 Harris, 820 F.2d at 1003.
7.1 Id. at 1004.
74 Id. at 1001.
75 Id. at 1005.
7,1 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
77 Harris, 820 F.2d at 1002.
7H Id. at 1002-03.
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gence had its operative effect. In this case, it was unclear
where the negligence, the design defect, occurred. Fi-
nally, the court rejected, as speculative, plaintiff's conten-
tion that decedent's contributions to his mother would
increase in proportion to his salary.79
C. Forum Non Conveniens
InJennings v. Boeing Co. ,80 the plaintiff held dual British-
Irish citizenship. Her husband died when a Boeing Chi-
nook helicopter crashed into the North Sea. Plaintiff sued
Boeing based on theories of gross negligence, strict liabil-
ity, and breach of warranty. Boeing filed a motion to dis-
miss based on forum non conveniens. 8 t  Plaintiff
unsuccessfully argued that a dismissal on grounds of fo-
rum non conveniens and a resulting suit in the U.K. would
effectively deny her the right to sue under favorable Penn-
sylvania law,8 and thereby violated the Treaty of Friend-
ship 83 between the United States and Ireland. The treaty
requires equal treatment of Irish and U.S. citizens with re-
spect to access to the courts of either nation.84 The court
71 Id. at 1005.
- 660 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
" Id. at 799. "The principle of forum non conveniens permits the court to
decline otherwise proper juridiction over an action where the convenience of the
parties and witnesses, or the administrative constraints on the court, would be
better served by allowing the action to proceed in a different available forum." Id.
at 800 (citing Dahi v. United Technologies Corp., 632 F.2d 1027, 1029 (3d Cir.
1980)).
82 Jennings, 660 F. Supp. at 799. Pennsylvania is a more favorable forum due to
the availability of strict liability theories, a more liberal measure of damages, and
the potential for punitive damages. Id.
1- Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, United
States-Ireland, art. IV(l), I U.S.T. 785, 790, T.I.A.S. No. 2792, at 274.
Nationals of either Party shall be accorded national treatment in the
application of laws and regulations within the territories of the other
Party that (a) establish a right of recovery for injury or death, or that
(b) establish a pecuniary compensation, or other benefit or service,
on account of disease, injury or death arising out of and in the
course of employment or due to the nature of employment.
Id.
Jennings, 660 F. Supp. at 800.
The Treaty... clearly.., affords Irish citizens no greater rights than
those afforded to United States citizens. Therefore, if a diversity ac-
1988]
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did not resolve whether Pennsylavania law would govern
because the crash of the helicopter into the sea gave rise
to jurisdiction under federal maritime law.85 Federal mari-
time law precludes recovery of damages for wrongful
death pursuant to state law.86
The court ruled that public and private interest factors
dictated dismissal.87 The court found special significance
in Boeing's agreement to concede liability for compensa-
tory damages in an English or Scottish court. This con-
cession would make the trial a simple damages case,
unless the courts of the alternative forum recognize a pu-
nitive damages claim. 88 The plaintiff merely filed suit in
the United States to take advantage of favorable remedies.
The court cited Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno89 for the proposi-
tion that "[t]he possibility of a change in substantive law
should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substan-
tive weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry." 90 The
tion filed by an American citizen may be dismissed even though such
a dismissal might result in a loss of a potential punitive damages
award, so may such an action be dismissed when filed by an Irish
citizen entitled to national treatment under the Treaty.
Id.
85 Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (crash of a helicop-
ter used to ferry oil rig workers is within admiralty jurisdiction).
kf Death on the High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1982).
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State .... the personal represenative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district court of the
United States ....
Id. (emphasis added). The Death on the High Seas Act was applicable because
the accident occurred more than a marine league (defined as three miles) beyond
the shore of any State of the United States. Jennings, 660 F. Supp. at 802.
7 Jennings, 660 F. Supp. at 809. "The court will weigh relative advantages and
obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice of an
inconvenient forum, 'vex', 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon
him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue his remedy."
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
11 Jennings, 660 F. Supp. at 805. "Both parties assume that under British law
punitive damages may not be awarded. It is at least conceivable, however, that
under choice of law rules, a British Court might apply the law of Pennsylvania or
some other forum, especially with regard to any survival action." Id.
"' 454 U.S. 235, 247 (1981).
Id. (citing inJennings, 660 F. Supp. at 807).
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court therefore did not resolve the issue of whether the
Treaty required application of the presumption in favor of
Irish citizens as if they were United States citizens.
Myers v. Boeing Co. ,91 arose from the deaths of Japanese
travelers in the Japan Air Lines crash of August 12, 1985.
The plaintiffs filed suit against Boeing in Washington. In
response, Boeing filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of
forum non conveniens. Boeing agreed not to contest lia-
bility and to try the issue of damages in Japan provided
the cases were dismissed.9 2
The court concluded that Japanese courts were an ade-
quate and available alternative forum for the damage is-
sues. Boeing was amendable to process in Japan, and
Japanese law provided an adequate remedy for the plain-
tiffs' injuries. The fact that Japanese law did not provide
for exemplary damages was not a significant factor in the
court's determination.93
The court further concluded that the balance of private
and public interest factors weighed heavily in favor of Ja-
pan as the forum in which to determine damages. Plain-
tiffs' decedents lived and worked in Japan, virtually all of
the witnesses, documents, and other evidence were lo-
cated in Japan, and ease of access to sources of proof fa-
vored trial in Japan. In addition, the cost of obtaining
attendance ofJapanese witnesses in Washington would be
substantial. Evidence located in Washington pertained
solely to the issue of liability, not to damages.94
The court granted Boeing's forum non conveniens mo-
tion on the condition that:
- Av. LIT. REP., Sept. 28, 1987, at 7,621. (Wash. Sept. 10, 1987).
112 Forum Non Conveniens:JAL Crash injapan, Av. LIT. REP., Mar. 6, 1987, at 6,666.
113 Myers, Av. LIT. REP., Sept. 28, 1987, at 7,622-23. "[Tlhe possibility of an
unfavorable change in law would not bar dismissal unless plaintiffs were left with
no satisfactory remedy. This is not such a case, as Japanese law provides for re-
covery of substantial damages in event of wrongful death." Id. at 7,623.
114 Id. at 7,623. "[W]ere these actions to be tried in Washington, it is likely that
at least some of the damages issues would be governed by Japanese law. The
Japanese courts' expertise in applying their own law, while not a factor of para-
mount importance, favors dismissal." Id.
1988]
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1. Boeing submit to jurisdiction and designate an
agent for service of process in Japan;
2. Boeing waive any statute of limitations defense;
3. Boeing admit liability for compensatory damages;
and
4. Boeing not oppose recognition in Japan of the lia-
bility judgment.95
In Chhawchharia v. Boeing Co., 96 another case aris-
ing out of the JAL crash, the survivors of an Indian
plaintiff's estate filed suit against Boeing in New
York. Before filing, the plaintiffs negotiated a set-
tlement and signed a release concerning JAL's lia-
bility for the death.97 Subsequently, the plaintiffs
refused to accept payment because they disputed
whether Boeing was a named party to the release.98
The district court dismissed the suit on forum
non con veniens grounds. The court held that India
was an adequate alternative forum. India's strong
interest was based on the Indian citizenship of the
survivors, as well as the fact that the release was ne-
gotiated, drafted, and executed in India.99
The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff's ar-
gument that the prosecution would be hindered in
India because of a backlog in the Indian court sys-
tem. 00 It cited Union Carbide '0' and Piper Aircraft, 10 2
'.' Id. at 7,624.
657 F. Supp. 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
1,7 Id. at 1159. The release was later revised to include Boeing as a released
party. Id.
tm Id. The plaintiffs claimed that they were falsely induced to release Boeing
based on representations by defendant's agents that Boeing's liability was limited
under the Warsaw Convention. Id.
,: Id. at 1161-62.
.... Id. at 1160. The plaintiff did not, however, deny that Indian law provides
compensatory damages for wrongful death. Id.
.... Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Union Carbide moved to dismiss, on the
grounds of forum non conveniens, the consolidation of several actions brought
against the corporation for injuries and damages resulting from a leak at a chemi-
cal plant in Bhopal, India).
.... 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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for the proposition that an alternative forum is in-
adequate only in rare circumstances where the fo-
rum is "so clearly . .. unsatisfactory that it is no
remedy at all." 10 3 If the suit remained in New York,
defendants would have to try the case by deposi-
tion.1 0 4  In this case, then, "the presumption in
favor of plaintiff's chosen forum [was] accorded
'less than maximum force' .. because the assump-
tion that the plaintiff's choice is convenient is
'much less reasonable' where the plaintiff is domi-
ciled abroad".10 5 Accordingly, the plaintiff's com-
plaint was dismissed with the stipulations that the
defendant waive any statute of limitations defense
and consent to personal jurisdiction in India.
In Kryvicky v. Scandinavian Airlines System, 10 6 the
plaintiff's husband died in a 1983 SAS crash in
Spain. The plaintiff sued Boeing and SAS on theo-
ries of tort liability, and both defendants asked for a
change of forum based on forum non con-
veniens.10 7  The Sixth Circuit found that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the
case on grounds of forum non conveniens. t0 8 The
district court correctly concluded Spain was an ade-
quate alternative forum.' 0 9 The court also did not
Io Id. at 254.
Chhawchharia, 657 F. Supp. at 1161. "[S]ources of proof and access to wit-
nesses regarding damages are factors weighing in favor of dismissal although not
heavily. Since most of the probable deposition testimony in a trial on damages in
the United States would relate to economic loss, a jury would not be severely
hampered." Id.
,os Id. at 1159 (citations omitted) (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 261).
... 807 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1986).
1,,7 Id. at 515. The plaintiff and her decedent lived in Spain at the time of the
crash. After the accident, the plaintiff moved back to Michigan, where she resided
before moving abroad. Id.
-s Id. at 516. The plaintiff argued that the district court should have withheld a
determination of forum non conveniens until after resolving whether the court
had personal jurisdiction over SAS. The appellate court noted this would be an
"excercise of futility." A finding of lack of personal jurisdiction would also re-
quire dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens. Id. at 516-17.
",, Id. at 516. "Dismissal was conditioned upon the defendants' submission to
the juridiction of Spanish courts, their waiver of any statute of limitations defense,
1988]
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abuse its discretion by failing to determine whether
United States law applied," 0 dismissing the case
without a finding that the forum was "oppressive"
or "vexatious" to defendants, failing to justify the
financial burden imposed on plaintiff by litigating
the claims in Spain,"' or failing to provide plaintiff
additional time to rebut an affidavit interpreting
Spanish law.' 1 2
In Diaz v. Mexicana de Avion,1 3 the court dis-
missed an action on the basis of forum non con-
veniens. The lawsuit arose from the crash of
Mexicana Airlines Flight 940, on March 31, 1986, in
the mountains west of Mexico City. The evidence
indicated that the crash was caused by the explo-
sion of a tire shortly after take-off. Plaintiffs alleged
negligence in Mexicana's failure to properly in-
spect, maintain, and operate the aircraft in Mexico
City.
The court examined several factors to determine
that Mexico was an adequate alternative forum.
The domicile and residence of the original plaintiffs
was in Mexico. Mexicana is incorporated and has
its principal place of business in Mexico. The dece-
dents purchased their tickets in Mexico City for the
flight to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. The court held
that these factors indicated that Mexico had the
most significant relationship to the crash and the
parties. In addition, the court stated that Mexican
and their stipulation to pay any final judgment issued by Spanish courts and to its
enforcement in the United States." Id.
111, Id. at 517. "The balance of public and private interest factors may favor trial
in a foreign jurisdiction even if it were determined that American law applied."
Id. (citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 260).
1 Id. The expense, inconvenience, and potential unfairness to the defendants
of a suit in the United States outweighed the plaintiff's burden of maintaining the
suit in Spain. Id.
112 Id. The plaintiff filed three motions in the district court, none of which ad-
dressed the inadequacy of a Spanish forum. The issue could not be presented for
the first time on appeal. Id.
-. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,981-83 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 1987).
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law should apply.' 14 The plaintiffs offered no evi-
dence that a Mexican forum was unavailable.
The court then went on to balance the public and
private interest factors. As for private interest fac-
tors, all of the evidence was in Mexico. In addition,
the defendants agreed to make any of their wit-
nesses available in the Mexican proceeding. Eyewit-
nesses were already located in Mexico. As for the
public interest, the court noted the administrative
difficulties flowing from court congestion." 5 The
court concluded that it is more appropriate for
Mexican law be applied by a Mexican court. The
only nexus the case had to Texas was the fact that
Mexicana did business in Texas and the plaintiff's
attorneys had their offices in Texas. The court held
dismissal based on forum non conveniens was
appropriate.
Smedresman v. United Airlines, Inc.,1 6 involved a
complaint, filed in New York arising out of an al-
leged accident aboard a United Airlines aircraft.
The flight originated in Newark, New Jersey and
landed in Chicago, Illinois. The injured plaintiff re-
sided in New Jersey and received medical attention
in New Jersey. The defendant's principal place of
business was in Illinois. The material non-party
witnesses resided outside New York, and were not
subject to the state court's subpoena power.
The court noted that no transactions took place
in New York. After considering the relevant factors,
weighing the burdens on New York courts, the
hardship to the defendant, and the availability of an
alternative forum, the court concluded the action
1,4 Id. at 17,983. "[W]hile the laws of Texas and Mexico differ in several as-
pects, these differences do not render Mexican laws violative of public policy." Id.
(citing Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979)).
-, Id. at 17,981-83, 17,985. "Boeing has suggested that the trial of this case
would be lengthy. Such a burden ought not to be imposed upon this Court when
this community has virtually no relation to this litigation." Id.
1- 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) at 17,618 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Dec, 12, 1986).
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would be more appropriate in another forum. 17
In Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. (In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisi-
ana on July 9, 1982) 118 which involved two claims of
Uruguayan passengers killed in the New Orleans air
disaster, Pan Am appealed the district court's de-
nial of its motion to dismiss on forum non con-
veniens grounds. It contended that the cases
should have been dismissed because Pan Am was
willing to 1) submit to the jurisdiction of the Uru-
guayan courts; 2) concede liability; 3) waive any
statute of limitations defense; 4) waive the Warsaw
Convention limitations on damages; and 5) guaran-
tee satisfaction of any judgment entered against it
in Uruguay." 9 Plaintiffs raised two noteworthy
contentions in response. First, plaintiffs claimed
that in a diversity case, the district court should
look to state, rather than federal, forum non con-
veniens law. Since Louisiana law did not permit a
forum non conveniens dismissal, Pan Am's motion
should have been summarily rejected.' 20 Second,
plaintiffs claimed that cases properly brought in the
United States pursuant to the Warsaw Convention
should not be subject to forum non conveniens dis-
missal. 12 ' Plaintiffs also claimed that Louisiana was
a proper forum in any event. 22
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, rejected plaintiffs' two
contentions but held that the case was properly
brought in Louisiana. 23 With respect to plaintiffs'
claim that the court should look to Louisiana's state
,,7 Id. at 17,619. The court granted defendants motion to dismiss on grounds
of forum non conveniens with the condition the defendant accept service in New
Jersey or Illinois, and waiver any statute of limitation defense. Id.
,, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
id. at 1152.
121 See id. at 1154.
1-1 Id. at 1160.
22 See id. at 1162.
2 3 Id.
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law concerning the forum non conveniens doctrine,
the Fifth Circuit held that the federal court's inter-
est in self-regulation, administrative independence,
and self-management were more important than
the disruption of uniformity created by applying
federal forum non conveniens law in diversity
cases. 1
24
With respect to the argument that the Warsaw
Convention precluded the application of the forum
non conveniens doctrine, the court noted that the
claim appeared to be one of first impression and re-
jected the argument. 25 The court noted that the
Warsaw Convention gives the injured party four
possible places to institute suit: the domicile of the
carrier; its principal place of business; the place of
business where the contract was made; or the place
of destination. 2 6  However, once the plaintiff
selects a forum, the convention provides that the
selection "is then subject to the procedural require-
ments and devices that are part of that forum's in-
ternal laws."1 27
The court found that the district court's denial of
Pan Am's motion was proper, because there was no
other forum in which all defendants could be par-
ties. Plaintiffs had sought to add the United States
as a party defendant, and the United States had
never consented to Uruguayan jurisdiction. Pan
Am argued that the potential absence of the United
States as a party was irrelevant, because Pan Am
was willing to admit liability and to pay any judg-
ment rendered against it. The court held that since
the United States had not consented to Uruguayan
jurisdiction and Pan Am had only agreed to pay a
judgment rendered against itself, not the United
124 Id. at 1159.
, Id. at 1160.
12, Id.; see Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 28(1).
,27 Trivelloni-Lorenzi, 821 F.2d at 1161.
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States, the trial court's denial of the motion was not
an abuse of discretion. 28
In Hatzlachh Supply, Inc v. Tradewind Airways, 12 9 the
plaintiff sued over misdelivery of cargo shipments
by the defendant. The cargo was destined for Nige-
ria. Defendant, a British carrier, moved for a forum
non conveniens dismissal, arguing that the case
should be brought in Nigeria. The court denied
Tradewind's motion on the ground that Nigeria was
not a viable alternate forum.1 30 Tradewind ob-
tained the sworn declaration of a Nigerian solicitor
that the plaintiff would have standing to sue in Ni-
geria; that Nigerian courts are competent to decide
such a case and that the plaintiff would be treated
fairly as a foreign litigant; that the plaintiff's repre-
sentatives would not have to appear in person in
Nigeria; that trial witnesses were subject to compul-
sory process; and that the Nigerian courts were free
from government interference.' 3'
The court found that Nigeria would not be an ad-
equate alternate forum. The court concluded that
Nigeria's currency controls limited the maximum
amount of currency that could be taken out of the
country to twenty Naira (about twenty dollars) and
that the plaintiff's sixty-year-old president, and the
sole witness, would incur health and other risks at-
tendant to travel to Nigeria.13 2
In addition to finding that Nigeria was not an ad-
equate forum, the court also held that the balance
of public and private interest factors favored keep-
ing the case in New York. It noted that there were
numerous and substantial contacts between the
New York forum and the controversy. For exam-
12S Id. at 1168.





pie, the plaintiff was a New York corporation and
the defendant did business in New York; the goods
were delivered to the defendant in New York and
transported from New York to Nigeria; and the sale
of the goods was negotiated in New York.133
D. Removal
In Rockwell International Credit Corp. v. United States Air-
craft Insurance Group,'3 4 the Ninth Circuit sua sponte ques-
tioned the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, found
jurisdiction lacking, and then asked counsel for United
States Aircraft Insurance Group (USAIG) to show cause
why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to iden-
tify the real party in interest.
Rockwell sued USAIG in Maricopa County, Arizona,
seeking recovery on an insurance policy. USAIG then re-
moved the case to the United States District Court based
on diversity. The removal petition stated that although
USAIG was the named defendant, the controversy was be-
tween citizens of different states, namely the plaintiff and
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., the insurer on whose be-
half USAIG had written the insurance. 3 5 These asser-
tions apparently were never disputed. USAIG
subsequently obtained summary judgment on the merits
and Rockwell appealed. After oral argument, the Ninth
Circuit panel raised the question of whether diversity ju-
risdiction existed sua sponte.' 36
The appellate court reversed and found that federal ju-
risdiction did not exist because the real party defendant
was not Aetna, but USAIG. Seeking removal, USAIG had
the burden of establishing diversity in its petition.
Neither the petition nor the record indicated that one of
the USAIG group was not a Delaware corporation. 3 7
Id. at 116.
823 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 303.
Id.
-. Id. at 304.
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USAIG then sought to amend its removal petition, stat-
ing for the first time that United States Aviation Under-
writers, Inc. (USAU) was the real party in interest. USAU
was diverse from Rockwell. The court refused to allow
the amendment, stating that: (1)the insurance policy itself
established that USAU was. not the real party in interest;
and (2)the proposed amendment was not merely technical
but attempted to create jurisdiction where none
existed. 138
USAIG, in its motion to amend, stated that it should
have advised the court of the defect in the proper party
defendant. USAIG did not do so, and the court inter-
preted the action as a failure to disclose the true state of
affairs to the district court. The panel remanded the case
to state court and ordered counsel for USAIG to show
cause why sanctions should not be imposed pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.139
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit imposed sanctions
against the Arizona law firm which had filed the petition
for removal.1 40 The court accepted that the law firm had
relied upon information provided by a vice-president for
general aviation claims at United States Aviation Under-
writers who was also a lawyer admitted to practice in New
York. The vice-president had told counsel that it was the
practice of the USAIG to seek removal on the basis of the
citizenship of one of its member companies. After the
propriety of the original petition was brought into ques-
tion, the vice-president suggested that USAU be substi-
tuted for USAIG and that such substitution had been
done "in other cases."' 14 1 Nevertheless, the court held
that the filing of the petition to remove was objectively
frivolous as a matter of law, notwithstanding the subjec-
tive good faith of the attorneys who filed it. The court
I -" Id.
,m, Id. at 305. Rule 11 provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a
certificate that, to the best of his knowledge, the paper he is filing with the court is
well grounded in fact. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
In re Disciplinary Action Against Mooney, 841 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1004.
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noted that the Fifth Circuit had dismissed a similar re-
moval petition for lack of jurisdiction, where USAIG had
attempted to remove to federal court by relying solely
upon the citizenship of one of USAIG's members. 142
Even if counsel was unaware of the decision, the vice-
president of USAIG had to be aware of the case. The
court added:
But the Vice-President's failure to let Mooney know of a
case Mooney should have brought to this court's attention
underlines a basic fact. Mooney should not have relied on
the Vice-President for the law. We are told nothing of the
Vice-President's legal attainments. He is not listed in Mar-
tindale-Hubbell's Directory of Lawyers. We do not know
why Mooney thought him an expert in federal jurisdiction.
In any event the responsibility was Mooney's. Counsel
who are admitted to practice in a federal court take on
themselves the obligation to know the relevant law. 14 3
The court uphled the imposition of sanctions against the
law firm.
In Angela Curhmings, Inc. v. Purolator Courier Corp. ,144 the
court held that removal was appropriate because Purola-
tor's misdelivery of a package raised a federal question
under federal common law but not under the Federal Avi-
ation Act. 145 Purolator provided bills of lading to the
plaintiff which stated that it would not accept shipment of
any articles having an actual or declared value in excess of
$25,000. The bills of lading also stated that articles of ex-
traordinary value would be limited to a maximum de-
clared value of $500. On the bills of lading, the plaintiff
declared the value of six items to be $25,000 each but did
not fill in the content description. The packages were
never delivered. Plaintiff sued for breach of the bill of
lading, failure to deliver goods, conversion, and punitive
damages in New York state court. 46 Defendants then re-
142 Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Hillman, 796 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1986).
14. Mooney, 841 F.2d at 1006.
,4 670 F. Supp. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
, Id. at 94.
346 Id. at 93-95.
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moved the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1441 (b). 4 7
Defendants argued that federal jurisdiction was appro-
priate because the Federal Aviation Act 48 empowers the
federal government to prohibit unfair or deceptive prac-
tices by air carriers. But the court rejected this argument
because the section of the Act relied upon does not create
a private right of action.
149
However, the court did agree that federal common law
governed the loss of goods during interstate air transpor-
tation. 50 Prior to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,'5'
federal common law governed air carrier liability and both
the rights and liabilities of airlines and shippers were de-
termined by the shipper's valid tariffs.' 52 Passage of the
Airline Deregulation Act did not eliminate federal com-
mon law regarding limitations of interstate air carrier lia-
bility. 53 Defendant's conduct was, therefore, governed
147 Section 1441(b) provides for removal jurisdiction without regard to diversity
of citizenship, if the action is founded on a claim or right arising under the Consti-
tution, treaties, or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(b) (1982).
,48 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
-, Angela Cummings, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 94; see also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
426 U.S. 290, 302 (1976); Sanders v. Air India, 454 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
.... Angela Cummings, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 94.
15' Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 40(a), 92 Stat. 1744 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1551 (1982 & Supp. I 1984)).
1.52 Angela Cummings, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 94; see North Am. Phillips Corp. v.
Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 223-34 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Congress has
created a broad, comprehensive scheme covering the interstate shipping of
freight, aimed at preventing preferential treatment among shippers and establish-
ing national equality of rates and services. This. has occupied the field to the ex-
clusion of state law."); Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines, 413 F.2d 1401,
1403 (2d Cir. 1969) ("Tariffs filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board if valid, are
conclusive and exclusive; and the rights and liabilities between airlines and their
passengers are governed thereby.").
I.- Angela Cummings, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 94; see Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Great W. Airlines, 767 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[F]ederal law,
rather than state law, controls the resolution of this action. The purpose of dereg-
ulation was to allow competition and the marketplace to determine rates and prac-
tices . . . .Congress, however, has not reliquished complete control over air
transporation .... Given Congress' retention of significant control .... We hold
that federal common law governs."); First Pa. Bank v. Eastern Airlines, 731 F.2d
1113, 1121-22 (3d Cir. 1984) (deregulaton had "no impact upon the applicability
of the federal common law's released value doctrine .... Deregulation deprived
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
by federal common law which confers jurisdiction upon
the federal courts. 154 The court held that the bills of lad-
ing were valid and that the $500 limitation governed the
defendant's liability and the plaintiff's right to
recovery. 155
E. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Zemp v. Boeing Vertol Co. ,156 the United States District
Court remanded to Pennsylvania state court thirty-two
cases that Boeing had removed, citing lack of subject mat-
terjurisdiction. 5 7 The cases arose from the November 6,
1986 crash of a Boeing.Vertol helicopter into the North
Sea. Forty-five of the forty-seven passengers were killed,
as well as the crew. Plaintiffs asserted wrongful death
claims under state law.
Boeing removed the lawsuits to federal court on the ba-
sis of federal question jurisdiction. Boeing contended
that the estates' wrongful death actions should be
recharacterized as arising under the federal Death on the
High Seas Act (DOHSA). 58 Boeing argued that because
DOHSA preempted the state cause of action and pro-
vided a remedy, the plaintiff's wrongful death claims must
arise under DOHSA. 5 9
The court stated that Boeing had submitted no persua-
the C.A.B. of power to determine questions of reasonableness of tariff provisions.
Hence, in effect, it merely did away with the applicability of the doctrine of pri-
mary jurisdiction.").
1-14 Angela Cummings, Inc., 670 F. Supp. at 94.
,c- Id. at 96.
,-- No. 87-1884 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987) (1987 Lexis 6840, 1987 Westlaw
14851).
,.7 Id. The court could find no clear congressional intent to create removal ju-
risdiction. Id.
1- Id. Boeing contended that even though the complaints raised exclusively
state law claims, the claims must nevertheless be recharacterized as federal claims
because of DOHSA. "DOHSA provides a federal wrongful death action in admi-
ralty for deaths caused by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high
seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any State... of the United States."
Id.
159 Id. Boeing argued that DOHSA preempted a Pennsylvania wrongful death
action. Id.
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sive authority or support for expanding the doctrine of
"complete preemption" to cases involving DOHSA. The
legislative history of DOHSA indicated no congressional
intent to preempt state law claims within the scope of
DOHSA so as to subject them to removal to federal
court. 6 ' The court further concluded that because the
complete preemption doctrine did not apply, application
of the well-pleaded complaint rule required remand, even
though a defense of preemption may exist with regard to
the state law wrongful death actions.
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. Admiralty
Comind, Companhia De Seguros v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division of
United Technologies Corp.,6' held that an insurance com-
pany was permitted to bring a subrogated products liabil-
ity claim in admiralty for the loss of a helicopter. The
same court's earlier decision was the first aviation applica-
tion of East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 162 which recognized products liability as part of mari-
time law. The Supreme Court held that liability in admi-
ralty under negligence or products liability could only be
imposed in cases where the defective product malfunc-
tioned and inflicted personal injury on a user or third
party.163
In Comind, United Technologies claimed that the insur-
ance company could not bring a products liability claim
,a" Id. The court stated: "Without some indication from Congress or the Court
that the complete preemption doctrine should be expanded to encompass
DOHSA, I decline to take such a course." Id.
-1 116 F.R.D. 397 (D. Conn. 1987). Comind insured a helicopter owned by
VOTEC, a Brazilian corporation. The helicopter crashed off the coast of Brazil on
March 20, 1980, due to an alleged defect in its rotary mechanism. Comind's claim
arose from the same accident which took the lives of those aboard the helicopter
and, therefore, Comind was permitted to bring its tort claim in admiralty. Id. at
417.
"2 106 S. Ct. 2295 (1986).
',o Id. at 2302. The Court held that when only the product is harmed, the rea-
sons for imposing a tort duty are weak. The Court stated that contractual reme-
dies are more appropriate. Id.
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for purely economic loss. The court rejected this argu-
ment because the loss of the helicopter also involved the
loss of several lives. The defendants argued that under
East River Steamship, economic injury could never be re-
coverable in admiralty, even when the accident involved
the death of several victims. The court rejected this inter-
pretation. Near-misses or disappointed users may not
properly give rise to a tort claim in admiralty, but "situa-
tions involving personal injury as a result of product de-
fect lie at the very heart of negligence and strict products-
liability concerns." 164
United Technologies also argued that state law did not
provide a permissible alternative remedy for the plaintiff.
The court held that a plaintiff who invokes admiralty juris-
diction may also pursue state law remedies, provided that
the state has a significant and pressing interest in the mat-
ter 6 5 and would recognize the claim if the tort had oc-
curred outside of admiralty law. 166 The application of
state law cannot disrupt a pre-existing rule in admiralty
which requires uniformity, and the plaintiff must have an
independent jurisdictional basis for its state law claim.
Therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to pursue existing
state law causes of action which did not conflict with fed-
eral admiralty law. The court found no disharmony be-
tween state law and federal maritime law.
B. Government Contractor Defense
For the past several years, the courts have sharply di-
164 Comind, 116 F.R.D. at 423-24. The court stated that "[p]arties injured as a
result of this latter type [strict products-liability] of products disaster are entitled
to lay full claim to the salutory liability roles embodied in negligence and strict
products liability concepts." Id. at 424.
-.. East River Steamship, 106 S. Ct. at 2299 n.2 (citing Kossick v. United Fruit
Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961)). The East River Steamship court held that the state lacked
a pressing and significant interest in the tort action. Id.
1... Comind, 116 F.R.D. at 417. The court stated that because (1) admiralty juris-
diction was not exclusive; (2) admiralty law did not preempt the state law claim;
and (3) the court would otherwise have proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 to hear the state law claims, Comind was entitled to pursue its state law
claims in addition to its admiralty claims. Id.
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vided over the question of whether a government contrac-
tor who manufactures a product to government
specifications may be sued for product liability by an in-
jured serviceman. In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,167
the United States Supreme Court recognized the govern-
ment contractor defense, holding that the federal govern-
ment's interest in the procurement of equipment was
paramount to the right of states to impose liability under
tort law. The Court held that the state-imposed duty of
care, which was the asserted basis of the contractor's lia-
bility (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the
sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was nec-
essary), was precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the
government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver
helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism
shown by the specifications). Accordingly, the Court held
that liability for design defects in military equipment
could not be imposed pursuant to state law when: (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise specifications;
(2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and
(3) the supplier warned the United States about the dan-
gers in the use of the equipment that were known to the
supplier but not to the United States. Notably, the Court
held that such a defense would apply whether or not the
claimant was a serviceman barred from suing the govern-
ment directly under the Feres doctrine 68 and specifically
rejected the more liberal formulation of the government
contractor defense adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in
Shaw v. Grumann Aerospace Corp. 169 The government con-
tractor defense was also considered in the following lower
court cases, which were decided before Boyle. These cases
should be read with caution in light of the Supreme
Court's more recent ruling.
167 56 U.S.L.W. 4792 (U.S. Jun. 27, 1988) (1988 U.S. LEXIS 2880).
-. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
"w, 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1 1th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3632
(U.S. Mar. 17, 1986) (No. 85-1529).
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In Ramey v. Martin-Baker Aircraft Co.,17° a district court
held that the government contractor defense was not lim-
ited to bar only claims by servicemen. 17 ' The court
granted summary judgment for the government contrac-
tor in a case alleging a design defect in an E-18 ejection
seat even though the injured party was a civilian aircraft
mechanic. The court distinguished the duty of the manu-
facturer to warn of known defects. The case was re-
manded and the parties directed to brief whether a
distinction existed in the allegations of defective design
and the duty-to-warn. The court later found that the
duty-to-warn claim was in effect a design-defect claim and
was consequently barred by the government contractor
defense.
In Wilson v. Boeing CO. ,172 a district court reiterated the
government contractor defense in dismissing the case in-
volving oil contamination in the engine of a CH-46D heli-
copter. The oil problem ultimately caused a fatal
emergency landing at sea. Plaintiffs had already settled
with Boeing, the manufacturer of the plane. General
Electric was the manufacturer of the engine, which the
plaintiff claimed had a defectively-designed lubrication
system and lacked a warning device. The court deter-
mined that the engine manufacturer complied with the
specifications and did not have superior knowledge of the
lubrication problem. The court rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment that the contractor must show continuous discussion
or negotiation regarding the item, stating: "This is not the
formulation of the defense adoptea by the Third Circuit
in Koutsoubos. It is sufficient for the contractor to show...
that the overall detailed specification was established or
,71 656 F. Supp. 984 (D. Md. 1987).
17' Id. at 987. The government contractor defense states that if a product is
manufactured according to government specifications, the manufacturer is enti-
tled to share in the government's privilege of immunity. Id.
172 655 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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approved by the government."'' 7 3
C. Proof of Defect
In Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., t7 the New York
Court of Appeals ruled that an employee of a commuter
airline could recover from the original part manufacturer
for injuries allegedly caused by a defective aft hangar,
even though the owner of the aircraft had substituted a
fabricated replacement for the original part. The aft han-
gar is a device used to hold one end of a portable ladder.
At the time of injury, the plaintiff-employee had finished
unloading baggage and was preparing to jump from the
aircraft's baggage compartment. As she did so, the mid-
dle finger of her left hand caught on the aft hangar and, as
a result, the plaintiff's finger was amputated.
After a jury trial, it was found that the aft hangar was a
replacement part of substantially the same design as the
original. The jury found the design to be defective and
that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury. The plaintiff was awarded $185,000.
The Appellate Division reversed, 75 finding that the trial
court had misinterpreted Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Divi-
sion, 1 76 which held that a manufacturer can be liable if the
original product is modified in an unsubstantial manner.
17. Id. at 773 (construing Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, 755 F.2d 352 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985)).
The Koutsoubos court adopted a three-part test to establish the government con-
tractor defense: (1) the contractor must prove that the government established
specifications; (2) the product met those specifications; and (3) the government
knew as much or more than the contractor about the hazards of the product. Kout-
soubos, 755 F.2d at 354.
The plaintiff argued that the first prong of the Koutsoubos test required "the con-
tractor to show that there were continuous back and forth discussions or negotia-
tions regarding the inclusion or exclusion of the specific design deficiency alleged
in this case." Wilson, 655 F. Supp. at 773.
174 70 N.Y.2d, 517 N.E.2d 1304, 523 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1987).
175 Sage v. Fairchild-Swearingen Corp., 126 A.D.2d 914, 511 N.Y.S.2d 432, 434
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
17,; 49 N.Y.2d 471, 403 N.E.2d 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (1980) (holding that
a manufacturer is not liable on a products liability or negligence cause of action
where the owner substantially modifies the product).
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Robinson did not address the issue of total replacement of
the part. However, the New York Court of Appeals re-
versed, finding that plaintiff presented a "tenable claim"
and noted that she established a prima facie case. 17 7
Plaintiff's expert testified that the replacement part ap-
peared to have the same dangerous design as the original
part. 7 8 Ordering a new trial, the court held that there
was a "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences
which could lead rational men to the conclusion reached
by the jury."'t 79
Norris v. Bell Helicopter Textron 180 held that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that excessive flapping of rabbit ears con-
stituted a design defect. Even if a design defect existed,
the plaintiffs failed to show this directly caused a Bell heli-
copter crash in 1980. The court stated that "lapse of
time, inadequate 'accounting' for use between manufac-
ture and accident, and alterations and repairs by persons
other than the manufacturer will tend to negate the infer-
ence of a defect existing at the time of manufacture."''
The court noted, however, that mere alterations and re-
pairs alone do not exculpate a manufacturer from liability.
D. Exculpatory Clause
In Continental Airlines v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. ,182 the
Ninth Circuit held that an exculpatory clause in a contract
for the sale of an airplane did not shield a parts manufac-
turer from liability where the parts were not included in
the repair warranty. The purchase contract between Con-
tinental and McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) in-
cluded a limited warranty. 83 MDC agreed to repair all
177 Sage, 517 N.E.2d at 1308.
,79 Id. "[P]hotographs presented to the jury permitted them to compare the
parts and reach a similar conclusion." Id.
179 Id. (quoting Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 382 N.E.2d
1145, 410 N.Y.S.2d 282, (1978)).
495 So. 2d 976 (La. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 499 So. 2d 85 (La. 1987).
Id. at 978.
1.2 819 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1987).
I' Id. at 1521.
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parts of the aircraft manufactured by MDC or by other
manufacturers, as long as their parts were made to MDC's
design specifications. 84 An exculpatory clause in the con-
tract with MDC excluded all remedies against MDC other
than those provided by the "warranty and service life pol-
icy." ' 8 5 In 1978, a DC-10 aborted its takeoff when two of
the front tires failed. The subsequent crash and fire de-
stroyed the plane and caused four fatalities. The court re-
manded the case to the district court to determine
whether the warranty in fact reached the component parts
involved. The court affirmed the district court's ruling
that the exculpatory clause barred Continental's negli-
gence and strict liability claims against MDC. However,
the court remanded on the issue of whether the exculpa-
tory clause barred any property damage recovery against
the tire companies.
The lower court had relied on an earlier Ninth Circuit
case which held that an exculpatory clause barred suit
against parts manufacturers. 86 The earlier case reasoned
that an airline could recover from the parts manufacturer
who would then simply seek indemnity from the manufac-
turer.' 87 But here the exculpatory clause differed. This
warranty covered other manufacturers' parts only if those
parts were made to MDC's specifications. 8
Piper Acceptance Corp. v. Barton 189 arose after the defend-
ant, Barton, purchased an allegedly defective Piper Sen-
eca III aircraft. The court held that he could not sue
Piper Aircraft Corporation (Piper) on a strict liability the-
ory because Piper was a remote manufacturer. Barton
'" Id. at 1526.
" Id. at 1529.
Id. at 1528. The lower court relied on Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 677 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1982) (airline, by way of an exculpa-
tory clause, waived its consequential damage remedies in return for
manufacturer's promise to provide valuable servicing of component parts that al-
legedly caused the accident). Id.
1.7 Aeronaves de Mexico, 677 F.2d at 773. The Aeronaves de Mexico court feared the
airline would receive a windfall of free repairs plus consequential damages. Id.
Continental Airlines, 819 F.2d at 1528.
No. 83 Civ. 4998 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 1987) (1987 Westlaw 5801).
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purchased the aircraft on October 9, 1981 from Piper Ac-
ceptance Corp (PAC). After six months of unsuccessful
attempts to repair the aircraft, Barton stopped making
payments. PAC repossessed and resold the aircraft. Also,
PAC sought to recover its loss and Barton cross-claimed
against Piper for his economic loss.
The court concluded that implied warranties do not run
to remote purchasers. Barton did not purchase the air-
craft directly from Piper and he alleged no personal in-
jury. Therefore, implied warranties did not run to his
benefit. Piper's warranty included an exclusion for conse-
quential damages. Relying on Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Al-
lis-Chalmers Corp.,190  the court concluded that the
consequential damage exclusion remained effective even
if Barton's limited remedy failed of its essential
purpose. '91
E. Evidence
In Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,192 the Eleventh Circuit,
en banc, divided evenly on the scope of admissibility of fac-
tual findings contained in a Navy Judge Advocate General
report. The effect of the stalemate was to let stand the
panel decision, 193 which held that "evaluative conclusions
and opinions" such as those contained in the report
should not have been admitted by the trial court. 9 4
In Krause v. American Aerolights, Inc. ,195 the Oregon Court
of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of the defend-
-, 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (harvesting machine's
consequential damages exclusion valid unless unconscionable, despite a separate,
limited remedy of repair clause which failed in its essential purpose).
.. N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 2-719(2) (McKinney 1964) provides that when a limita-
tion of remedy "fail[s] of its essential purpose," the aggrieved party may seek any
other remedy under the U.C.C.
827 F.2d 1498 (11 th Cir. 1987).
784 F.2d 1523 (1 th Cir. 1986).
,'4 Id. at 1528. The court relied on the Fifth Circuit's interpretation in Smith v.
Ithaca Corp., 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980), where a narrow reading of the "factual
finding" language in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) prevailed. Id. at 1527-28.
... 88 Or. App. 383, 745 P.2d 796 (1987), reh'ggranted, 305 Or. 102, 750 P.2d
496 (1988).
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ants, who manufactured and sold an ultralight. The court
held that the trial court had erred in failing to admit evi-
dence of post-accident remedial measures in a products
liability case.' 96 The court reasoned that while post-acci-
dent measures are of marginal relevancy in a negligence
case, they can be highly probative of whether a defect in
the product existed at the time of the accident. 97 More-
over, the court noted that since the manufacturer's
"fault" is not at issue in a strict liability case, admission of
such evidence would be less likely to prejudice the de-
fendant than would the admission of such evidence in a
negligence action. 98 The Oregon Supreme Court ac-
cepted review and has heard oral argument. As of this
writing, the decision is still under advisement.
III. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. Feres Doctrine
In United States v. Johnson,' 99 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and ruled that the
Feres200 doctrine barred a Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA)20' wrongful death action arising from damages
suffered incident to military service, even when the negli-
gent act was committed by a civilian employee of the fed-
eral government. The Eleventh Circuit had held that a
suit against a civilian air traffic controller was not barred
by the Feres doctrine.20 2 The case arose from the death of
a Coast Guard helicopter pilot. The pilot requested radar
assistance from air traffic controllers, who vectored him
u d. 745 P.2d at 800.
197 Id. at 798.
.. Id. at 798-99.
107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
2. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
21, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1986).
'"1 Johnson v. United States, 749 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 107 S. Ct.
2063 (1987). The Feres doctrine bars tort suits on behalf of service members
against the government based upon service-related injuries. Feres, 340 U.S. at
146.
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into the side of a mountain in IFR conditions. 3  The
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit. It rea-
soned that the Feres doctrine had been used consistently
for forty years, and the Court had never suggested that
the military status of the alleged tortfeasor was crucial to
the application of the doctrine. Here, the crash arose di-
rectly from Johnson's military service. The Court stated:
"[T]he potential that this suit could implicate military dis-
cipline is substantial. ' 20 4 The decisions of military per-
sonnel would be subjected to scrutiny if the case
proceeded to trial.
In Walls v. United States, 20 5 an active duty service mem-
ber of the United States Army was injured in the crash of
an Air Force Aero Club airplane.20 6 Walls and the pilot
were on their way to Sacramento, California to visit family
members. The investigation concluded that the crash was
caused by the pilot's gross negligence. The Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld dismissal of the action under the Feres doc-
trine, which bars claims against the government brought
by servicemen injured incident to military service.
Relying on Woodside v. United States,2 °7 the court held
that an activity was incident to military service where it
was provided directly by the military or where there was
substantial involvement by the Armed Forces in the activ-
ity. The court concluded that if Walls could sue for inju-
ries resulting from activities related to the Aero Club,
serious adverse effects regarding military discipline and
relationships could develop.
203Johnson, 749 F.2d at 1531.
2- Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2069.
20", 832 F.2d 93 (7th Cir. 1987).
206 See Air Force Regulation 215-1, vol. II (April 12, 1974) at 5. Air Force Aero
Clubs are established and operated as non-appropriated instrumentalities of the
United States under the control of the Air Force. Walls, 832 F.2d at 94 n.2.
21)7 606 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 904 (1980) (wrongful
death claim against government is barred where Air Force officer was killed while
receiving flight instruction from an Air Force Aero Club, an activity "incident to
service" under the Feres doctrine).
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B. Air Traffic Control
In Barbosa v. United States,20 8 the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed a district court ruling that a pilot had the duty to
obtain further weather information when prior informa-
tion suggested a need to inquire.20 9 Plaintiff failed to ask
for an updated weather briefing, even though his weather
briefing was more than one hour old. 21 0 The court held
that supplying weather information was an "additional
service" to be supplied by controllers to "the extent pos-
sible" and conditioned on the limitations of radar and
higher priority duties.2 ' In addition, the Air Traffic Con-
trol Manual did not set forth mandatory duties on the part
of Air Traffic Controllers to provide weather informa-
tion.2t 2 The court determined that the briefing indicated
the presence of thunderstorms inland and reduced visibil-
ity along the coast and sufficiently notified the pilot of ac-
tual conditions.21 3 Moreover, the court upheld the district
courts' finding that plaintiff operated the aircraft in viola-
tion of standard practices and assumed the risk of flying
2- 811 F.2d 1444 (11th Cir. 1987). Barbosa (the pilot) and two passengers
died in the crash of a Beechcraft twin-engine plane on July 19, 1981. Personal
represenatives of the three victims alleged the air traffic controllers and weather
briefer were negligent and sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Id. at 1445.
209 Id. at 1446.
2 Id. Barbosa requested a weather briefing at 3:54 P.M. before the plane left
Opa-Locka, Florida, at 4:00 P.M. After takeoff, Barbosa reported observing thun-
derstorms and asked for weather information for his destination in Jacksonville,
Florida. He did not request any further weather information. The plane crashed
at 5:11 P.M. Id. at 1445-46.
211 Id. at 1447. The court accepted the Air Traffic Control Manual's provision
instructing controllers to disseminate weather information as an "additional ser-
vice." AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS MANUAL (ATCM) 7110.656, § 3, 50. The limits
and conditions accepted by the court on this "service" are similarly found in the
ATCM. Id. at 7110.6513, § 3, 45.
212 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS MANUAL § 50, a & b. Quoting from the manual,
the court determined the controller would only have such a duty if the pilot re-
quested weather information. Barbosa, 811 F.2d at 1447. Barbosa did not request
it. Id.
21.1 Barbosa, 811 F.2d at 1447. Though plaintiffs alleged the original weather
briefing was inaccurate, the court was not persuaded and stressed that the briefing
was only a statement of current conditions. It did not purport to forecast future
conditions. Id.
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under adverse weather conditions.21 4
In Haley v. United States, 5 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding that the air traffic controller's
negligence was not the proximate cause of the crash.21 6
Plaintiffs argued that the air traffic controller could have
substantially reduced the risk of a crash by directing the
airplane toward an interstate highway rather than di-
recting it over hilly terrain toward an unlit airport.1 7
However, there was evidence that, given the poor weather
conditions, it would have been difficult to find the inter-
state highway from the air. 1 8
The defendent produced evidence to support the dis-
trict court's finding that carburetor icing and the pilot's
failure to use carburetor heat (the plane was found with
the engine heater switch in the "off" position) caused the
engine failure and proximately caused the accident.21 9
There was testimony to support the district court's finding
that the initial re-route of the airplane did not send it into
substantially worse weather that it would have otherwise
encountered. 220  The court concluded that although the
conflict in the evidence could have been resolved differ-
ently, the district court's factual findings were not clearly
2 4 Id. at 1445. The court concluded that once Barbosa was en route, and could
observe weather conditions, "[h]is decision to continue his flight was his own de-
cision based on accurate weather information." Id. at 1448.
2 - 829 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir.) (mem.), aff'g 654 F. Supp. 481 (W.D.N.C. 1987).
Haley is a consolidation of three wrongful death actions filed by the representa-
tives of the pilot and two passengers killed in the crash of a chartered plane on
February 22, 1983, in North Carolina. Id. 654 F. Supp. at 482.
211 Id. 654 F. Supp. at 487. The court held that "a mere conjecture or surmise"
that the controller's negligence aggravated an inevitable crash was not sufficient
proof for recovery. Id.
217 Id. at 486. While admitting the crash was inevitable, plaintiffs argued that a
highway landing would have afforded a better chance of survival. Id.
218 Id. Indeed, the only evidence as to the highway's condition appears to be
that "but for a short stretch" it was not lighted. Id.
2'" Id. at 487. The court was persuaded by the government's experts that car-
buretor icing caused a "loss in manifold pressure, then the total loss of power,
then the fatal crash." Id.
221, Id. at 484 (finding that "the weather in the entire relevant flight area was
substantially the same.").
1988]
40 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
erroneous.
2 2 1
In McGory v. United States,222 a district court found no
liability on behalf of the United States for air traffic con-
trol's (ATC) actions in providing radar vectors and infor-
mation to a pilot.22' The proximate cause of the accident
was an aircraft malfunction. 24 Evidence suggested that
the malfunction, in turn, may have been caused by loss of
power from lack of fuel.225
In Springer v. United States,2 2 6 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the admission of testimony of a plaintiff's weather expert
concerning wind shear, without underlying factual foun-
dation. The air traffic controllers were found to have
given no notice of adverse wind conditions. 227  This
breach, by omission, proximately caused a crash.228
In Norwest Capital Management & Trust Co. v. United
States,2 29 the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court and
held that the FAA Flight Service Station (FSS) 23° special-
ists were negligent in providing a preflight weather brief-
ing to the pilot of a Beech Baron that crashed, allegedly
due to icing. The trial court found that plaintiffs had
failed to prove the proximate cause of the crash, but the
2' Id. at 488.
222 651 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ohio 1987). McGoy is a consolidation of five
wrongful death suits brought by representatives of the victims of a November,
1983 crash in Pennsylvania. Id. at 1337.
22. Id. at 1342. The court concluded that the controller had responded quickly
and accurately to the pilot's request for help, and that "he provided all of the
assistance proper under an emergency setting." Id.
22 Id.
2. Id. The trial record showed that the plane had no fuel in its fuel lines or in
its tanks after the crash. Id.
22,i 819 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987) (mem.), aff'g 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986).
The representative of the deceased pilot, Jon Ricky Springer, brought this suit
alleging a negligent failure to warn of wind shear as the cause of the crash. Id.
641 F. Supp. at 914-5.
227 Id. 641 F. Supp. at 925.
2'2, Id. at 936.
22, 828 F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1987). Estates of the pilot and passengers of a 1980
plane crash in South Dakota brought this suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
claiming a failure to warn of dangerous weather conditions. Id. at 1333.
2.1" The court describes an FSS as "a Federal Aviation Administration air traffic
facility that provides services to airmen such as weather briefings, receiving and
processing flight plans, and communicating with airborne aircraft." Id. at 1332.
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The pilot called the FSS at 5:40 A.M. for a weather
briefing. The FSS specialist gave the pilot a briefing, but
did not mention forecast icing, because the icing forecast
was old and an updated area forecast was expected at 6:00
A.M. The pilot said he would call in again at 6:00 A.M.
However, when the pilot called, the call was taken by an-
other FSS specialist who was unaware of the prior call and
did not give a full weather briefing. The Eighth Circuit, in
effect, re-weighed the facts, found the government liable,
and remanded for a determination of the comparative
fault between the pilot and the government and for as-
sessment of damages.232 The court also held that the trial
court's determination that the pilot and passenger were
engaged in a joint enterprise for purposes of contributory
negligence was clearly erroneous.233 Although they were
the president and assistant manager of the same company,
going on a business flight, the passenger had no responsi-
bility for operation of the aircraft and was not a pilot.
Moreover, the pilot's negligence occurred on the ground
before the flight took off.234 The decision evoked a strong
dissent, on the basis that the court had transgressed the
clearly erroneous rule by substituting its own findings for
those of the trial court.23 5
In Moorhead v. Mitsubishi Aircraft International, Inc.,2 3 6 the
Fifth Circuit held that (1) an FAA weather briefer was not
negligent in failing to tell a pilot of moderate mixed icing
"2: Id. at 1337. Indeed, the court of appeals determined that the district court's
findings as to proximate cause were "both devoid of evidentiary support and mis-
taken." Id.
'232 Id. at 1345. The pivotal fact in the determination of the government's negli-
gence was the failure of the FSS specialist to give an updated forecast, because
-[c]omplete information means current information." Id. at 1333.
233 Id. at 1345.
Id. at 1343.
-: Id. at 1347 (Gibson, J., concurring and dissenting).
... 828 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1987). Claims of negligence and strict liability were
brought against the United States and Mitsubishi after a fatal crash in Texas. Id.
at 281.
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along the flight path;237 (2) the defective manufacture of
the Mitsubishi's airspeed indicator contributed to the
crash; 238 and (3) the IFR-rated pilot's decision to enter
into clouds was not negligent.23 9
On September 2, 1981, a Mitsubishi MU-2B-25 airplane
accumulated ice and crashed near McLeod, Texas. The
crash killed all five occupants. Two hours before depart-
ing, the pilot received a weather briefing which included
several reports of thundershowers and precipitation of
unknown intensity along the expected flight path. The
briefer did not tell the pilot about the forecast of moder-
ate mixed icing, nor did the briefer report the freezing
level. The aircraft departed and climbed to 21,000 feet.
The aircraft began to accumulate ice, causing it to lose
velocity. The pilot then requested permission to climb to
23,000 feet. The aircraft reached 21,400 feet and an air-
speed of 125 knots, at which point the aircraft stalled, en-
tered a spin, and struck the ground.
The district court found that the weather briefer was
not negligent and that his conduct was not a proximate
cause of the accident. The court also found that Mitsub-
ishi was forty percent responsible for the defective air-
speed indicator and that the pilot was sixty percent
responsible. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding that
the evidence established that the weather briefer correctly
gave the pilot information having a higher priority than
the icing forecast. 240 The briefer also acted reasonably in
discounting the importance of the icing forecast because
the area forecast was seven hours old and not verified by
any pilot reports. Any failure to warn of possible icing
was not a proximate cause of the fatal crash, in light of the
intervening negligence of Mitsubishi24 ' and the pilot. 242
Evidence established that moisture froze in the pitot
237 Id. at 283.
2.18 Id. at 284.
2... Id. at 285.
2-," Id. at 281.
2-1 Id. at 284.
2"- Id. at 285. rhe court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the
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tube, trapping the pressure and causing the indicated air-
speed to increase with altitude. As a result, the pilot's air-
speed readings gave him no indication that the
accumulating ice was slowing the aircraft. Evidence indi-
cated that Mitsubishi's pilot system had previously mal-
functioned in a similar fashion, and warnings had been
issued to Mitsubishi pilots and owners to modify the sys-
tem. However, the maintenance records established that
the aircraft had an unmodified pitot system.
The appellate court reversed the district court's finding
that the pilot was negligent in entering the cloud respon-
sible for his demise.2 43 Witnesses testified that icing en-
counters of this magnitude were rarely hazardous and
were routinely handled by descending below the freezing
level. Further, it was not per se unreasonable for the pilot
knowingly to risk an encounter with moderate icing be-
cause the pilot was instrument-rated. The court affirmed
the finding that the pilot was negligent for not descending
immediately to escape the icing conditions. 244 The court
further concluded that the pilot was negligent for mis-
managing the stall. Evidence revealed that the pilot was
too short in stature to depress the rudder pedals as fully
as is necessary to prevent or control a spin.245
The district court had denied damages for the plain-
tiff's mental anguish and loss of inheritance. After this
judgment, the Texas Supreme Court abolished the physi-
cal manifestation requirement in wrongful death cases.246
Accordingly, the case was remanded for consideration of
the plaintiff's claim for mental anguish. It was found that
the district court had included compensation for the
plaintiff's loss of inheritance because the court's award in-
ultimate cause of the crash was a pilot-induced spin, caused by the pilot's misman-
aging the plane's controls. Id. at 286.
2 13 Id. at 285.
Id. at 286.
2 Id. Testimony was given that the pilot had been advised to fly with his seat
in its full-forward position to compensate for his lack of height. The pilot's seat,
however, was found locked several inches back from that position. Id.
.... Moore v. Lillebro, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1986).
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cluded both the portion of the salary that would have
been spent to support the plaintiffs and any amount the
decedents would have saved. 47
Rodriquez v. United States248 affirmed the trial court's
finding of ATC negligence in a VFR 249 mid-air collision
case but remanded for additional findings on the pilot's
negligence. Rodriquez was administering a biennial flight
review to Thomas in a Cessna 172 ("98V"). Diaz, a stu-
dent pilot, was practicing touch-and-go landings in the
traffic pattern ("21U"). The Cessna was instructed to fly
an overhead approach to the airport. Finnerman, an FAA-
certified traffic controller, and a trainee were monitoring
the pattern. The Cessna entered the pattern. The con-
troller trainee realized the dangerous course 98V was
about to embark on and advised the controller. The con-
troller said: "Start a right turn now sir." The Cessna did
not execute an immediate right turn. The controller
looked away momentarily. As his glance returned to the
monitor he said: "On the downwind, watch the traffic
coming in from overhead sir!" At this time there were
three other aircraft on the downwind leg. The Cessna
collided with 21U resulting in the death of 98V's two oc-
cupants. The survivors of the deceased pilots brought suit
against the United States under the FTCA. The district
court concluded that the air traffic controller's negligence
was the sole cause of the collision.
The court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the
air traffic controller was negligent because he failed to
comply with the Air Traffic Control Handbook.250 Once
the controller realized 98V was in an unsafe circumstance,
2#7 Moorhead, 828 F.2d at 291.
2- 823 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1987). This Federal Tort Claims Act claim was
brought by the estates of pilot Rodriquez and student-pilot Thomas, alleging neg-
ligence by the air traffic controller who allowed a plane to join a pattern the Rod-
riquez plane was already following. The planes collided in midair. Id. at 739.
,11! Under visual flight rules (VFR), a pilot flies, literally, according to what he
sees. Id. at 742. VFR was appropriate in this case because weather conditions
were clear, and visibility extended to twenty-five miles. Id. at 737.
25I Id. at 740. The court acknowledged that the duties of the controller were
those set forth in this handbook. Id.
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he was required to issue a traffic alert which instructed the
pilot to comply with altitude and heading parameters.
The controller failed to do this. He did not use any terms
generally understood as compelling immediate action and
he failed to give the reason for the immediate right turn.
The warning issued ten seconds prior to the collision was
insufficient to notify either 98V or 21U that the warning
was directed toward them.
The district court had found no pilot negligence, stat-
ing that the government had the burden of ruling out the
reasonable or likely possibility that various distractions,
rather than the pilots' negligence, were the cause of 98V's
failure to see and avoid 21U, and held that the govern-
ment failed to meet this burden. The appellate court held
that the pilots' breach of duty to see and avoid other air-
craft2 5 1 was not excused simply because they were operat-
ing in compliance with the controller's instructions. The
court also noted that the pilots of 98V failed to follow
right-of-way rules, 2  another indication that the pilots
were not carrying out their duty to see and avoid other
aircraft. The court concluded that there was no basis in
the record to support the district court's finding that the
pilots were distracted or could not have seen 21U had
they looked. Therefore, the finding was clearly erroneous.
The issue of comparative negligence was remanded to de-
termine the percentage of fault of the 98V pilots and to
apportion fault between them.
C. Navaids
In Behling v. United States,253 plaintiffs contended the
2-1' This duty is outlined in 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1988), which provides in part:
"When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is con-
ducted under [IFRI or [VFR], vigilance shall be maintained by each person oper-
ating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft in compliance with this
section." Id.
2,12 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.67(e), (f(1988) provide that an overtaking aircraft shall "al-
ter course to the right to pass well clear" of the overtaken aircraft, and that when
two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, "the
aircraft at the lower altitude has the right of way." Id.
2r... 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,135 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1987).
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FAA caused a Cheyenne to crash because of a non-func-
tioning middle marker, which confused the pilot and
caused him to impact rising terrain less than two miles
from the end of the runway. The district court concluded
that the marker functioned properly, and that if any defect
existed, it was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The proximate cause was the pilot's failure to execute a
missed approach at decision height.254
In addition, the court held the discretionary function
exception precluded liability. 255 The FAA has discretion-
ary authority to prescribe maintenance procedures for a
middle marker. The court noted that liability would not
be precluded, however, for negligence arising out of tech-
nical errors, such as negligent replacement of a fuse.
D. Independent Contractors
In Letnes v. United States, 56 the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court's finding that the decedent, a co-pilot em-
ployed by Waig Aircraft, which was under contract to the
Forest Service, was an employee of the government for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.257 On Decem-
ber 2, 1980, a mid-air collision occurred between Indio
and Palm Springs, California. One aircraft landed safely
at Palm Springs airport while the other aircraft crashed in
the desert, killing the pilot and the co-pilot.
The government may be sued for failing to supervise a
government contractor and its employees if the govern-
ment has the authority to control the detailed physical
performance of the contractor and supervises its day to
day operations.2 58 The Ninth Circuit stated, however, that
the mere ability to compel compliance with federal regula-
tions did not transform a contractor's personnel into fed-
.4 Id. at 18,147.
2-15 Id. at 18,142.
820 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1519. The court of appeals determined the pilot was not a federal
employee because there was no substantial supervision over his day-to-day opera-
tions. Id.
-,, Id. at 1518 (citing United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976)).
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eral employees. The court held that the district court
erred in finding that Waig's pilots were Forest Service em-
ployees. The contract, which included maximum operat-
ing periods between maintenance, weight and balance
requirements, engine overhaul procedures, and detailed
equipment provisions, was designed to secure minimum
safety, not to control the detailed physical operation of
the aircraft or the activities of a pilot. The court further
stated that the government's ability to tell Waig's pilots
where a fire was and where to drop the fire retardant was
insufficient to indicate the supervision over the physical
details of the pilot's daily operations necessary for em-
ployee status.
E. Discretionary Function
In Heller v. United States,219 the plaintiff was a profes-
sional airline pilot who was diagnosed as having had a my-
ocardial infarction in January, 1972. As a result, his
treating physician provided a medical report to an Avia-
tion Medical Examiner (AME), 2 60 and the AME withdrew
Heller's medical certificate because he had an "estab-
lished medical history or clinical diagnosis of ... myocar-
dial infarction."'2 6 1 After numerous attempts to become
recertified or to obtain an exemption, the plaintiff finally
received an exemption seven years later and sued the
FAA, claiming that the denial of his medical certificate was
caused by negligent investigation, data collection, data
production, and diagnostic procedures. He claimed that
the FAA failed to consult his 1968 electrocardiogram and
that denial of his certification was based solely on the
FAA's negligent application of the medical standard con-
tained in the regulations. The district court dismissed his
2m, 803 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).
2 14 C.F.R. § 183.21(c) (1988). An Aviation Medical Examiner may, subject
to reconsideration by the Federal Air Surgeon or his representatives, issue or
deny medical certificates. Id.
,, Heller, 803 F.2d at 1561. "To be eligible for a first-class medical certificate,
an applicant must [have] . . . [n]o established medical or clinical diagnosis of.
[m]yocardial infarction." 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.13(a),(e)(1)(I)(1988).
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claim as barred by the discretionary function exception
and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that
the FAA's medical standards could be divided into three
categories: 1) standards that leave little or no discretion
to the FAA; 2) standards that require the exercise of medi-
cal judgment but no balancing of competing policies; and
3) standards that require the FAA to balance a medical
judgment with a calculation of whether the applicant's
medical condition permits him to perform his duties
safely.262 The court found that the standard at issue re-
quired a sufficient balancing of policy considerations con-
cerning air safety to implicate the discretion ary function
exception.
In West v. Federal Aviation Administration,2 63 the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction, 264 holding that the design of a
departure procedure for Bishop Airport was an exercise
of discretion under the Federal Aviation Act2 65 and, there-
fore, was subject to the discretionary function exception
to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).2 66
The action arose when a Sierra Pacific charter aircraft
-v Heller, 803 F.2d at 1565.
2. 830 F.2d 1044 (9th Cir. 1987).
* ( Id. at 1049.
2... 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(6) (1982).
(a) The Administrator [Secretary of Transportation] is empowered
and it shall be his duty to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing and revising from time to time: (b)
Such reasonable rules and regulations, or minimum standards, gov-
erning other practices, methods, and procedures, as the Administra-
tor [Secretary of Transportation] may find necessary to provide
adequately for national security and safety in air commerce.
Id.
I.266 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title [28
U.S.C.] shall not apply for (a) Any claim based upon an act or omis-
sion of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the
execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or perform or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agancy or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.
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struck a slope of the White Mountains as the pilot at-
tempted to depart from the Bishop Airport. The district
court found that the cause of the accident was a lack of
sufficient ground lighting, resulting in a visual phenome-
non whereby pilots flying on dark nights could be misled
into believing they were closer to the airport than they
actually were. The FAA employees were aware of the
phenomenon but took no steps to determine whether it
existed at Bishop Airport. The FAA did not make a night
flight check of the departure procedure.
Relying on United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense267 the court concluded that the FAA's determi-
nation of the extent to which it would supervise the safety
of private individuals was an activity within the discretion-
ary function exception. The court held that the FAA em-
ployees who were responsible for the design of the Bishop
Airport departure procedure were given wide discretion
and used their best judgment to determine which tests
were appropriate to meet reasonable safety standards.
F. Miscellaneous
In Mooney v. United States,268 the court denied the gov-
ernment's motion to dismiss a "negligent rescue"
claim. 269 On June 12, 1982, shortly after take-off, radar
control of a Grumman aircraft was passed over to the FAA
at the Terminal Radar Control Center at Westbury, New
York. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft disappeared. Search
procedures were initiated three days after the disappear-
ance, but the airplane and the decedent were never found.
The plaintiff alleged that the passenger had survived
267 467 U.S. 797 (1984) (holding actions against FAA for its alleged negligence
in certifying aircraft for use in commercial aviation were barred by the discretion-
ary function exception of the FTCA).
2- 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,059 (E.D.N.Y. April 9, 1987)(1987
Westlaw 9683).
269 See generally 35 AM. JuR. 2D Federal Tort Claims Act § 84 (1967). If an agency
of the government attempts a rescue, the government may be liable for the negli-
gence of its agents in carrying out the attempt to the extent a private individual
would be liable under the Good Samaritan doctrine under applicable state law.
Id.
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the crash and would have been rescued but for the negli-
gence of the FAA. The plaintiff also alleged that the mon-
itoring of the aircraft was conducted in a negligent
manner. The government contended that the complaint
did not state a claim for relief because the plaintiff could
not prove that the decedent had in fact survived. How-
ever, the plaintiff produced expert opinions and data that
indicated a possibility that a timely air/sea rescue could
have saved the decedent's life. The court held that the
complaint was not subject to dismissal because it was le-
gally sufficient and entitled the plaintiff to proceed with
discovery and offer evidence in support of his claim.
In Dyer v. United States,270 the Ninth Circuit held that the
government was not liable for an airplane crash caused
when a small airplane got caught in the wake turbulence
of a large Coast Guard helicopter, landing in the traffic
pattern ahead of the airplane, at an uncontrolled field.
Plaintiff contended that the helicopter pilot was negligent
per se in violating Federal Aviation Regulations,.2 7 which
require a helicopter landing at an uncontrolled field to
"avoid the flow of fixed-wing aircraft. '272 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the Coast Guard pilot did not violate this
regulation because he could not tell that the fixed-wing
aircraft was in the pattern when the helicopter initiated its
approach. The court further held that the sole responsi-
bility for avoiding the crash was with the pilot of the
airplane.
IV. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
In Bell Helicopter v. United States, 273 the Ninth Circuit held
that what Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States274 giveth,
27o 832 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1987).
271 14 C.F.R. § 91.89(a)(2) (1988). "(a) Each person operating an aircraft to or
from an airport without an operating control tower shall .. .(2) In the case of a
helicopter approaching to land, avoid the flow of fixed-wing aircraft. Id.
22Id.
27!1 833 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1987).
27 460 U.S. 190 (1983) (holding the FTCA's exclusive remedy provision does
not bar a third-party indemnity action against the United States).
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state law taketh away. In Bell, a helicopter crashed due to
fuel starvation near Port Hardy, British Columbia, while
being operated by a pilot employed by the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. A pas-
senger, also a government employee, suffered severe per-
sonal injuries. The passenger sued the manufacturer, the
seller, and the lessor of the helicopter, claiming the heli-
copter was not crashworthy because of the design of the
fixed float kit and because the shoulder harnesses had
been removed before it was leased to the government.
Bell, the manufacturer, and Sea Airmotive, the seller,
thereupon sought to recover contribution or indemnity
from the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).275
Before 1983, such a claim would probably have been
barred; all federal circuits but one had held that the fed-
eral government's tort immunity, from direct suits by in-
jured employees under the Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA)2 76 , also prevented recovery by
contribution or indemnity. Then, in Lockheed, the United
States Supreme Court held that FECA did not bar claims
for contribution or indemnity. However, in Bell, the Ninth
Circuit held that even though the contribution claim was
not barred under FECA, it was nevertheless barred under
the immunity provisions of the state workers compensa-
tion act in Alaska.277 The court held that this result was
27 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). The United States is generally
liable
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per-
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission accurred.
Id. § 1346(b).
27,i 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1982).
277 Bell, 833 F.2d at 1379. The Ninth Circuit held that the government enjoys
the same immunity from claims of contribution and indemnity as does a private
employer. Id.; see also ALAsKA STAT. §§ 23.30.005-23.30.270 (1987). The liability
of an employer is exclusive under the Alaskan Workers Compensation Act. Id.
§ 23.30.055.
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compelled because liability under the FTCA was gov-
erned by the law of the state where the act or omission
occurred. Since the pilot's improper preflight planning
occurred in Alaska, the immunity provisions of the Alaska
Workers Compensation Act applied and the government
was entitled to the immunity afforded a private employer
under analogous circumstances, pursuant to state law.
Alaska law applied even though the government did not
participate in the state compensation system, the govern-
ment's employees did not live in Alaska, and the accident
occurred outside Alaska. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the court should look to Alaska's choice-of-
law rules and that an Alaska court would decide an em-
ployer's immunity by looking to the substantive provi-
sions of the workers compensation system under which
the injured worker was employed. The court, however,
remanded the case on the common-law indemnity claim
because, under Alaska law, claims for indemnity were not
barred by the Alaska Workers Compensation Act.
In Gibbs v. Air Canada,78 the Eleventh Circuit held that
the district court erred in its determination that the in-
demnity clause in a ramp service contract covered the will-
ful misconduct of a contracting employee. Aircraft
Services entered into a contract with Air Canada to pro-
vide various ramp services for Air Canada at the Miami
International Airport. In the contract, Aircraft Services
agreed to indemnify Air Canada for damages caused by
the negligence or willful misconduct of its employees. On
March 6, 1980, a truck driver employed by Aircraft Serv-
ices misappropriated a cargo of precious metals. How-
ever, Air Canada's ramp supervisor was responsible for
the cargo's security and was not present when the cargo
was unloaded. The truck driver's duty regarding the
cargo was completed when the shipment was unloaded on
the ramp.
The plain meaning of the indemnification provision re-
V7, 810 F.2d 1529 (lhch Cir. 1987).
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quired that the injury or damage bear a causal relation-
ship to the performance of Aircraft Services' obligation
under the contract. The court stated that the truck
driver's conduct did not occur during the performance of
his services, because the truck driver had finished per-
formance when he unloaded the cargo at Air Canada's
ramp. Thus, the theft of the container did not come
within the scope of the indemnification clause.
Additionally, the district court established that Air Can-
ada was guilty of gross negligence and willful misconduct,
because it failed to ensure the safety and security of the
cargo. Under Florida law, agreements to indemnify par-
ties against their own wrongful acts are not favored and
are only enforced if such an intent is clearly expressed. In
the absence of such intent, any fault of the indemnitee
that is the legal cause of its own loss negates the contrac-
tual indemnitor's obligation.
Air Canada argued that the finding of gross negligence
in the lower court did not defeat its right to indemnifica-
tion. The court held that Air Canada was bound by the
lower court's finding of gross negligence because the in-
demnitee relied on the earlier judgment against him as
the basis for his right to recover from the indemnitor.
The court further held that the contract did not express a
clear intent to indemnify Air Canada against its own negli-
gence or willful misconduct, because the provision indi-
cated an intent to limit liability only to those situations
where the cause of damage was the negligence or miscon-
duct of Aircraft Services.
In Passalacqua v. United Airlines, Inc. ,279 the Pennsylvania
Superior Court rejected United's contention that an in-
demnification clause implied coverage for simple negli-
gence. The indemnification provision excluded any claim
for liability resulting from United's own gross negligence
or willful misconduct. The action arose when a United
Airlines ground services crew negligently injured the
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,050 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 18, 1986).
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plaintiff, a co-pilot for Altair Airlines, after failing to se-
cure baggage restraining rods. Altair and United settled,
each paying $22,500. United then sought indemnification
from Altair under a provision in a ground service agree-
ment between the two airlines.
United alleged that the agreement implied simple negli-
gence coverage because it specifically excluded indemnifi-
cation against United's own gross negligence. The court
rejected this interpretation because, under Illinois law, an
indemnity clause is not construed in favor of indemnifying
a party against his own negligence unless the intent is ex-
plicit.280 The court affirmed the lower court's finding that
an explicit intent to indemnify did not exist and that ex-
cluding indemnification against United's own gross negli-




In Forrester v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,282
the New York Supreme Court held that a passenger in-
jured while entering a taxi cab could not recover from
TWA or the Port Authority for lack of supervision and im-
proper design of the taxi cab boarding area. The plaintiff
had arrived on a TWA flight and was preparing to enter a
taxi cab in front of the TWA terminal. He was walking
behind the cab, to enter on the passenger side, when an-
other cab, parked behind the first, lurched out and struck
the plaintiff. Based on the language of the lease between
TWA and the Port Authority, the plaintiff contended that
TWA had a duty to control and supervise all roadway traf-
fic around the boarding area.283 A second cause of action
alleged that TWA was negligent for designing the taxi cab
21 Id. at 18,052; see also Westinghouse Elec. Elevator Co. v. LaSalle Monroe
Bldg. Corp., 395 I1. 429, 433, 70 N.E.2d 604, 607 (1946).
2-1 Passalacqua, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 18,053.
212 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,430 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 6, 1986).
2'1: Id. In its lease, TWA expressly agreed to "control all traffic on the roadway
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loading area in a manner which required the passenger to
enter and exit into the traffic flow. 28 4
The court held that the airline was under no duty to
duplicate the supervisory services provided by the taxi
company's agent, and nothing in the contract made the
airline an insurer of all passengers' safety. 85 As to the
negligent design claim, the court held there was no causal
connection between the design of the loading area and
the alleged negligence of the second taxi cab driver.2 86
Relying on Margolin v. Freidman,28 7 the court stated that
the premises merely furnished the location and the setting
for the occurrence of the accident, rather than being the
cause of the accident. Therefore, no liability for the air-
line resulted from the accident, either from the alleged
lack of supervision or improper design.
In Williams v. Aer Lingus Irish Airlines,28 8 a minor was seri-
ously injured on an escalator at an airport. The district
court upheld the $1.25 million jury verdict against the two
defendant airlines and the escalator manufacturer. The
airlines, as co-lessees of the area in which the escalator
was operated, were under a duty of care to maintain the
escalator in a reasonably safe condition for use by patrons
and the public.289
In Great American Airways, Inc. v. Airport Authority of
Washoe County,290 the Nevada Supreme Court ordered a
new trial on the issue of contract liability. 91 On February
and take all precautions reasonably necessary to promote the safety of passen-
gers." Id.
294 Id. The plaintiffs asserted that designing a wide taxi cab loading area
tempted eager taxi drivers to drive negligently; therefore, the chance of an acci-
dent was "highly predictable." Id. at 17,431-32.
285 Id. at 17,431.
2" Id.
2s7 43 N.Y.2d 982, 375 N.E.2d 734, 404 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1978) (holding that
where there was no causal connection between the design or maintenance of the
car wash and the accident, the companies that constructed or operated the car
wash were not liable for injuries arising from the accident).
2- 655 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
219 Id. at 429.
.... 743 P.2d 628 (Nev. 1987).
29 1,Id. at 629.
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27, 1983, a Great American jet struck a chunk of ice while
attempting to depart Reno-Cannon International Airport.
The airplane's nose wheels, fuselage, and engines suf-
fered over $46,000 in damage.
Pursuant to an agreement between Great American and
the airport authority, the airport authority agreed to: op-
erate and maintain the Authority facilities in a safe, worka-
ble, clean, and sanitary condition, and in good repair and
free from obstructions, including such clearing and removal
of snow that is reasonably necessary to permit operations
and as soon as it is practical for Authority to do. 292 The
trial court denied relief for Great American, construing
this provision to require the Authority to remove obstruc-
tions from the runways to a degree "reasonably necessary
to permit operations. ' 93 The district court determined
that the Authority had sufficiently removed obstructions
from the runways. 2 9' The Nevada Supreme Court stated
that the phrase "that is reasonably necessary to permit op-
erations" clearly modifies only the Authority's responsi-
bility with respect to the clearing and removal of snow. 95
The Authority did not specify in the contract that it would
keep the runways "reasonably" free from obstructions.
To the contrary, the Authority made an unqualified prom-
ise to maintain the facilities "free of obstructions. ' 29 6
The court held that by modifying the Authority's express
agreement to keep its facilities sufficiently free from ob-
I2 Id.
293 Id.
295 Id. The court attempted to construe the contract to ascertain the intent of
the parties. Id. If such intention is clear from the contract itself, the court is
bound to follow the language of the agreement. Id.; see also Watson v. Watson, 95
Nev. 495, 596 P.2d 507 (1979) (obligating the court to follow the language of the
agreement); Barringer v. Gunderson, 81 Nev. 288, 302, 402 P.2d 470, 477 (1965)
(concerning intent of the parties). Watson v. Watson, 95 Nev. 495, 596 P.2d 507
(1979) (obligating court to follow the language of the agreement).
Great American, 743 P.2d at 629. The airline's contract with the Airport Au-
thority, which required the Authority to keep the runway free from obstructions
and to perform snow removal reasonably necessary to permit operations, imposed
an unqualified duty on the Authority to remove the ice chunk from an otherwise
clear runway. Id.
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structions, the district court effectively revised the agree-
ment, which it was not free to do.297
B. Preemption
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey,298 the Second Circuit upheld an airport's use of
a local "perimeter rule", limiting use of the airport by op-
erators of certain nonstop flights. In the district court,
Western sought to enjoin the perimeter rule, citing the
Federal Aviation Act,299 which limits local authority to
regulate airlines' "rates, routes or services' 1;300 requires
an airport proprietor receiving federal funds to make its
facilities available on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory
basis; 30 ' and prohibits such proprietors from granting ex-
clusive access to any airline. 2 The Second Circuit found
that the plaintiff airline had no private right of action to
enforce the federal aviation statutes involved, 0 3 and that
the Airline Deregulation Act and other federal statutes
did not preempt the perimeter rule. 0 4
Western claimed an implied private right of action ex-
isted under both the Federal Aviation Act3 0 5 and the Fed-
eral Civil Rights Acts.30 6 Western also contended that 49
U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1) preempted the perimeter rule under
the Supremacy Clause. 7
The district court held Western could assert its preemp-
297 Id. The Court found that when the district court used "reasonably" to mod-
ify "free from obstructions," it was effectively revising the agreement rather than
construing it. Id.
2s 817 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1987).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1982).
'' Id. § 1305.
Id. § 2210(a).
-2 Id. § 1349(a).
Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 225.
. Id. at 225-27.
"' See supra note 298.
mw 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides civil liability for "[e]very
person who, under color of [law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
*.. to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws ...." Id.
..... Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 223-24; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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tion claim based on the Supremacy Clause, but found on
the merits that § 1305 did not preempt the Authority's
perimeter rule. °8 The district court, relying on Montauk-
Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope,3 0 9 also held that there were
no implied private rights of action under the Federal Avia-
tion Act to enforce sections 1349(a) and 1305(a), and that
plaintiffs cannot use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce sec-
tionsl305(a) and 1349(a).3 '0 The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of Western's claim of a pri-
vate right of action and stated it did not need to decide
whether section 1983 applied with respect to section
2210(a), because the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in holding that Western did not press its sec-
tion1983 claims in court.3 ' In its reply brief, Western
argued that the FAA, by granting "slots" at LaGuardia,
preempted any regulation of those slots by the Author-
ity.3 12 The court rejected Western's contention that sec-
tion 1305 authorized the Authority to regulate those slots
in accordance with its proprietary powers, the perimeter
rule falling within those powers. 31 3
In Bryski v. City of Chicago,3 14 the Illinois Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal of nuisance and trespass ac-
tions by property owners near an airport, holding that
federal law preempted any state or local action. In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs' claims were based on the inflight oper-
ation of aircraft, regulated by the Federal Aviation Act.
The court followed City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc. 3'5 and ruled that the plaintiffs' claims "interfered"
-,,m Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 224-26.
m ", 784 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 248 (1986) (airline denied an
implied cause of action under Federal Aviation Act and a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. section 1983 in a suit against competitor airline and city authority which
had refused to allow airline to serve at city airport on a year-around basis).
Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 225-26; Hope, 784 F.2d at 97-98.
Western Air Lines, 817 F.2d at 225-26.
.1 ld. at 226.
Id. at 226-27.
148 Ill. App. 3d 556, 499 N.E.2d 162 (11. App. Ct. 1986), cert. denied, 113 Ill.
2d 572, 505 N.E.2d 351 (1987).
-, 411 U.S. 624 (1973). In City of Burbank, a city ordinance prohibited depar-
tures between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. the following morning. The court found that
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with the pervasive nature of federal regulation of air com-
merce and are therefore preempted by federal law.3 16
The court reversed on the inverse condemnation claims,
however, and permitted plaintiffs to seek a remedy for
damages to their property. 1 7
In City and County of San Francisco v. Engen,3 t8 the city air-
port commissioner refused to grant permission to Bur-
lington Northern Air Freight, Inc. (Burlington) to fly
Boeing 707s into the airport, based on San Francisco's
noise regulations. Burlington then filed a complaint with
the FAA. Subsequently, the FAA staff issued a Notice of
Proposed Order which proposed suspension of current
grants to San Francisco and refusals to make future
grants. The city petitioned for review. The court held
that the matter was not reviewable because the FAA had
not taken any final agency action.31 9 The proposal was
merely a staff recommendation and did not impose an ob-
ligation, deny a right, or fix a legal relationship.3 20 The
only grievance which the city could claim at the time was
the Administrator's apparent refusal to process the city's
grant applications for fiscal years after 1985.321 However,
the refusal to process the grant applications was not
reviewable.322
C. Free Speech
In Board of Airport Commissioners of Los Angeles v. Jews for
the need for an exclusive and uniform system required federal preemption of state
and local air commerce regulation. Id. at 638-39.
... Bryski, 499 N.E.2d at 165.
7 Id. at 168.
3-1 819 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1987).
-1, Id. at 874.
.4211Id.; 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a) (1982) provides the court of appeals with ex-
clusive jurisdiction to review FAA orders issued under the Federal Aviation Act,
Chapter 20 of Title 49. The court found that a "mere staff recommendation" was
not an "order" which was reviewable. Engen, 819 F.2d at 874.
.12 Engen, 819 F.2d at 874-75.
.'22 Id. at 875. The Administrator has the power to refuse to grant applications
under Chapter 31 of the Title 49. The court was unable to review the refusal
because its jurisdiction was limited to the review of orders issued under Chapter
20 of Title 49. Id.; see supra note 319.
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Jesus,323 the Supreme Court held that a resolution banning
all First Amendment activities within the Central Termi-
nal Area at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) was
unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine.3 24
In July, 1983, the Board of Airport Commissioners
adopted a resolution which prohibited all First Amend-
ment activities within the central terminal area by any in-
dividual or entity. On July 6, 1984, a minister of the
Gospel Jews for Jesus was stopped by a police officer
while distributing religious literature. The minister was
advised of the resolution and asked to leave the
325premises.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit held that the
airport complex was a traditional public forum and that
the resolution was unconstitutional on its face.326 The
Supreme Court held that the resolution was overbroad
because it prohibited even talking and reading, or the
wearing of campaign buttons or symbolic clothing.32 7
The Court did not decide whether LAX was a public fo-
rum because it stated that even if LAX were a nonpublic
forum, the ban was unjustified and not subject to a more
limiting construction. 2
International Caucus of Labor Committees v. City of Chicago 329
held that an association which challenged the constitu-
tionality of airport regulations at O'Hare Airport prohibit-
ing them from setting up tables, hanging signs from a
table, and storing literature under a table, did not state a
claim for which relief could be granted.33 0 The Interna-
tional Caucus of Labor Committees (ICLC) was an unin-
corporated association of persons dedicated to the
3.1 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987).
.,24 Id. at 2573.
.1. Id. at 2570.
.126 Id. at 2570-2571. The court of appeals relied upon Rosen v. Port of Port-
land, 641 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1981), and Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d
1130 (9th Cir. 1973), in reaching its decision.
127 Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. at 2572.
:32 Id.




dissemination of philosophical and political information
to the public.3  ICLC did not allege that the regulations
had been applied in a discriminatory fashion or that the
regulations were overbroad or vague. 3 2
In order to survive constitutional attack, the regulations
must be content-neutral, serve a significant governmental
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information. 3  The court con-
cluded the regulations were clearly not content based. 34
The regulations also served a significant interest in pro-
tecting the safety and convenience of persons using the
public forum, and there were ample alternative channels
for disseminating the information at Chicago O'Hare Air-
port.3 35 The court held that the regulations were reason-
able, based on the nature of the airport traffic, and
narrowly tailored to the city's interest in airport safety. 336
Because ICLC alleged no more than the existence and
nondiscriminatory enforcement of the regulations, the de-
termination of their constitutionality was appropriate on a
motion to dismiss. 37
In Jamison v. City of St. Louis,338 the court reversed the
district court's finding that exclusion of the plaintiff for
silently protesting his termination in an unsecured section
of the airport was constitutional. 39 The court affirmed
.,i Id.
''Id.
See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640, 647-648 (1981).
It is also common ground, however, that the First Amendment does
not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and
places or in any manner that may be desired .... We have often
approved restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified
without reference to content of the regulated speech, that they serve
a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of information.
Id.
Labor Committees, 816 F.2d at 339.
'"Id.
:vw Id. at 340.
' Id.
828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1281.
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the finding that the defendant's process to determine who
may protest at the airport was unconstitutional. 40
Plaintiff was employed by Trans World Airlines (TWA)
for sixteen years until his termination on April 16,
1984.34' Believing that his discharge was discriminatorily
based on his mental illness, plaintiff requested to stand in
an unsecured area of the Lambert-St. Louis International
Airport with a sign reading: "TWA discriminates against
the handicapped. 3 42 Plaintiff's request was denied be-
cause the director of the airport felt the public could be
placed in jeopardy. 43
The court stated that an airport terminal is similar to a
busy city street. 44 Both are lined with shops, restaurants,
newsstands, and other businesses, with members of the
general public coming and going at will. No security
checkpoint must be crossed to reach the area where the
plaintiff wished to protest, nor must a fee be paid to enter
the area.3 4 ' Relying on these facts and the city's Solicita-
tion Rule 1.05,346 the court concluded that the concourses
of Lambert Airport were a public forum. 4 7
The defendant's procedure for determining who may
exercise First Amendment rights at the airport was, there-
fore, unconstitutional in two respects.3 48 Relying on Staub
... Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1281.
.42 Id.
.4- Id. The director testified that he had general discretion to disallow any activ-
ities that in his opinion would not be in the best interests of the airport or persons
using it. The director's unvarying practice was to deny all requests for permission
to protest or solicit except those accompanied by a court order. Id. at 1282.
3- Id. at 1283.
3'45 Id.
Id. at 1282. Rule 1.05 stated that persons or organizations desiring to exer-
cise constitutional freedoms "shall be protected in such activities, provided that
the same do not constitute commercial activities and do not result in interference
with transportation functions of the Airport." Id. The second section of the rule
stated that the rule and its accompanying regulations were intended "[t]o insure
that persons seeking to exercise constitutional freedoms of expression can com-
municate effectively with users of the Airport." Id.
:17 Id. at 1285. The court also concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to attor-
ney's fees. Id.
- Id. at 1283.
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v. City of Baxley,349 the court concluded that giving the di-
rector complete discretion to rule on applications to exer-
cise First Amendment rights "makes the peaceful
enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees
contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official" and
therefore, "an unconstitutional censorship or prior re-
straint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. 3 5 0 More-
over, the city's practice was not narrowly tailored to serve
compelling interests, because the director routinely re-
fused all requests to protest except those accompanied by
a court order.3 '
The government may regulate the time, place, and
manner of expression in public forums as long as its regu-
lations are content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave open ample al-
ternative channels of communication. 52 The district
court held that defendant's -refusal to allow plaintiff to
protest because of his mental illness satisfied these
criteria.53
The Eighth Circuit disagreed, concluding that the city
had failed to demonstrate how excluding all persons suf-
fering from mental illness will further the city's interests
in security and operational efficiency. 54 Relying on Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,355 which
stated "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression, "356 the court opined that a broad assertion
that some manic-depressive persons may be prone to vio-
lence cannot justify depriving all mentally ill persons of
their First Amendment rights.3 57 Nor did the evidence
:-. 355 U.S. 313 (1958).
..... Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1284 (citing Straub, 355 U.S. at 322).
:151 Id.
351- See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
35:. Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 671 F. Supp. 641, 646 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
.... Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1285.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1285.
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demonstrate that plaintiff would, in fact, pose a danger to
the public. 58
D. Nuisance
Redington Ranch Associates v. Redman 359 held that a home-
owner association's protective covenant prohibited the
defendant from landing his helicopter on his three-acre
homesite located near the Rincon Mountains.3 60 The cov-
enant prohibited the lots from being used in a way that
would cause any noise which would disturb the peace,
quiet, comfort, or serenity of the occupants of the sur-
rounding property. However, under the Pima County
Zoning Code, the defendant's helicopter was permitted if
it was a customarily incidental and subordinate use of the
property.36 '
The court stated that if it were to hold that the defend-
ant's helicopter was a customarily incidental use, the zon-
ing code would be construed to allow all residences and
businesses to use helicopters. 6 2 The effect, in terms of
noise, invasion of privacy, and potential safety hazards
would be enormous. Therefore, the court concluded that
the defendant's use of his helicopter was not
permissible. 63
Board of County Commissioners ofJohnson County v. Atter 64
held that the Board of County Commissioners satisfied its
burden of establishing that public necessity required the
condemnation of two parcels of land in order to extend a
runway.3 65 The court concluded that a showing that the
project improved public safety was sufficient to satisfy
these requirements. 6 6
:'r, Id.





364 734 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1987).
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 553. "Public necessity" within the meaning of the eminent domain
statute meant a reasonable necessity. The court held this was established by a
[54
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In State v. Doyle,3 67 property owners brought an action
for inverse condemnation against the State of Alaska as a
result of construction and operation of a new runway at
Anchorage International Airport. 68 Plaintiff's property
actually increased in value after the runway was built.
However, the trial court found that the property would
have appreciated even more, but for the runway construc-
tion.3 69 The Alaska Superior Court held that the plaintiffs
had a legally cognizable claim for inverse condemnation
because of the reduced rate of appreciation of the
property. °
In Stephens v. United States,37' plaintiffs sued for inverse
condemnation as a result of low overflights of jet aircraft
in the landing pattern at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The
court found that in 1982, the year of the alleged taking,
there were 73,384 takeoffs, overflights, or landings, over
35,000 of which were by F-16s. The base conducted
20,835 "sorties" flown by F-16s stationed at the base,
85% of which overflew plaintiff's property, resulting in an
average of seventy-three overflights per day. The vast
majority of overflights were between 1,000 and 2,500 feet
above the ground. 2 The court established the general
rule that when overflights occur in navigable airspace, a
presumption of non-taking exists which can be overcome
by proof of destruction or substantial impairment to the
property. 73 As the height of overflights increases, how-
ever, the government's interest in maintaining air sover-
eignty increases, while the landowner's interest
showing that the airport would result in increased safety for pilots and passengers.
Id.
Id.'7 35 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1987).
Id. at 734.
Id. at 738. Testimony at trial showed an annual appreciation rate of approxi-
mately 13.7%, while average appreciation rates for similar properties unaffected
by airport noise was about 16%. Id.
.. Id. at 737-38.
.. 11 Cl. Ct. 352 (1986). The decision may also be found at 3 Av. L. Rep.
(CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,584 (Cl. Ct. Dec. 17, 1986).
:172 Stephens, II Cl. Ct. at 355-56.
..... Id. at 362.
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diminishes, so that the damage showing required in-
creases in a continuum toward showing absolute destruc-
tion of all uses of the property. 74 These flights, virtually
all of which occurred in navigable airspace, were not so
severe as to amount to a practical destruction or substan-
tial impairment of the property, which at that time was
used primarily for raising cattle. 75
E. Noise Abatement
In Illinois v. FAA,376 the state challenged a final rule
promulgated by the FAA. The state maintained that the
FAA violated applicable statutory requirements by failing
to provide a detailed explanation for its decision not to
require all certificated airport operators to submit aircraft
noise abatement plans to the agency. 77
In 1976, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
proposed that all certificated airport operators submit
noise abatement plans to the FAA for approval. In 1981,
the FAA finally promulgated an interim rule. In com-
ments to the interim rule, the EPA took the position that
the FAA was statutorily required to embrace the
mandatory nature of the EPA's proposal. 378 The FAA's fi-
nal rule stated that the mandatory nature of the EPA's
proposal "would be burdensome and unnecessary. 379
The court stated that the EPA'S argument "badly
misses the mark."' 38 0 The FAA did promulgate an elabo-
rate set of regulations.3 81 Further, the FAA set forth a va-
riety of reasons for adopting a voluntary program. These
reasons included concern over imposing an "unnecessary
374 Id.
"75 Id. at 369.
.... 832 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
.77 Id. at 169.
:17. Id.
371 Airport Noise Compatibility Planning, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,259, 49,263 (1984)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 150).
Illinois, 832 F.2d at 170. "It is clear beyond cavil that the FAA has promul-
gated an elaborate set or regulations ... [which stand] in sharp rebuke to Illinois'
strained assertion that no regulations were prescribed at all." Id.
.... See 14 C.F.R. § 150 (1987).
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cost burden on those airports with no present or antici-
pated noise problem, ' 382 and concern that the airport cer-
tification program would not be "the proper vehicle for
implementation of an airport noise abatement planning
program. ' 383 The court denied the state's petition for
384review.
F. Auto Concessions
In Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Au-
thority,3 85 the Eleventh Circuit rejected Alamo's claim that
the airport authority denied them equal protection by
treating off-airport auto rental companies differently than
those operating on the field.38 6 Even if the fee schedule
placed off-airport rental companies at a competitive disad-
vantage, the rules did not violate equal protection, be-
cause they were rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objective of maximizing revenue from air-
port operations. 7
-2 46 Fed. Reg. 8,328 (1981).
... Id. at 8,329.
484 Illinois, 832 F.2d at 171. The court also stated that the FAA rule was not "at
war with Congress' intent." Id. But even in the face of conflict with Congres-
sional intent, the court noted its duty to defer to the statutory interpretation of
the agency charged with administering it. Id.; see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
107 S. Ct. 1207, 1221-22 (1987) (interpreting the new Immigration Reform and
Control Act. The Court stated that an agency's interpretation of a statute which
conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is entitled to less deference).
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,174 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 1987). ,
Id. at 18,178. The district court below had agreed with Alamo and "found
that the [airport] authority, by charging off-airport companies a ten-percent user
fee, in effect treated those companies in a manner similar to the on-airport compa-
nies, which pay a ten-percent concession fee but which also receive benefits from
their location on airport grounds. The [district] court concluded that there was
no rational basis for establishing comparable fees for both categories of compa-
nies." Id. at 18,176.
:117 Id. at 18,178. The circuit court listed two justifications for its finding. First,
the off-airport fee was applied only to passengers picked up at the airport by a
courtesy vehicle. Thus, the off-airport fee fluctuated based upon the number of
airport passengers who use the off-airport service, while on-airport services were
required to pay ten percent of revenues from all customers. Id. Second, any ben-
efits the on-airport companies received by virtue of their location was offset by the
rent they paid in addition to the ten-percent fee. Id. at 18,179.
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VI. WARSAW CONVENTION AND AIR CARRIER LIABILITY
A. Warsaw Jurisdiction
In Kapar v. Kuwait Airways Corp. ,388 the court dismissed a
lawsuit against Kuwait Airways, citing lack of Warsaw
Convention 389 jurisdiction. The action was brought
against Kuwait Airways and three other defendants3 90 for
negligence and willful misconduct in connection with the
airplane hijacking in which four Americans were held hos-
tage in Tehran, Iran. The plaintiff was one of four Ameri-
cans taken hostage by terrorists for six days in December,
1984. Two of the hostages were killed and the other two
were tortured and beaten. Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention establishes the forum in which actions for
damages may be brought:
(a) the domicile of the carrier;
(b) the carrier's principal place of business;
(c) the place of business through which the contract of
carriage has been made; or
(d) the place of destination.39 '
Plaintiff relied on subsections (c) and (d) above. His
status as a federal employee required him to purchase his
ticket through an American carrier by means of a govern-
ment travel voucher; he purchased his ticket from Pan
American and on Pan American ticket stock. However,
the court held that this did not establish jurisdiction
under the Warsaw Convention. 92 The entire contract of
carriage was performed by Kuwait Airways and Pan Amer-
ican owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court stated that
663 F. Supp. 1065 (D.D.C. 1987).
"' Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 28(1).
mw Kapar, 663 F. Supp. at 1068. The other defendants were Pan American
World Airways, which, plaintiff claimed, owed him a duty because it sold him his
ticket; the International Air Transport Association, which plaintiff claimed had a
duty to warn him that the security procedures used by Kuwait Airways and Middle
East Airlines Airliban were inadequate; and Middle East Airlines Airliban, which,
plaintiff claimed, negligently transported the hijackers from Beirut, Lebanon to
Dubai U.A.E., where the hijacking took place. Id.
!.. Id. at 1067.
32Id.
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the sequence of events through which the ticket was is-
sued did not transform the United States into the place
through which the contract of carriage was made.393
Kuwait Airways was domiciled in Kuwait; the airline's
principal place of business was Kuwait; and the carrier's
place of business through which the contract was made
was Yemen; and the place of destination was Karachi, Pak-
istan 94 Thus, there were no grounds for plaintiff's argu-
ment that the United States was his place of destination,
even though, as a U.S. citizen, he would eventually return
there. 95 All four defendants' motions to dismiss were
granted.
B. Injuries and Events Within Scope of Convention
In Lemly v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,396 the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed dismissal of a Warsaw Convention claim of
negligence and strict liability from an accident on the do-
mestic leg of plaintiff's journey from Maryland to Saudi
Arabia. The court found that the journey was broken up
into two flights on different airlines, and tickets were
purchased separately. The flights were also a day apart.
TWA and the plaintiff did not contemplate international
travel for both legs of the journey, because TWA could
not be held to know plaintiff's international travel plans
once she arrived in New York.397
In Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc. ,398 the deceased's re-
mains were delivered to American Airlines in a sealed cas-
ket. The names of the shipper and consignee appeared on
the waybill, but not the names of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs
I , d. Plaintiff purchased his ticket in Yemen, and the court found that the fact
that his purchase was through an American carrier did not satisfy the "place of
business" test in Article 28(1)(c) of the Warsaw Convention. Id.
194 Id.
im, Id.; see Smith v. Canadian Pacific Airways, 452 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1971) (plain-
tiff, injured on Canadian Pacific aircraft on flight from Vancouver, Canada to To-
kyo, Japan, had to bring suit in Japan to satisfy the "place of destination"
jurisdiction test).
:... 807 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1986).
',7 Id. at 28.
... 834 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1987).
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did not declare an excess value for the casket. When the
casket arrived in Ireland, the seal had been broken, the
remains were damaged, and items of personal property
were missing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under the
Warsaw Convention because they were not parties to the
shipping contract 399 and holding that remains were
"goods" under the Convention 4°° and, therefore, the
Convention was the exclusive remedy.
Kenner Products-General Mills, Inc. v. The Flying Tiger Line,
Inc.,4"' arose when a steel mold, shipped from Taipei to
Cincinnati, was temporarily lost. Kenner was the con-
signee of one waybill under which Morrison Express ac-
cepted the goods for transportation to Cincinnati, but
there was a second waybill by which Morrison arranged
with Flying Tiger to transport the goods to Chicago. The
steel mold was lost for about three months, whereupon it
turned up in Flying Tiger's facility in Cincinnati. Flying
Tiger attempted to return the mold to Kenner, but Ken-
ner sued for damages.
The court had initially dismissed all of Kenner's claims
except the claim under the Warsaw Convention.40 2 De-
fendants moved to reconsider the court's refusal to dis-
miss the Warsaw claim, and the court, on reconsideration,
dismissed the Warsaw claim as well. Initially, the court
had held that under Article 30(3) of the Convention, the
plaintiff was free to sue the alleged last carrier or any of
the intermediate carriers. However, on reconsidera
' Id. at 724-25. The plaintiffs had arranged for a California funeral home to
ship the decedent's body to a funeral home in Ireland. Id. at 722. The funeral
homes were thus the consignor and consignee to the air waybill and were the only
parties with standing to sue the airlines involved. Id. at 725.
-, Id. at 723-24. The remains were listed as "goods" on the waybill. Id. at 723.
The waybill warned that any recovery for injury to the goods was limited by the
Warsaw Convention, unless the shipper opted to pay a higher shipping fee to
receive additional coverage. Id.
4... 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,282 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 1987).
4o2 Id. at 18,283.
4" Id. at 18,284. "Thus, [plaintiff] can take action against .. .the alleged last
carrier, and the intermediate carriers, one or more of whom may be responsible
for the loss or delay at issue here." Id. at 18,283-84.
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tion, the court acknowledged that this provision of Article
30(3) only applied if the transportation by successive car-
riers "has been regarded by the parties as a single opera-
tion. '4 0 4 Here, there were separate waybills between
different parties for different shipments to different desti-
nations, with different freight charges assessed. Since
Kenner was not the consignee on the second waybill, it
could not sue the carriers who transported the goods
under that waybill.40 5
C. Cargo and Passenger Baggage
1. Non-Warsaw Cases
Travellers should beware of the consequences of failure
to insure man's best friend. In Deiro v. American Airlines,40 6
seven racing dogs died and two others were injured from
heat exhaustion during a layover. The Ninth Circuit held
that American's baggage liability limitation on the passen-
ger ticket of $750 per dog was valid under a "reasonable
communicativeness test. ' 40 7 The court found the contract
of carriage included the baggage liability provision, and
the airline met the requirements under the released valua-
tion doctrine, providing plaintiff reasonable notice and a
full and fair opportunity to declare a higher value for his
baggage. The airline's contractual limitation of liability
for gross negligence was also held valid.
The reasonable communicativeness test, adopted by
several circuits, 40 8 evaluates whether the physical charac-
teristics of the ticket are reasonably conspicuous and clear
and whether the circumstances surrounding the passen-
ger's purchase of the ticket, including his familiarity and
time to study the ticket, render it reasonable to bind the
passenger to the ticket's contractual limitations. The
court found the plaintiff was an experienced commercial
40" Id. at 18,282, 18,284; Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 30(3).
4o, Kenner, 3 Av. L. REP. at 18,284.
401. 816 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1987).
4,,7 Id. at 1365.
4... Id. at 1364.
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air traveler and aware of print on the back of the ticket,
having received the ticket nine days prior to his flight.
The plaintiff thus had ample opportunity to familiarize
himself with the baggage provisions, particularly in light
of the baggage's value.
2. Warsaw Cases
In Republic National Bank of New York v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc.,4°9 the Second Circuit held that absence of informa-
tion about the weight and identification number on bag-
gage tickets did not vitiate an airline's limited liability
under the Warsaw Convention. The case arose out of the
loss of baggage containing $2 million in currency on an
international flight from New York to Lima. The court
found relevant that Republic's courier personally super-
vised handling of the currency bags and that Eastern had
no opportunity to assure that the baggage was properly
identified because the baggage was loaded from an ar-
mored truck. Republic was found to be on notice that it
could declare a higher value.
In Eli Lilly Argentina, S.A. v. Aerolineas Argentinas,41 0 an ac-
tion for damages to fifteen drums of chemicals, prejudg-
ment interest was added to an award for property damage
under the Warsaw Convention. The court followed
Domanque v. Eastern Airlines Inc. ,'4 1 and stated that Article
28 of the Warsaw Convention 41 2 could be interpreted to
allow prejudgment interest. The purpose of the Conven-
tion, which was to fix, at a definite level, the cost to air-
lines for damages, was not thwarted by awarding interest.
If prejudgment interest was disallowed, the money paid
would actually be the present value of a future payment, a
discounted amount, and less than the limitation imposed
by the Convention. The court granted interest from the
date of the loss.
41.., 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 6,948 (D.D.C. May 11, 1987).
4... 815 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1987).
411 133 Misc. 2d 858, 508 N.Y.S.2d 865 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1987).
4, 722 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1984).
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In Import Birds, Inc. v. Empresa Ecuatoriana De Aviacion,4 13
the court held that plaintiff's attempt to escape a contrac-
tual limitation of liability was for the birds. Plaintiff's par-
rots died enroute from Peru to Miami. The district court
found the airline's liability was limited to $20 per kilo-
gram, as provided by the airway bill. Import Birds did not
declare a higher value for the birds and was, therefore,
subject to the contractual limitation.
In Montazami v. Kuwait Airways Corp. ,4 1 an action by a
passenger seeking to recover $3,000 in damages for the
theft or destruction of his luggage and its contents, the
court denied the airline's motion for partial summary
judgment, limiting liability to $400 pursuant to Article 22
of the Warsaw Convention.4 15 The plaintiff arrived in New
York from London on KAC flight KU100 on July 22,
1986. The plaintiff's luggage was missing when he ar-
rived in New York. Within fifteen days, the luggage was
returned, but the plaintiff claimed that the suitcase had
been ripped open and several valuables were either lost or
destroyed.
The defendant argued that the losses should be limited
to $20 per kilogram, under Article 22 of the Warsaw Con-
vention. However, such a limitation is only valid, under
Article 22, in the absence of willful misconduct. The
plaintiff claimed that coins, a silver tea set, and gifts were
taken from his returned baggage, that candy and ciga-
rettes were opened and crushed, and that his suitcase had
been ripped open. These assertions suggested a possible
intentional act, making summary judgment
inappropriate.41 6
What happens when the total weight of a shipment is
one hundred and thirteen pounds and the carrier loses or
damages one item weighing only five pounds? Is the ship-
per entitled to recover the liability limit ($9.07 per pound)
41 Warsaw Convention, supra note 27.
- 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,943 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1987).
-, Warsaw Convention, supra note 27, art. 22.
416 Mllontazami, 3 Av. L. Rep. at 17,943.
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on the total weight of the total shipment or only on the
five-pound item? In Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. ,4 7 the court held that the Warsaw Con-
vention's limits apply only to the weight of the lost or
damaged goods.
D. Tour Operators
In Arkin v. Trans International Airlines, Inc. ,418 the Second
Circuit held that passengers seeking damages from a char-
ter airline, for physical and emotional injuries they alleg-
edly suffered as a result of a delayed international flight,
could not recover because the airline breached no duty of
care. The Arkins had purchased a tour package from a
tour operator who in turn chartered an aircraft from
Trans International for a New York - Lisbon tour. The
aircraft was scheduled to depart from Kennedy Interna-
tional Airport in New York (JFK) at 11:59 p.m. on May 2,
1979. The departure was delayed due to a hydraulic sys-
tem failure. The Arkins were originally told that the flight
would depart at 4:00 or 4:30 a.m. The tour operator
would not provide dinner or motel accommodations. The
Arkins returned at 2:30 a.m., as requested, only to be ad-
vised there would be further delays. The flight eventually
departed at approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 3, 1979.
The Arkins claimed they did not receive appropriate
flight information. However, the court stated that the
Arkins were provided with truthful flight information,
although not by Trans International directly. Mrs. Arkin
was having physical discomfort but did not seek medical
attention. Therefore, her claim for a failure to provide
medical services failed. With regard to the claim that a
rest place was not provided, the court stated that the
Arkins spent at least four hours in a motel restaurant and
room and the remainder of the time in the Concorde area
of the Air France lounge, a large area with many seats.
# 7 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,254 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 1987).
4...815 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1987).
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The international terminal at JFK was operated by the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and any com-
plaints about the airport's lack of amenities can only be
made to the Port Authority. Moreover, since the passen-
gers were aware that when they purchased less expensive
charter transportation they would not have "Concorde-
type amenities" in connection with their late night flight,
they had no complaint against the charter airline, and any
complaint they may have had could only be brought
against their tour operator.1 9
Neilan v. Value Vacations, Inc. ,420 held that a class action
brought against a tour operator for failure to provide re-
imbursements for cancelled flights adequately stated a
cause of action. The tour operator had entered into a de-
pository agreement with a bank to provide escrow ac-
counts for the consumer's funds. When the consumers
sought reimbursement, it was discovered that approxi-
mately $1.33 million was missing from the escrow ac-
count. It was later discovered that Arrow Air, the air
carrier, had consistently requested more money for flights
than was appropriate. Arrow Air's bank, on request,
transferred funds from the escrow account to Arrow's op-
erating account but never cross checked to be sure the
amounts coincided with the original payment amount.
The court held that direct mailing of notices followed
by publication of the proposed settlement was sufficient.
The plaintiffs alleged that Arrow Air's bank violated a fed-
eral regulation requiring separate accounts to be main-
tained, and that the bank had breached its fiduciary duty
created by the same regulation. The court stated the pur-
pose of the regulation was to segregate and protect con-
sumer's funds, and concluded that Arrow's bank had
failed to observe the required procedures and granted
summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court approved
the class settlement, stating that it was within an accepta-
Id. at 14.
116 F.R.D. 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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ble range of reasonableness and the risks of proving liabil-
ity were outweighed by the benefits of settlement.
E. Discrimination
In Williams v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc.,421 the Ninth Circuit
held that formerly-employed pilots were not entitled to
partial summary judgment when they challenged a com-
pany policy requiring experimental and production test
pilots to stop flying when they reached certain ages. On
October 1, 1982, Hughes Helicopters put into effect a
policy which required experimental pilots to stop flying at
age 55 and production pilots to stop flying at age 60. A
complaint was filed alleging age discrimination, and
Hughes raised the bona fide occupational qualification de-
fense (BFOQ). The plaintiffs alleged that Hughes could
not properly rely on the FAA's age-60 rule and other ex-
pert testimony developed at trial to validate its stop-flying
policy.
Plaintiffs contended the FAA's age-60 rule was irrele-
vant. The court disagreed. Relying on Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Criswell,422 it held the rule was relevant in support of
a BFOQ defense, if there was sufficient congruity between
the occupation of commercial airline pilots, upon which
the age-60 rule is based, and helicopter test pilots. The
court found sufficient congruity between the two and also
found that the weight of the evidence supported a safety
rationale. The court held the age-60 rule relevant.
F. Miscellaneous
In Patterson v. United Airlines, Inc. , judgment was en-
tered in favor of United Airlines in a negligence action
brought by a passenger who fell from the mobile stairway
while deplaning. As the plaintiff was deplaning, she fell
from the last step when the passenger agent allegedly
421 806 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1986).
422 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
12:, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,073 (D. Or. May 12, 1987).
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"lunged" at her. The court found that the plaintiff was 61
years old, had a weak and unstable left knee, and was sus-
ceptible to stumbling. The passenger agent went up the
stairs to render assistance to the passenger because she
seemed to have stumbled. The passenger agent's actions
were a minor factor in causing the plaintiff to fall, if his
actions were a cause at all. The court held that the plain-
tiff had not established that the negligence of United Air-
lines or its agent approached the 51 % fault necessary to
entitle plaintiff to damages.
In Harby v. Saadeh,424 the Ninth Circuit held Kuwait Air-
ways was not liable for damages arising out of a passen-
ger's delay in Yemen, for 10 days, because the airline
could not provide him timely return reservations. The
plaintiff had purchased a round-trip, open-return ticket
between San Francisco and Yemen. The court found that
an open-return ticket guarantees no departure time but
merely the right to the next available open seat. In addi-
tion, the court found the travel agent was not an agent of
Kuwait Airways. Plaintiff failed to show he was entitled to
the difference between the round-trip airfare and the por-
tion of the ticket used by plaintiff, as provided for in the
Federal Aviation Act.42 5
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster426 the D.C. Circuit held that
KAL was entitled to avail itself of the $75,000 per passen-
ger limitation contained on its tickets even though the
tickets used 8-point type, rather than the 10-point type re-
quired under the Convention. Plaintiffs contended that
the court was bound to follow contrary Second Circuit427
precedent because the cases had been transferred to the
District of Columbia and the transferee court was bound
424 816 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1987).
42 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 403(a), 49 U.S.C. app. § 1373(a) (1982).
42o 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1288 (1988).
427 Robles v. LOT Polish Airlines (In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland),
705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845 (1983) (airline's use of 8.5 point
rather than 10 point type to inform passengers of liability limitations made the
airlines limitation of liability void).
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by the law of the transferor court.42 18 The D.C. Circuit,
however, held that the rule relied upon by the plaintiffs
only required the transferee court to follow state law in
diversity actions, not conflicting interpretations of federal
law.429 In the latter case, each circuit is free to adopt its
own interpretation. The court noted, however, that such
matters are "in need of definitive resolution for our na-
tional court system. "430 Accordingly, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the issue.43'
In Tsangalakis v. Olympic Airways,432 the court denied the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, because at is-
sue was the place of destination, which the court deter-
mined was a question of fact. Pursuant to Article 28(1) of
the Warsaw Convention, the plaintiff could bring his ac-
tion in the forum of his destination. However, the plain-
tiff's destination could not be readily determined
because, although the ticket provided for passage from
Athens to New York on June 17, 1985, the return to Ath-
ens was "open." No date for the return was booked.
VII. LIMITATION oF ACTIONS
A. Statutes of Repose
Kirchner v. Aviall, Inc. ,433 held that Florida's 12-year stat-
ute of repose barred plaintiff's wrongful death action. In
1955, General Dynamics Corporation sold to the United
States Navy, the original purchaser, a certain airplane
which crashed on April 30, 1983, killing Kirchner's hus-
428 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). "[W]here the defendants seek
transfer, the transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that
would have been applied if there had been no change of venue." Id. at 639.
4211 In re Korean Airline Disaster, 829 F.2d at 1175-76. "The federal courts.., owe
respect to each other's efforts and should strive to avoid conflicts, but each has an
obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis. Binding precedent for
all is set only by the Supreme Court . Id. at 1176.
410 Id.
4".1 In re Korean Airline Disaster, 108 S. Ct. at 1288.
--, No. 87-C-6553 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 1987) (1987 LEXIS 11381, 1987 Westlaw
27321).
433 513 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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band.434 Less than two years later, Kirchner sued General
Dynamics for wrongful death based on a products liability
theory.43 5
Relying on Phlieger v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. ,436 the court
stated that the survivor's right of action under the wrong-
ful death statute must be determined by the facts existing
at the time of the death. Wrongful death actions may be
maintained only if the fatal event would have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action and recover damages
if death had not ensued. The twelve year statute of re-
pose on products liability actions43 7 had run long before
the death of Kirchner's husband. Therefore, the dece-
dent would not have been entitled to maintain an action.
The judgment was affirmed.
In Spellissy v. United Technologies Corp.,438 the court af-
firmed the trial court's denial of aj.n.o.v. and reversed the
dismissal of General Dynamics, Inc., the manufacturer of
the C-131F transport. The court of appeals held that the
statutory period for wrongful death actions, not the pe-
riod of time in Florida's statute of repose, applied to the
personal representatives of thirteen Navy crewmen who
died in the C-131F crash.439 The panel certified to the
Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the stat-
ute of repose should apply to the sole survivor.
The action arose from the April 30, 1983 crash of a
Navy C-131F transport plane which attempted an emer-
gency landing at the Jacksonville Naval Air Station, fol-
lowing an in-flight fire in the left engine. Fourteen
persons were killed, and the only survivor was severely in-
4.14 Id. at 1273.
-5 Id.
4.- 487 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 508 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1987)
(twelve-year products liability statute of repose inapplicable to wrongful death ac-
tion brought on behalf of truck driver killed due to allegedly defective roof
design).
417 FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1985). Amendment of this statute has effectively re-
pealed the twelve-year statute of repose as it applies to products liability actions.
Phlieger, 508 So. 2d at 715 n.2.
'i 823 F.2d 438 (1 1th Cir. 1987).
43s, Id. at 445-46.
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jured. Lawsuits were filed against Aviall, Inc., the
overhauler of the R2800 engine, and against General Dy-
namics, Inc., the designer and manufacturer of the air-
frame. The plaintiffs alleged that the engine failure and
resulting fire were caused by Aviall's use of an unauthor-
ized, or used, No. 8 piston pin during the overhaul pro-
cess. Plaintiffs also claimed that General Dynamics was
negligent in the design of the aircraft's fire control
system.
Florida's statute of repose required a product liability
action be brought within twelve years after the date of de-
livery of the completed product to its original purchaser.
The statute was subsequently repealed by the Florida leg-
islature. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court inter-
preted the statute, following the district court's decision,
and held that the statute of repose does not apply to an
action brought by a personal representative. 440 There-
fore, the appellate court in Spellissy held that the statute of
repose did not apply in the actions brought by the per-
sonal representatives for wrongful death.
In Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp. ,44 1 the
Oregon Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
and held the products liability statute of repose did not
insulate a manufacturer from negligence liability for fur-
nishing incorrect life-limit information on an engine com-
ponent after a product was sold.442 The suit arose out of
1981 crash of a helicopter which was purchased in 1971.
Plaintiff alleged that in 1977 the engine manufacturer
gave him a sheet incorrectly listing the life-limit of an en-
gine compressor disc as 6,000 hours, when in fact it was
4,000.4 43 The engine failed after approximately 4,300
hours. The trial court found liability.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court on the
ground that the products liability statute applied to any
44.. See supra notes 435 and 436 and accompanying text.
44 303 Or. 281, 735 P.2d 614, modified, 303 Or. 452, 736 P.2d 1023 (1987).
44._ Erickson Air-Crane, 735 P.2d at 618.
-:. Id. at 615.
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claim of failure to properly warn or instruct concerning
the use of the product.444 That court also held the claim
was barred because the action was brought more than ten
years after the helicopter was first sold.
The Oregon Supreme Court examined the legislative
history of the products liability statute and concluded the
legislature intended to establish a uniform cutoff date
concerning product defect claims arising at, or before, the
time the product was first purchased for use or consump-
tion.445 The court held that where there was a post-sale
failure to warn or properly instruct, another state statute
of repose was activated, which allowed ten years from the
date of the act or omission.
In S.S. Aircraft Company v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,446 the Mich-
igan Court of Appeals held that an aircraft purchaser's
products liability claim against the defendant was barred
by the three-year statute of limitations concerning prod-
ucts liability. The case arose from a 1981 crash of a Chey-
enne during an instrument approach. The complaint was
filed more than three years after the crash. The court also
dismissed, as untimely, defendant's amendment to its
original timely cross complaint to allege products liability.
B. Tolling
In Bancorp Leasing and Financial Corporation v. Agusta Avia-
tion Corporation,447 the Ninth Circuit held that breach of
warranty claims against a foreign helicopter manufacturer
were barred by Oregon's two-year products liability stat-
ute of limitations. 448 The complaint was filed within two
years of the injury, but the summons was not served
within sixty days from the date the complaint was filed.
Service of the summons did not therefore, relate back to
44 79 Or. App. 659, 720 P.2d 389 (1986).
4 Erickson Air-Crane, 735 P.2d at 617.
446 159 Mich. App. 389, 406 N.W.2d 304 (1987).
4 7 813 F.2d 272 (9th Cir. 1987).
44 Id. at 277.
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the time of filing the complaint under Oregon law.449 The
court rejected plaintiff's argument that the statute was
tolled because the defendants did not transact business in
the state and were not amenable to service. Plaintiffs did
not claim they were unable to locate and serve the defend-
ants. Because the defendants were amenable to service by
mail, the tolling statute for persons who could not be
"found within the state" was inapplicable.4 50
The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that
the breach of warranty claim should be governed by the
UCC four-year statute of limitations45' rather than the
two-year statute of repose.452 Plaintiff claimed that the
four-year UCC statute applied because the claim was for
property damage, rather than personal injury. The Ninth
Circuit disagreed.453
In Tennimon v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. , the appellate
court held that the district court correctly granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant. 45 5 Texas' limi-
tations period commences upon discovery of the injury
described in the complaint, not upon discovery of all the
elements of the applicable cause of action.45 6 Plaintiff's
husband was killed in a 1973 crash in Kentucky. Plaintiff
argued, before the district court, that the Texas statute of
limitations should be tolled because defendant was aware
of the phenomenon of "mast bumping" since 1967, and
did not inform the pilot. 45 7 The district court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that this constituted concealment of
the plaintiff's cause of action and the plaintiff did not take
this issue on appeal. Also significant was the plaintiff's
,c, Id. at 274 n.2.
-.. Id. at 275.
4.' OR. REV. STAT. § 72.7250(i) (1988).
4. OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(2) (1988).
1 Bancorp Leasing, 813 F.2d at 277. "Under [Oregon] law, a claim remains a
products liability claim even though the only property damage for which the claim
is made is damages to the product itselt." Id. (citations omitted).
454 823 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1987).
455 Id. at 69.
451! Id. at 72.
4,7 Id. at 73 n.5.
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failure to ascertain who manufactured the helicopter. Nor
did the plaintiff sufficiently raise an issue of fact concern-
ing Bell's actual knowledge of any wrong. Bell's affidavit
claimed no concealment of the mast-bumping taking
place.
In First Interstate Bank v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,458 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
could be tolled by an aircraft manufacturer's fraudulent
concealment of the facts underlying the wrongful act. The
elements necessary to toll the statute were:
1) concealment of a material existing fact that in equity
and good conscience should be disclosed; 2) knowledge
on the part of the party against whom the claim is asserted
that the fact is being concealed; 3) ignorance of that fact
by the one from whom the fact was concealed; 4) the in-
tention that the concealment be acted upon; and 5) action
on the concealment resulting in damages.459
The court held that the question of fraudulent conceal-
ment was for the jury.
VIII. HAGUE CONVENTION
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dis-
trict Court,4 60 arose from a 1982 crash in Alaska of a heli-
copter manufactured by a French government-owned
corporation. The plaintiff alleged a design defect and re-
quested discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34.461 The
French corporation objected on the grounds that the
Hague Convention should be followed, and that French
law precluded French citizens from disclosing economic,
commercial, or related documents, except those subject
to international treaties or agreements.46 2
The Supreme Court held, 5-4, that the Hague Conven-
45m 744 P.2d 1197 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
... Id. at 1200.
4W. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
4- Id. at 2546.
4i2 Id.
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tion4 63 was not an exclusive discovery device against for-
eign defendants; nor were courts uniformly required to
resort to the Hague Convention before permitting discov-
ery under the Federal Rules.464 Rather, the Court held
that principles of international comity require a court to
determine such issues on a case-by-case basis. The Court
turned to the following factors contained in the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law: 465
[1] the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested;
[2] the degree of specificity of the request;
[3] whether the information originated in the United
States;
[4] the availability of alternative means of securing the in-
formation; and
[5] the extent to which noncompliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United
States, or compliance with the request would under-
mine important interests of the state where the infor-
mation is located.466
The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit,
which had held that the Convention does not apply when
a district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant,
even though the information sought may be physically lo-
cated within the territory of a foreign signatory to the
Convention. The Court stated, "such a rule would deny
the foreign litigant a full and fair opportunity to demon-
strate appropriate reasons for employing Convention
procedures.... 467
Foreign-based manufacturers had argued in these types
of cases that the Hague Convention preempted the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, that the
463 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commer-
cial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 255, T.I.A.S. No. 7444,
847 U.N.T.S. 231.
464 Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
4i RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 437(l)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
466 Id.; Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
467 Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
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Convention should be a first resort before using the Fed-




In Andor v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,469 the Oregon Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that punitive
damages were not warranted against United Airlines. A
jury had awarded $161,275 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages to a minor who survived
United's DC-8 crash in Portland, Oregon in 1978, in
which both her parents died.470 The crash occurred when
the plane ran out of fuel. It circled Portland because the
crew mistakenly believed that the landing gear had failed.
Plaintiff maintained that United took an unreasonable risk
to reduce costs by failing to replace a corroded eyebolt in
the landing gear system, and that the pilot and crew's con-
duct in running out of fuel after the abnormal extension
of the landing gear constituted willful or wanton
misconduct.47
The trial judge granted aj.n.o.v. as to punitive damages
and the court of appeals reversed en banc.472 The court of
appeals held that whether a defendant's conduct qualified
for punitive damages was a jury question and that judges
should not attempt to substitute their judgment for that of
the jury by making subjective, normative evaluations of
the "aggravatedness" of the defendant's conduct.473
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, ruled that
neither of plaintiff's claims supported a claim for punitive
A- Id. at 2551-52 n.20.
... 303 Or. 505, 739 P.2d 18 (1987).
4711 Id. at 507, 739 P.2d at 19.
-471 Andor v. United Air Lines, 79 Or. App. 311, 311, 719 P.2d 492, 497 (1986),
rev'd, 303 Or. 505, 739 P.2d 18 (1987).
17-2 Id. at 311, 719 P.2d at 499.
... Id. at 311, 719 P.2d at 496 (citing 2-D's Logging v. Weyerhaeuser, 53 Or.
App. 677, 632 P.2d 1319 (1981)).
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damages.474 The court was required to determine
"whether the defendant's relationship to the victim im-
pose[d] obligations greater than would [exist] toward a
stranger," which in turn bore upon "the mental element
required to impose liability and also on the offensiveness
of the conduct." The Oregon Supreme Court pointed
out that a court may also have to determine whether the
alleged acts, "if proved, qualify as extraordinary conduct
which a reasonable jury could find beyond the farthest
reaches of socially tolerable behavior." Finally, the
supreme court noted that a court must determine whether
the defendant in fact engaged in conduct beyond the far-
thest reaches of socially tolerable behavior.475
The court concluded that in certain instances, not ex-
isting here, negligent actions, involving persons perform-
ing different functions in an organization, may establish
that the organization as a whole was indifferent to known
or highly predictable risks. This indifference evinces the
degree of social irresponsibility that justifies punitive
476damages.
B. Non-Pecuniary Damages
In Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc.,"7 the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal upheld a non-economic damages
award for a seriously retarded child even though the
award substantially exceeded the amount of economic
loss. A 42V Piper aircraft crashed enroute from Guaymas
to Tucson killing the child's father. The court held the
lower court's award of $1.5 million in non-economic dam-
ages to the seriously retarded child not excessive. De-
fendants' argument that the retarded child would miss the
love and affection of parents less than a normal child
would provoked chastisement by the court.
474 Andor, 303 Or. at 515-16, 739 P.2d at 24-25.
475 Id. at 513, 739 P.2d at 23 (citing Hall v. May Dept. Stores, 292 Or. 131, 637
P.2d 126 (1981)).
06 Id. at 516, 739 P.2d at 25.
177 191 Cal. App. 3d 709, 236 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1987) (review denied July 23,
1987).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In Darras v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. ,478 a district court
found that the wife of a passenger aboard a hijacked plane
was not entitled to recover for emotional distress suffered
from viewing seventeen days of media coverage, because
she was not in the zone of physical danger.
C. Personal Consumption/Income Taxes
In Woodling v. Garrett Corp.,4 the Second Circuit af-
firmed the liability of the defendants for the Lockheed Jet-
star crash near Westchester County, New York in 1981.
Six executives of Texasgulf, Inc., the pilot, and the co-pi-
lot were killed. Defendants were not immune from liabil-
ity merely because they were covered by worker's
compensation. In addition, the court affirmed the district
court's refusal to apply that state's law to avoid the
worker's compensation immunity defense.4 0 The court
ruled that the plaintiff was also entitled to rescission of a
release she signed in favor of the parent company.48'
However, the court vacated the damages award of $1.1
million. The court found that the district court erred on
the following points: (1) allowing the jury to deduct in-
come taxes from one plaintiff's future lost earnings; (2)
calculating the prejudgment interest to which one plaintiff
was entitled; and (3) failing to require the same plaintiff to
pay Texasgulf interest on $250,000 for the period during
which she had use of the money prior to her rescission of
the release agreement.48 2
D. Wrongful Death
Schuler v. United States48 3 arose when a Cessna 401
crashed in the vicinity of the Muskegon County Airport
47, Darras v. Trans World Airlines (In re Hijacking of Trans World Airlines Air-
craft on June 14, 1985), 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,441 (D. Mass. Oct.
27, 1986).
47t. 813 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1987).
.. Id. at. 549.
Id. at 551.
,,- Id. at 557.
-. Av. L. REP., Sept. 28, 1987, at 7,647 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 1987).
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killing the pilot and a paying passenger. On the issue of
damages, the court held that evidence concerning future
tax liability would be considered in calculating the
amount of economic damages awarded to the passenger
but, with regard to the pilot, future tax liability would not
be considered, because the economic injury he suffered
was modest.
The passenger, Schuler, was the president of a Michi-
gan company. To determine the amount of economic loss
to Schuler's estate, the court considered the earnings of a
co-owner, stating that it was proper to consider evidence
of salary and profits earned by similarly situated persons,
because such testimony has a tendency to prove what the
decedent would have earned had he remained in a partic-
ular line of business. Income tax returns and the financial
condition of the Schuler estate were also factored into the
court's conclusion that the estate suffered a loss of
$1,650,000. Future income awarded for profits and in-
vestments was limited to ten years, because consideration
beyond this period would entail speculation. Schuler's
widow was awarded $750,000 for non-economic damages
and the two surviving children were awarded $200,000
each. The pilot's estate was awarded a total of $85,000.
Punitive damages were denied because they are not recov-
erable against the government.
E. Pecuniary Damages
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Texasgulf Avia-
tion, Inc. ,484 the defendants moved for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial on
the issue of damages. Defendants argued that the verdict
should be set aside because of the plaintiff's counsel's im-
proper summation. Alternatively, the defendants argued
that the judgment was excessive.
Plaintiff argued in summation that the decedent's in-
come should be used as a guideline to determine the pe-
... 669 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
cuniary value of the loss of parental care. The defendants
objected and submitted a curative instruction, claiming
that there was no relationship between the decedent's in-
come and the pecuniary loss of parental care. The court
rejected the instruction because it was not accurate to say
there was no relationship between the decedent's earning
power and the pecuniary value of his parental services.485
The court then correctly charged the jury as to what ele-
ments should be considered with respect to the pecuniary
damages for the loss of parental guidance. The court re-
jected the motion for a new trial based upon improper
summation.
The court did hold the verdict to be excessive. Dece-
dent had eight children, but only one was a minor at the
time of the crash. One of the adult children was living at
home, but the remaining children had established their
independence and their careers. After reviewing cases de-
cided by New York courts and federal courts, the court
reduced the award to $250,000.
F. Recovery of Costs and Attorney Fees
In Tiedel v. Beech Aircraft Corp. ,86 plaintiff filed a motion
to vacate a judgment granting the defendant costs and at-
torney fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920,487 Fed. R. Civ.
485 Id. at 83. The court concluded that decedent was a rich and influential man
who had power to do more for his children than someone of more humble status,
For example, the decedent had already helped several of his children with their
career opportunities. Two of his children had been employed by Texasgulf, and
he had helped another gain employment with Morgan Guaranty some years
before his death. Id.
486 118 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (1987 Westlaw 3500).
497 Id. at 60. 28 U.S.C. section 1920 reads as follows:
A judge or clerk or any court of the United State may tax as costs the
following: (1) Fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) Fees of the court
reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily
obtained for use in the case; (3) Fees and disbursements for printing
and witnesses; (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers nec-
essarily obtained for use in the case; (5) Docket fees under section
1923 of this title; (6) Compensation of court appointed experts,
compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs
of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. A
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P. 54(d), 488 and Michigan Local Court Rules 42(j) and
42(k) 489
Plaintiff argued that Local Rules 42(j) and 42 (k), in im-
posing the prevailing party's actual costs on the losing
party, was inconsistent with both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, because neither
the statute nor the Rules contain any provision for includ-
ing, as "costs", the prevailing parties actual expert wit-
ness fees or attorney's fees.
The court applied Michigan law regarding the imposi-
tion of attorney's fees. Under Michigan law, attorney's
fees may not be recovered as an element of costs unless
authorized by statute or court rule. Under Michigan's
mandatory mediation rule, attorney's fees may be
awarded as costs, if a party fails to recover a verdict
greater than that awarded by the mediation panel. Thus,
the court found the imposition of attorney's fees as costs a
valid exercise of its rule-making authority.
Plaintiff also objected to imposition of enhanced expert
witness fees as taxable costs pursuant to the mediation
rule. The court relied on Crawford-Fitting Co. v. J.T Gib-
bons, Inc. ,490 where the Supreme Court held that absent
explicit statutory or contractual authority, a federal court
bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included
in the judgment or decree.
28 U.S.C. § 1920 (1982).
4sH Tiedel, 118 F.R.D. at 60. The circuits had previously split on whether Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(d) and 28 U.S.C. section 1920 permitted taxation of expert witness fees
in excess of the $30 limit mandated by 28 U.S.C. section 1821. Id.
4... Id. at 58. Sections 42(j)(3) and (k) provide:
6)(3) If the mediation panel's evaluation is unanimous and the de-
fendant accepts the evaluation but the plaintiff rejects it and the mat-
ter proceeds to trial, the plaintiff must obtain a verdict in an amount
which, when interest on the amount and costs from the date of filing
of the complaint to the date of the evaluation are added, is more
than ten (10) per cent greater than the evaluation in order to avoid
the payment of actual costs to the defendant. (k) Actual costs. Ac-
tual costs include those costs and fees taxable in any civil action and
attorneys' fees for each day of trial as may be determined by the
court.
Id.
.. 107 S. Ct. 2494 (1987).
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may not tax expert witness fees against a losing party in
excess of the thirty dollars per day statutory fee mandated
by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. 49 1 The award was reduced to the
extent that costs awarded included payment of expert wit-
ness fees in excess of thirty dollars per day of trial.492
X. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. Pilot Qualifications
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Zurzolo, 493 the Third
Circuit affirmed a declaratory judgment in favor of the in-
surer, finding no coverage for a pilot who failed to satisfy
the pilot warranty requirements of the policy. The crash
occurred while the policy was still under binder. The in-
sured argued that the binder was ambiguous on its face,
and, therefore, must be construed in favor of coverage.
Relying on Vlastos v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Insurance
Co. ,494 the court noted that, in determining whether there
was any ambiguity, the court need not confine its atten-
tion to the four corners of the contract but may consider
extrinsic evidence. The district court, therefore, correctly
considered evidence of the pilot's understanding of the
binder's terms. Specifically, the district court found that
the coverage requirements were explained to the pilot
and that the pilot requested a reduction in the solo flight
prerequisites for coverage. From these facts, the district
court reasoned that the pilot was aware that he would not
be covered for solo flight until he met the binder's re-
quirements. The district court concluded that the con-
tract was not ambiguous, in light of the extrinsic evidence.
The Third Circuit found that the district court's findings
and conclusions were not clearly erroneous.
Transport Indemnity Co. v. Sky-Kraft, Inc. ,495 found no cov-
erage for a renter pilot's estate under fixed-base operator
41, Tiedel, 118 F.R.D. at 60.
49)2 Id.
4 , 835 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1987).
4... 707 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1983).
49r, 48 Wash. App. 471, 740 P.2d 319 (1987).
19881
92 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
(FBO) policy and that there were issues of fact precluding
summary judgment as to a "hull and liability" policy.
On August 13, 1981, Schaefer rented an aircraft from
Sky-Kraft for a flight to Klamath Falls, Oregon. Schaefer
held a private pilot's license limited to VFR operations.49 6
At 5:50 a.m., Schaefer obtained a weather report from the
Portland Flight Service Station which indicated that the
weather at Portland International Airport was "marginal
VFR."497 Schaefer departed from Pearson Airpark, four
miles from Portland International, at 6:11 a.m. By this
time Portland International was reporting IFR weather
conditions. Schaefer crashed approximately four minutes
after takeoff, in a wooded area 3.5 miles from Pearson
Airpark.
Schaefer's estate filed a wrongful death action against
Sky-Kraft, alleging negligent entrustment and instruction
by Sky-Kraft in the operation of its flight school business.
Sky-Kraft was covered by two insurance policies at the
time of the accident: a hull and liability policy and a FBO
policy.498 The insurer claimed there was no coverage
under the hull and liability policy because: (1) Schaefer
was not properly rated for instrument flight; and (2)
Schaefer's claims of "negligent entrustment" and "negli-
gent flight instruction" did not arise out of the use of the
aircraft.499
The insurer disputed coverage under the FBO policy
because: (1) Schaefer's death was not caused by an acci-
dent which arose in or about the premises or elsewhere in
the course of the performance of the insured's duties; and
(2) Schaefer's death was not caused by an accident which
arose out of the possession, use, consumption, or han-
dling of any goods supplied or distributed by the
insured.500
-,; Id. 740 P.2d at 321.
497 Id.
-. Id. at 322.
4, Id. at 327.
Id. at 327-28.
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In order to determine whether Schaefer was properly
rated for the flight, the court had to determine whether
the fatal flight should be characterized as a VFR or an IFR
flight. Relying on National Insurance Underwriters v. King
Craft Custom Products, Inc. ,5o1 and Glover v. National Insurance
Underwriters,50 2 the court stated that the flight was to be
characterized as a whole according to the weather condi-
tions existing at the point of departure.
The record failed to establish if the weather was indis-
putably IFR or VFR at Pearson Airpark at the time of de-
parture. The court concluded that a genuine issue of
material fact remained to be determined, and held that
summary judgment in favor of Schaefer's estate was im-
proper. Relying on Farmers Insurance Group v. Johnson,50 5
the court concluded that the claim based on negligent en-
trustment and instruction was indivisibly related to the
use of the aircraft. Therefore, if Schaefer was properly
rated for the flight, the liability portion of the policy
would be applicable.
Regarding the FBO policy, the court found there was
no coverage. The court viewed "in or about the prem-
ises" to mean in the immediate vicinity of the FBO prem-
ises. The aircraft crashed 3.5 miles from Pearson Airpark
and, thus, was not in the immediate vicinity. The court
further concluded that after Schaefer obtained the keys to
the aircraft, Sky-Kraft ceased performing any ongoing
work or duties. Accordingly, Schaefer's death did not oc-
cur in the course of the performance of Sky-Kraft's duties.
Coverage was also denied under the FBO policy because
368 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir. 1974).
. 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977). The court stated that the term "flight" refers
to the entire time the aircraft is in flight. The court refused to adopt a "segmented
approach" whereby the flight status changes as the pilot enters differing weather
condtions. Id. at 762.
5W, 43 Wash. App. 39, 715 P.2d 144 (1986). InJohnson, the court held that a
claim of negligent entrustment of a boat was indivisibly related to an insurance
clause that precluded coverage for injuries arising from use of watercraft. Id. at
146-47. The court stated that the favored trend is to view the claim of negligent
entrustment as derived from, rather than exclusive of, use of an "instrumentality."
Id. at 146.
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the policy was intended to provide coverage for injuries
or damages caused by defects in goods or products, not
negligent operation of the flight school.
In URSA Air Ltd. v. Federal Insurance Co. ,504 plaintiff's air-
craft was destroyed when flown by a pilot who was not
authorized to operate the aircraft. Plaintiff delivered the
aircraft to a broker for the purpose of selling the aircraft,
but the broker permitted the aircraft to be flown by some-
one who was not an approved pilot under the pilot war-
ranty. Defendant denied coverage, and the plaintiff sued
for a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff claimed, in effect,
that it should not bear the loss when the aircraft was flown
without its permission. The insurer argued successfully
that the policy excluded coverage for any "loss due to
conversion by any person in lawful possession of the air-
craft or by any person whose possession of the aircraft
would be lawful but for such conversion. ' ' 5 °- The court
held that under the exclusion, "the defendant does not
assume the risk of the insured's carelessness in delivering
the aircraft to and allowing its use by someone who might
convert it." 50
6
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. V. Zuver,50 7 the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals held there was no coverage for a
non-instrument rated pilot who flew in instrument condi-
tions for at least one mile prior to the crash. However,
the Washington Supreme Court reversed.
The insured argued that an ambiguity existed between
the exclusionary language and the pilot warranty. 50 8 The
51.4 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,281 (E.D.N.Y. July 19, 1987).
Id. at 18,282.
I ld. The court stated that if there was a conversion, it was the plaintiff who
created the opportunity. Id.
507 47 Wash. App. 540, 736 P.2d 675 (1987), rev'd, 110 Wash. 2d 207, 750 P.2d
1247 (1988).
Id. 736 P.2d at 676. The policy exclusionary language stated:
This policy does not apply: To any insured while the aircraft is in
flight (b) if piloted by a pilot not properly certified, qualified, and
rated under the applicable federal air regulations for the operation in-
volved, whether or not said pilot is designated in the declarations;
The pilot warranty stated: 1. Insurance will be effective only when
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court of appeals disagreed, concluding that the intent of
the words "operation involved," which is not defined in
the policy, meant something other than "flight" or "in
flight". 50' Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court
overruled the lower court's decision. The supreme court
held that the terms "operation involved" were ambiguous
and that insurance law requires construing an ambiguous
contract term in favor of the insured. The court held that
the terms refer to the flight as a whole, from its inception,
rather than as a segmented moment-to-moment series of
incidents. 510  Thus, the insured's coverage was held
effective.
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer,51" ' National
denied coverage because the policy endorsement stated
that the insurance would be effective only when the air-
plane was operated by a pilot holding a current medical
certificate. 51 2 The airplane crashed while flown by a pilot
with an expired medical certificate. The pilot's physical
condition was not a cause of the crash. The trial court
concluded that National waived its contention that a cur-
rent medical certificate was required to cause effective
coverage because in responding to a request for admis-
sion, it admitted that the policy was in full force and effect
the operation of the insured aircraft in motion is by a pilot desig-
nated below who possess [sic] a current and valid pilot certificate of
the kind specified with appropriate ratings, and a current medical cer-
tificate; all as required by the Federal Aviation Administrationfor the
flight involved and who meets the additional qualifications set forth
below.
Id.
. Id. at 677-78.
Zuver, 750 P.2d at 1249.
s,, 192 Cal. App. 3d 866, 237 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1987).
Id. 237 Cal. Rptr. at 633. The endorsement stated:
Insurance will be effective only when the operation of the insured
aircraft in motion is by a pilot designated below who possess[es] a
current a valid pilot certificate of the kind specified with appropriate
ratings, and a current medical certificate; all as required by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration for the flight involved and who meets
the additional qualifications set forth below.
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the day of the accident.5 1 3
The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that
National had not waived the coverage issue.5 14 It further
held that the pilot warranty clearly excluded coverage
where the pilot did not meet the medical certificate re-
quirement, and that there need not be a causal connection
between the policy violation and the loss.5 5
B. Renter Pilots
In Rusk Aviation, Inc. v. Northcott,516 a student pilot
crashed during a solo flight, damaging the plane and two
parked aircraft. The aircraft was operated under a rental
agreement or a training program, for which renumeration
was received. Rusk Aviation and Employers Casualty
sued for damages to parked aircraft, claiming the owners
of the aircraft negligently entrusted the Piper aircraft to
the pilot.
The court held that the insurance company could prop-
erly refuse to defend the student pilot because he was not
an "insured" under the omnibus clause.5 1 7 -The provision
was held not to include persons operating under any
rental agreement or training program which provided re-
muneration to the named insured. The court based this
holding on a provision in the policy which expressly ex-
cluded such persons.51 8
C. Air Taxi Endorsement
Forum Insurance Co. v. Seitz Aviation, Inc. ,59 arose out of
an airplane crash in which several occupants of the aircraft
.11 Id.
I t14 Id.
' Id. at 636.
3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,817 (Ill. App, Dec. 31, 1986).
5 Id. at 17,818-19. The plaintiffs agreed that the definition of "insured" set
out in the policy included student pilots. The definition included "the named
insured and any person or organization legally responsible for its use, provided
the actual use is with the permission of the [niamed [i]nsured." Id at 17,818.
,I /d.
241 Kan. 334, 737 P.2d 29 (1987).
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were insureds under an aviation insurance policy. The
policy specifically excluded liability coverage for any claim
by one insured against any other insured. However, the
policy also contained an air taxi endorsement deleting all
exclusions and replacing them with a more limited set of
exclusions which omitted the exclusion in question. The
Kansas Supreme Court held that the exclusion applied
unless the decedents were killed in an air taxi opera-
tion. 52 0  The court remanded the case to determine
whether the fatal flight was that of an air taxi flight.52'
D. Miscellaneous Coverage Cases
In American Eagle Insurance Co. v. Lemons,522 the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals held an insurer liable under terms
of the "newly acquired aircraft" clause of a policy when a
passenger was killed on the same day the pilot purchased
a new airplane. 523
Employers Casualty Co. v. Dietz,524 held that "[a]n aviation
liability and hull insurance policy covering an aircraft in-
volved in a mid-air collision did not provide coverage as
to any claims either directly or indirectly from the estate
of an individual killed in an aircraft or from any other
party seeking contribution or indemnification for pay-
ments of obligations to the estate. ' 525 During the cover-
age period, a Cessna 150 and a Mooney M-20C collided in
mid-air, killing Baker and Dietz in the insured Mooney
aircraft and Gibbons and Goldsmith in the Cessna 150.26
"The policy provided in the definition of the term 'in-
520 Id. 737 P.2d at 34-35.
52 Id. at 35.
52"- 722 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
.12.1 Id. at 232. The clause provides: "If you notify us during the policy period
and within 30 days after you acquire ownership of another aircraft, and pay the
additional premium, we cover it ..... Id. The court held that since the clause did
not require sole ownership, it was not required in order for the clause to attach.
ld.
d. 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,819 (Pa. Comm. Pleas Nov. 18, 1986),
aff'd, 533 A.2d 1079 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
52t Id. at 17,819.
526 Id. at 17,820.
19881
98 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
sured' that the insurance with respect to any person or
organization other than the named insured did not apply
to: '(a) bodily injury or death of any person who is the
named insured .... ' 527 There was no merit found in the
contention that the language which had the effect of a de-
nial of coverage was in the wrong place in the policy and
should have been in the exclusion section of the policy.528
"It was significant that the policy was approved as re-
quired by statute and there was no ambiguity created by
either the language of the policy or by its placement in the
policy. Finally, a contention that public policy demanded
that the insurance policy be enforced could not be
accepted."529
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Tex-
tron,530 the Tenth Circuit held that the manufacturer was
not immune from a subrogation suit by its insurer under
an insurance policy intended to benefit both purchaser
and manufacturer. 53' The manufacturer was not the "in-
sured" party under the policy, since the purchaser's pol-
icy, by endorsement, reserved a right of subrogation.
Recognition of the manufacturer as an insured would
have precluded suit by the insurer.
In St. Paul Insurance Co. of Illinois v. Venezuelan Interna-
tional Airways, Inc. ,532 the court held that the "contract of
carriage" between Viasa and St. Paul consisted of both
the airway bill and all validly filed tariff. The action arose
from the alleged pilferage or shortage of spare tractor
parts sent from Caracas, Venezuela to Miami, Florida.
527 Id. at 17,819.
52H Id.
5211 Id.
..0 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986). Rocky Mountain purchased the helicopter
involved in an accident from Bell, the manufacturer. Id. at 909. The sales con-
tract, as well as a prior lease agreement, provided that Rocky Mountain, the pur-
chaser, would insure the helicopter "for the benefit of the Purchaser and Seller as
their interests may appear .. " Id. Following an accident involving the helicop-
ter, both Rocky Mountain and Southeastern, the company carrying the insurance
policy, sued Bell, claiming the accident was caused by a manufacturing defect. Id.
at 909-10.
5: I Id. at 914.
r132 807 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1987).
[54
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The shortages were discovered onJune 3rd andJune 10th
of 1983, but written notice was not sent to Viasa untilJuly
21, 1983. The court determined that the notice provision
in Viasa's tariff controlled. Consequently, St. Paul had
failed to give timely notice of its loss and its claim against
Viasa was barred.
In re Bethel Ventures, Inc. 533 concerned the construction of
the breach of warranty (BOW) endorsement in the insur-
ance policy purchased by Bethel. Plaintiff insured a fleet
of aircraft, some of which were financed by Cessna Fi-
nance. The underlying policy provided for a 10% deduct-
ible on losses; the breach of warranty endorsement
provided for a 3% deductible. The insurer argued that
the loss occurred without a denial of coverage by the in-
surer; in effect, Cessna Finance was simply a loss payee
under the main policy and, therefore, was subject to the
larger deductible on the main policy. Cessna Finance ar-
gued that the BOW was a separate contract of insurance
under which it was tantamount to a "first-party in-
sured. ' ' 534 The court agreed, holding that Cessna Fi-
nance's protection was afforded under the BOW and was,
therefore, subject to the smaller deductible.
XI. FAA ENFORCEMENT/LOCAL REGULATION
In Searight v. NTSB,53 5 the Tenth Circuit reviewed an ad-
ministrative law judge's (ALJ) determination that Searight
was careless and reckless in the operation of his aircraft in
violation of Federal Aviation Regulation § 91.9. 536 The
FAA claimed that Searight took off, landed, and then took
off again from the No. 2 airport in Salt Lake City, Utah, at
a time when the airport was closed for snow removal. The
.- , 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,296 (D. Alaska June 7, 1987).
": Id. Cessna Finance argued that the BOW was a separate contract which of-
fered protection to the lienholder from negligent acts of the insured. Id.
812 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1987). The case arose from the NTSB's suspension
of the pilot's commercial pilot certificate. Id. at 638.
5:,1, Id. at 638. Section 91.9 provides that "[n]o person may operate an aircraft
in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of another."
14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1988).
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FAA also claimed that Searight flew in close proximity to a
snow blower and its operator.
In response, Searight contended that "someone" had
informed him that the airport was open. He testified that
he landed after the initial takeoff because he thought
something was wrong with his engine. Searight further
stated that he never saw the snow blower or its operator.
The ALJ responded by saying that Searight's testimony
that he did not see the snow blower was "inherently
incredible." 537
Searight claimed that the ALJ was personally biased be-
cause the ALJ overruled an objection based on hearsay,
stating that "he was going to be 'up front' and apprise all
at that point that he was disinclined to give much weight
to that type of testimony. ' 538 The court held that Sea-
right's claim of prejudice was unsupported by the record
and affirmed the NTSB's suspension order.
New York v. Muhly5 9 held that provisions of the New
York City Administrative Code,5 40 which prohibited ad-
vertising by aircraft using tow banners, were not violated
when a helicopter equipped with an illuminating sign
overflew the city advertising a fast food chain. On July 5,
1986, a fast food chain used the defendant's company to
conduct promotional flights. The helicopter was
equipped with an illuminating sign installed below the fu-
selage and above the landing skids. The sign became a
permanent part of the aircraft when installed thus requir-
ing the defendants to obtain authorization from the FAA.
The defendant obtained the necessary authorization but,
'.7 Seafight, 812 F.2d at 639. The findings of the ALJ can be summarized as
follows: (1) Searight knew, or should have known, that the airport was closed at
the time of takeoff, landing, and subsequent takeoff; (2) Searight took off on a
runway where a snowblower was being operated; (3) testimony that Searight
never saw the snowblower being operated was "inherently incredible"; and (4)
Searight's conduct was reckless and endangered his passengers as well as the
snowblower. Id.
5:11 Id. at 639-40.
539 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,791 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Nov. 13, 1986).
..... N Y. Crr ADMIN. CODE § 435-16.0(d) (Consol. 1986).
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nonetheless, the helicopter was intercepted and forced to
land, and the pilot was arrested.
The Administrative Code prohibited any person to ad-
vertise in the form of towing banners from aircraft. The
defendant argued that the electric sign was "affixed" to
the helicopter and did not constitute a "tow banner"
within the meaning of the statute.-4 ' The court stated that
due process required a criminal statute to be stated in
terms which were reasonably definite so that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know what the law prohib-
its. 542 The court found that a person of ordinary intelli-
gence would not necessarily conclude that the defendant's
electric sign constituted a "tow banner" within the mean-
ing of the New York statute. Therefore, the defendant's
motion to dismiss was granted.
In Roach v. NTSB,543 the NTSB suspended Roach's
commercial pilot's certificate in a proceeding in which
Roach was called as an adverse witness. Roach claimed
that this violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Tenth
Circuit held that a certificate revocation proceeding
before the NTSB was not a criminal or quasi-criminal pro-
ceeding. Therefore, the airman was not entitled to invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
In Twomey v. NTSB,544 the First Circuit upheld the
FAA's revocation of plaintiff's certificate. Plaintiff had
backdated his application for renewal of his medical certif-
icate. Twomey argued that backdating his application
.14, Muhly, 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,791.
.54 Id.
.14 804 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1986) Roach, in the process of conducting a sales
demonstration flight, made three passes over the runway at approximately 500
feet, including a roll-over. Id. at 1149. This conduct violated section 91.79(c) of
the Federal Aviation Regulations, which prohibits operation of an aircraft at less
than 500 feet from the surface or within 500 feet of structures on the surface. 14
C.F.R. § 91.79 (1988).
.54 821 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1987). An FAA inspector discovered, on May 6, 1984,
that Twomey's medical certificate had expired on April 30, 1984. Twoney pro-
ceeded to falsify a medical certificate, backdating one acquired on May 7, 1984, to
appear as if it was issued on April 30, 1984. The administrator of the FAA learned
of the falsification and subsequently revoked Twomey's medical, pilot, flight engi-
neer and ground instructor certificates. Id. at 65-66.
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was not falsification of a material fact.545 Relying on Cassis
v. Helms,5 46 the court concluded the falsification was mate-
rial because the falsification need only have a "natural
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, a de-
cision of the agency in making a required
determination." 547
Twomey then argued that the FAA never established
that he was flying as pilot-in-command.548 If Twomey had
served in some lesser capacity, his existing medical certifi-
cate would have been valid. However, Twomey's com-
mand status was confirmed because, on the date of the
FAA inspection, he was scheduled to fly as the captain and
pilot-in-command of Delta Flight 164 from Memphis to
Atlanta.
Twomey finally contended that the revocation was arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. 549 Relying
on Nevada Airlines, Inc. v. Bond,550 this court held that to
challenge an FAA emergency determination, it must be
shown "that the determination was a 'clear error ofjudg-
ment' lacking any rational basis in fact. ' 55 1 The court
.4.1 14 C.F.R. § 67.20 (1988) refers to falsification, reproduction, or alteration of
applications, certificates, logbooks, reports, or records. Subsection (a)(l) pro-
vides that "[n]o person may make or cause to be made . . . [a]ny fraudulent or
intentionally false statement on any application for a medical certificate under this
part ... ." Id. Although it does not expressly require that a falsification be of
"material fact," nevertheless it is undisputed that materiality is required. Twomey,
821 F.2d at 66.
54,i 737 F.2d 545, 547 (6th Cir. 1984). In this case a commercial pilot license
was revoked on the ground that Cassis had intentionally made false, material
statements in a pilot logbook. Id. at 546. The court found the entries were mate-
rial because they were capable of "influencing the ultimate decision" as to how
many hours of flight experience the applicant actually had. Id.
.7 Twomey, 821 F.2d at 66.
." Id. at 67. The FAA found that Twomey had violated section 61.3 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations by acting as a required crewmember without an ap-
propriate current medical certificate. Id. Section 61.3(c) requires that a person
acting as pilot in command or as a required flight crewmember must have in his
personal possession an appropriate current medical certificate. 14 C.F.R.
§ 61.3(c) (1988).
54!. Twomey, 821 F.2d at 68.
.5o 622 F.2d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1980).
551 Twomey, 821 F.2d at 68 (quoting Nevada Airlines, Inc. v. Bond, 622 F.2d
1017, 1021 (9th Cir. 1980)).
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concluded that no clear error in judgment occured, due to
basis in the record which concluded
that such a material false statement indicates ... the lack
of the necessary degree of care, judgment, and responsi-
bility that the holder of any type of airman certificate could
have or should have to be certified accordingly as a pilot
by the Federal Aviation Administration.552
In Peabody Coal Co. v. Missouri Tax Commission,553 plaintiff
operated two aircraft, primarily for transportation of its
employees and property around the country. The aircraft
were hangared in the St. Louis area and were there about
75% of the time. Missouri tried to tax the aircraft at their
full appraised value even though the aircraft had acquired
a taxable situs in Indiana. One aircraft made 19.1% of its
landings in Indiana, and the other made 31.8% of its
landings there. Plaintiff claimed that to tax the aircraft at
full value in Missouri was a denial of due process and a
restraint upon interstate commerce.5 54
The court noted that the case appeared to be one of
first impression, inasmuch as Peabody was not a regularly
scheduled common carrierand the parties cited no cases
involving the ad valorem taxation of aircraft not operated
by a common carrier. However, the court found that
Peabody's showing that the aircraft were flown often to
Indiana was insufficient to require apportionment, and
that apportionment would not be constitutionally re-
quired absent a showing of a "continuous presence" in
another state sufficient to "supplant" the home state.555
552 Id.
-5 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,211 (Mo. June 16, 1987).
55 Id. at 18,212. Plaintiff argued that to allow Missouri to tax the aircraft at
their full value would burden interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution (art I, § 8, cl.3) and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
m- Id. at 18,213. The court wrote: "[lIt has never been considered that appor-
tionment is required simply because an item of personal property is not always in
the same place." Id. The court indicated that the plaintiff has not met its burden
of showing a continuous presence in Indiana. Id. Plaintiff used the two aircraft to
travel to Indiana without any regularity and only in accordance with business re-
quirements. Id. Compare Central R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962)
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XII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Sierra Club v. Lehman,556 the Ninth Circuit held that
the Secretary of the Navy did not exceed his authority by
designating, without specific approval from the FAA, a su-
personic operations area in air space over, and including,
a previously designated military operations area, where
the military operations area had received specific ap-
proval. The action arose from the Navy's establishment
of a Supersonic Operations Area (SOA) which would ex-
tend upward from a Military Operations Area (MOA) al-
ready approved by the FAA, into space designated as Air
Traffic Control Assigned Airspace (ATCAA).557 The Si-
erra Club challenged the Secretary of the Navy's authority
to establish a SOA without the approval of the FAA.
The district court granted the government's motion for
summary judgment, on the basis that the SOA was within
existing special use airspace and that the FAA did not reg-
ulate supersonic flight by military aircraft above 10,000
feet. 558  The FAA referred to supersonic flight in its
guidelines for special use airspace restrictions.55 9 When
the military anticipated supersonic flight, the FAA re-
quired an environmental assessment to accompany the re-
quest for FAA approval. 560 The Navy prepared such an
(holding that State of New Jersey could levy an apportioned ad valorem tax on
interstate railroad carrier which operated under a habitual employment contract
over the lines of the New Jersey railroads) and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska
State B. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954) (holding that Ne-
braska courts may levy an apportioned ad volorem tax on interstate air carrier
which operates daily scheduling to and from points in Nebraska).
.- 825 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987). The Sierra Club and the Nevada Outdoor
Recreation Association brought this suit in an attempt to stop the Navy's flying
supersonic training flights over Nevada. Id. at 1368.
.7 Id. at 1367. The FAA-approved MOA extended from 100 feet above ground
level to 18,000 feet above mean sea level. The new SOA was to extend from
11,000 to 58,000 feet above mean sea level. The airspace from 18,000 to 60,000
feet above mean sea level is designated as ATCAA, and all flights! there are FAA
controlled. Id. The Secretary of the Navy did not seek specific FAA approval for
the SOA designation. Id. at 1368.
558 Id.
559 Id. at 1369. The court refers to Part 7 of the FAA Handbook, which requires
FAA approval for assignment, review, or modification of special use airspace. Id.
Id. The assessment is necessary to comply with the National Environmental
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assessment in 1979 for the designation of one of the
MOA's involved, and the FAA reviewed and approved the
request. The extension of an SOA into airspace above
MOAs did not constitute modification of existing special
use airspace because it was within the boundaries of the
existing MOAs and ATCAA already approved by the
FAA.56' In the limited facts of this case, the SOA did not
modify existing airspace designations.
After the Ninth Circuit's decision in Graham v. Teledyne-
Continental Motors,562 plaintiff petitioned the Supreme
Court to review and finally resolve the issue of whether
the NTSB could conduct destructive testing.
In January, 1986, the Ninth Circuit enjoined destructive
testing, pending a hearing on the merits. On December
17, 1986, the Ninth Circuit allowed a teardown, but
Teledyne had already torn down the engines on Decem-
ber 15, in cooperation with the NTSB. The Ninth Circuit
refused to hold the NTSB and Teledyne in contempt,
holding that a contempt motion was moot. The Ninth
Circuit instructed the district court to enter judgment in
favor of Teledyne and NTSB, and declared that the in-
junction was no longer in effect. The Supreme Court de-
nied plaintiff's application for recall and stay of mandate
and injunction pending a petition for writ of certiorari.
In Miller v. Rich,563 the Ninth Circuit held that the
NTSB's refusal to allow an aircraft owner to observe the
Policy Act of 1969, which requires an environmental assessment of any major gov-
ernmental activity. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982). Paragraph 7005 of the FAA Hand-
book, part 7, states: "Special use airspace actions are subject to environmental
assessments and procedures ... if supersonic flight is anticipated at any altitude."
Lehman, 825 F.2d at 1369.
r,,; Lehman, 825 F.2d at 1370. Though admitting that supersonic flights would
increase dramatically in the SOA, the court held the increased use was not a modi-
fication because the FAA had anticipated some supersonic use. Id.
562 805 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 67 (1987). James Gra-
ham was the pilot of an aircraft that crashed in California in December, 1985,
killing five persons and injuring others. His estate sought to have its representa-
tive "participate in, or at least observe" the teardown of the craft's engine. Id. at
1387.
836 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1987), Av. LIT. REP.,Jan. 18, 1988, at 8,150 (9th Cir.
Dec. 31, 1987). Miller involved a fatal crash in California on January 1, 1987.
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teardown of his engine without providing any reason for
its refusal constituted an abuse of discretion.
In Badhwar v. United States Department of the Air Force,5 64
the court upheld the privilege, first established in Machin
v. Zuckert, 5  for confidential statements made to military
air crash safety investigators.5 66 The court further held
that the comments and evaluations solicited from govern-
ment contractors by government accident investigators
were also privileged and were not disclosable under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 67 Finally, the court
remanded to the district court for a determination of
whether disclosure of portions of autopsies of the dece-
dents might constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy" and, therefore, be exempt from disclo-
sure under the FOIA. 568
.64 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Badhwar is a consolidation of three cases in
which journalists sought access to reports concerning military aircraft accidents
from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Id. at 183.
., 316 F.2d 336, 339 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963) (determining
that, "when disclosure of investigative reports obtained in large part through
promises of confidentiality would hamper the efficient operation of an important
Government program ... the reports should be considered privileged.").
561; The Machin privilege distinguishes between disclosable and non-disclosable
parts of a mishap report by whether the material sought was "obtained in large
part through promises of confidentially" or otherwise reflects official "delibera-
tions or recommendations as to policies that should be pursued." Id.
167 Badhwar, 829 F.2d at 185. The court held that any revelations (including
factual ones) that "would tend to compromise the promise of confidentiality"
would undermine the Machin privilege. Id. The FOIA, exception 5, incorporates
the Machin privilege protecting confidential statements made to military air crash
safety investigators. Id. at 184; see also United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465
U.S. 792 (1984).
FOIA, exception 5, reads as follows:
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1982).
Badhwar, 829 F.2d at 185-86. FOIA exception 6 reads as follows:
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy ....
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982). The court wrote: "Some autopsy reports, presumably,
would not be of a kind that would shock the sensibilties of surviving kin. Others
clearly would. Because the district court did not address an exemption 6 claim,
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XIII. NEGLIGENCE
Beck By Chain v. Thompson 569 affirmed a lower court's rul-
ing that a pilot was not negligent for failing to have an
authorized emergency locator transmitter (ELT) on
board, failing to file a flight plan, failing to request flight
following, failing to activate his transponder, deviating
from his planned flight course, failing to provide de-icing
equipment, and failing to request updated weather
information.570
The action arose when a Piper Lance, conducting a
cross-country flight between Jackson, Mississippi, and
Van Nuys, California, crashed into Mt. Graham in Ari-
zona. The failure to have an operable ELT on board
delayed the rescue efforts, leading to the death of the
plaintiff's mother. The plaintiff's mother survived the im-
mediate crash but died of hypothermia. 57I The district
court found that the defendant was not negligent, because
he had not violated a Federal Aviation Regulation and did
not breach his duty to act as a reasonably prudent pilot
under the circumstances.572
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court's finding of
no negligence under the clearly erroneous standard and
affirmed. The appellate court agreed that the defendant
failed to remove an unauthorized ELT in violation of a
1979 Airworthiness Directive (AD). 3  However, this
alone did not constitute negligence per se, because the AD
also authorized continued operation of aircraft without
we vacate judgment with respect to the material contained in Block 13 of the Au-
topsy Report." Badhwar, 829 F.2d at 185-86.
ml!. 818 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1987). Beck was a wrongful death claim filed by the
daughter of the sole passenger in pilot Thompson's attempted cross-country
flight. Id. at 1206.
570 Id. at 1206.
57,1 Id. at 1207. An ELT would have been activated immediately when the plane
crashed, emitting a signal that could have aided rescurers in finding the crash site.
Id. at 1206. The wreckage was not found for six months. Id. at 1207.
'7 Id. at 1209, 1212.
5 Id. at 1209. Because ELTs with lithium sulphur dioxide batteries were sus-
pected of not meeting federal safety standards, FAA Airworthiness Directives is-
sued in 1979 required that such ELTs be removed from the aircraft. Id.
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operable ELTs until after the date of the accident. a The
defendant was in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 91.52, which re-
quired placarding an aircraft not equipped with an au-
thorized ELT.575 However, the appellate court was
persuaded that the error was harmless because the plac-
ard was required to be placed in the view of the pilot and
not the passenger. The court rejected plaintiff's com-
mon-law negligence claims under the clearly erroneous
rule, thereby evoking a strong dissent.
In Monger v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,576 the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of presumption of due care. It upheld
the district court's ruling that the existence of some evi-
dence precluded a jury instruction that the pilot was pre-
sumed to have undertaken a preflight check for water in
the fuel. 7  Here, that circumstantial evidence showed
that the decedent pilot did not have a ladder with which to
conduct a proper inspection of the aircraft's fuel supply or
to check for water in the fuel. 578 The court also held that,
in a diversity case, state law applied concerning the pre-
sumption of due care, and that the trial judge had broad
discretion to instruct the jury concerning the presumption
of due care.
In addition, the court found the trial court properly ad-
mitted defendant's expert's testimony, even though he
worked closely with NTSB. The expert's conclusions
.7 Id. Two of the 1979 Airworthiness Directives authorized operation of an
aircraft without an operable ELT for a period until March 28, 1980. Id. The acci-
dent occurred on December 20, 1979. Id.
.7.1 Id. at 1209-10. The placarding requirement states: "No person may operate
the aircraft unless the aircraft records contain an entry which includes the date of
initial removal, the make, model, serial number, and reason for removal of the
transmitter, and a placard is located in view of the pilot to show 'ELT is not in-
stalled.' " 14 C.F.R. § 91.52 (f)(10)(i) (1987).
57, 812 F.2d 402 (8th Cir. 1987). Monger involves a 1982 crash in Missouri in
which the pilot and his wife were killed. The cause of the crash was in dispute: the
deceased children claimed it was caused by undetectable water in the fuel system;
Cessna claimed the pilot had run out of fuel. Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
571 Id. The Court of Appeals noted that lack of a ladder was "direct and circum-
stantial evidence" of the pilot's negligence in operating the plane and was suffi-
cient "contrary proof" to rebut any presumption of due care. Id.
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were not barred by statute because the expert was not an
NTSB employee.5 79 The court also upheld the district
court's refusal to admit into evidence a letter from the
chief of the FAA's Flight Standards Division criticizing
Cessna for past failure to identify safety problems in its
plane because it related to prior misconduct and would
overly confuse the jury.580
In Ocasek v. Krass,5s l the court held that the plaintiff
failed to meet the requirements necessary to avail herself
of the dual capacity doctrine,582 an exception to the exclu-
sive remedy provision of the Worker's Compensation
Act.583 The action arose on January 16, 1980, when an
aircraft crashed at Lake County Airport killing the pilot
and his wife, who was also the pilot's employee.
The dual capacity doctrine provides that an employer,
normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive rem-
edy principle may become liable in tort to his own em-
ployee if the employer occupies a second capacity that
confers obligations independent of those imposed on him
as employer. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the
pilot had a legal persona separate from his role as em-
ployer and failed to establish that his obligations were un-
related to his capacity as employer.
In Schellinger v. Marschall, Preston & Associates, Inc.,584 a
wrongful death and survivorship action, the Montana
579 Id. at 408. The statute is section 304(c) of the Independent Safety Board Act
of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1903(c) (1982).
580 Monger, 812 F.2d at 406.
581 153 Il1. App. 3d 215, 505 N.E.2d 1258 (1987).
582 Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1259. Under workers' compensation jurisprudence, the statutory rem-
edies normally serve as the employee's exclusive remedy if he encounters injury
on the job. Id. The dual capacity doctrine is an exception to this general rule. Id.;
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.5 (Smith-Hurd 1986). Section 5(a) of the Act
states in pertinent part:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the em-
ployer ... for injury or death sustained by any employer while em-
ployed in the line of his duty as such employee, other than the
compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is
governed by the provisions of this Act.
Id.
733 P.2d 346 (Mont. 1987).
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Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of a ground survey crew. In early
May, 1981, Schellinger was picking up two members of a
geological survey crew on a steep hillside, when the heli-
copter's rotors hit the hillside and caused the crash.
The plaintiffs attempted to raise the following issues of
material fact: (1) whether the survey crew's contact with
the helicopter prior to the crash caused the helicopter
crash; (2) whether the survey crew's lack of training and
experience contributed to the crash; (3) whether one of
the survey crew members actually opened the door of the
helicopter; and (4) whether the testimony of one of the
survey crew members was credible. 85 The court held
that nothing in the record supported any of these conten-
tions.58 6 Therefore, the plaintiffs failed to set forth spe-
cific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.
In Erickson Air-Crane Co. v. United Technologies Corp. ,587 the
plaintiff's helicopter crashed when an engine compressor
disk failed. The disk had been operated in excess of its
FAA-approved time between overhaul (TBO), but the
manufacturer had furnished a document which errone-
ously listed the life-limit as substantially longer. The de-
fendant claimed that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent per se for failing to comply with the FARs that
require the operator to maintain a record of the "current
status of life-limited parts" and to ensure that the aircraft
at all times conforms to the type certificate data.58 How-
ever, the court held that the aircraft operator could not be
negligent per se, because the operator was not among the
class of persons intended to be protected by the mainte-
nance regulations and that economic injury arising from
the loss of the helicopter was not the type of injury sought
to be protected by the regulations.
, Id. at 347.
Id. The only eye witnesses to the accident were the defendants, from whom
the plaintiff did not get any depositions or sworn statements. The record was
absent of any summary judgment proof from the plaintiffs. Id. at 347-48.
587 87 Or. App. 577, 743 P.2d 747 (1987).
r- Id. at 749; see 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.173(a)(2)(ii), 91.171(b) (1988).
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In Canada v. Blain's Helicopters, Inc. ,589 the Ninth Circuit
reversed the granting of summary judgment in favor of
Blain's Helicopter Sales and Service (BHS&S). On May 1,
1981, a helicopter owned by BHS&S crashed near Willis-
ton, North Dakota. The pilot of the aircraft, Canada, and
all seven passengers were killed. Canada was an em-
ployee of BHS&S. The cause of the crash was engine fail-
ure attributed to improper fuel mixing. The district court
granted BHS&S's motion for summary judgment because
Canada had failed to verify the fuel invoices, which could
show that BHS&S was responsible for improper fueling of
the aircraft, and the court could not consider them in rul-
ing on the summary judgment. Canada had also failed to
produce evidence to prove that BHS&S was liable as les-
sor of the aircraft for failure to warn of a known danger.
Relying on Restatement § 407590 and § 388591 and re-
lated comments,592 the court concluded that BHS&S, as
lessor, owed a duty to Canada as a foreseeable user of the
helicopter, because the duty is owed to the entire class of
persons whom the supplier expects to use the product.
831 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1987).
-"' Id. at 923. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 407 (1965) provides:
[a] lessor who leases a chattel for the use of others, knowing or hav-
ing reason to know that it is or is likely to be dangerous for the pur-
pose for which it is to be used, is subject to liability as a supplier of
the chattel.
Id.
Canada, 831 F.2d at 923. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965)
provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the
use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose
use it is supplied, if the suppler (a) knows or has reason to know that
the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is
supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use
the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c)
fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous
condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id.
Id.592 Canada, 831 F.2d at 923; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 com-
ments a, b, and c (1965).
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BHS&S owed Canada a duty to warn him of any known
danger which pertained to the operation of the helicopter
and to advise him of all information about the character
and condition of the helicopter which would be necessary
for Canada to learn of the danger of using this helicopter.
The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
show that BHS&S breached its duty to Canada.593
Doug Miller, another company pilot, testified that the
president of the company represented that there was a let-
ter on file from a major oil company which stated that the
mixture of fuel met all the required specifications. If
Miller's testimony was believed, it would tend to show
that the president affirmatively misled the pilots into be-
lieving the fuel was safe. The court concluded that
BHS&S had raised a question of fact concerning the rea-
sonableness of the president's efforts to warn the pilots,
and, therefore, summary judgment was not appropriate.
The court also held that a court may not consider unau-
thenticated documents in opposition to a motion for sum-
mary judgment.
In Butcher v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ," a Cessna 182 crashed
at Gulf Park Airport in Ocean Springs, Mississippi. All of
the passengers were killed. Plaintiffs alleged that the
crash was caused by the negligence of the pilot and the
owner and operator of the aircraft. The parties settled for
$75,000 each. Subsequent to the settlement, another ac-
tion was filed against Cessna Aircraft Company. This sec-
ond action alleged that the crash occurred because the
pilot's seat slipped back on its tracks, rendering the pilot
unable to maintain full control of the aircraft. The court
stated that the plaintiffs were attempting to allege incon-
sistent facts which would necessarily deny the facts earlier
plead and on which a settlement was obtained. It was the
court's opinion that either the accident occurred because
-', Canada, 831 F.2d at 924. The court refused to decide whether Montana law
would recognize a duty of lessors to warn lessees of dangers discovered after de-
livery. Id.
r.... 668 F. Supp. 569 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
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of the pilot's and/or the operator's negligence or because
the seat slipped back. The court also stated that although
one may pursue joint tortfeasors separately, one may not
pursue one party on one set of facts and, after obtaining a
recovery based on those facts, assert a claim for the same
damage against one who was not a party to the first ac-
tion. 9 The court held that because adequate discovery
was had in the prior litigation, the decision to proceed
without Cessna was irrevocable.
Memphis Aviation, Inc. v. Kershaw 5 9 6 held that the seller of
a used aircraft who negligently misrepresented airworthi-
ness directive (AD) compliance to the buyer could not be
sued for negligent misrepresentation. The buyer, who
showed experience in aviation and expertise in ADs, and
who had access to the logbooks, did not justifiably rely
upon the representation. This was true even though the
evidence showed that it was not customary for the buyer
in such transactions to make an independent examination
of AD compliance.
In Yocum v. Piper Aircraft Corp. ,7 the court held that the
prior owner of an aircraft, who was not in the business of
selling aircraft, owed no duty to warn subsequent pur-
chasers of any defect in the aircraft.
XIV. ANTITRUST
In Association of Retail Travel Agents, Ltd. v. Air Transport
Association of America, 98 the court denied ATA's motion for
summary judgment under the "rule of reason. 599
ATA is a joint venture consisting of 134 air carriers.
.-.. Id. at 576. The court noted that "[t]o allege in the present actions negli-
gence and/or strict liability in tort against Cessna is to deny the negligence earlier
alleged and settled upon." Id.
... 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,266 (Tenn. Jun. 19, 1987).
.1,7 738 S.W.2d 145 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
59 3 Av. L. REP. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 17,728 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 1987).
-- ' The rule of reason provides that, under antitrust law, a court must engage in
a complex inquiry to decide if a particular restraint, once found to exist, is unrea-
sonable. The test is usually whether the restraint suppresses or destroys competi-
tion. See Association of Retail Travel Agents, Ltd. v. Air Transport Ass'n of
America, 623 F. Supp. 893, 898 (D.D.C. 1985).
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ATA's members control nearly 100% of the market for air
transportation and carrier-purchased travel agent serv-
ices. ATA required all accredited agents to report and re-
mit payments on a uniform schedule. Agents who failed
to do so were subject to termination. The effect of these
requirements was to restrict competition in respect to the
time during which carriers and agents have the use of
ticket proceeds. The court held, following Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc.,600 that a restriction on credit terms was
an unlawful restriction on price competition.
ATA further required each agent to post a bond or let-
ter of credit. Failure to do so was grounds for termination
of the agent-carrier relationship. The court ruled that this
practice had no pro-competitive effects which, on balance,
justified the restraint on competition. An additional re-
quirement imposed by ATA required an agent who
purchased another travel agency accredited by ATA to as-
sume the obligations of its predecessor. The court held
that this practice was not materially different from that
struck down in United States v. First National Pictures, Inc.60 1
ATA argued that these restrictions permitted important
efficiencies, but ATA offered no showing that increasing
the number of participants in the market had the effect of
increasing competition in the market. The court stated
that the purpose of the antitrust laws was not to protect
efficiencies but to protect competition.
The First Circuit in Interface Group, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Port Authority60 2 held that a practice of the Massachusetts
Port Authority to require non-tenant airlines to have their
planes serviced exclusively by the airport's fixed base op-
erator did not constitute an unreasonable exclusive deal-
ing arrangement. The Interface Group, in planning its
charter service operation, agreed with TWA to use TWA's
,, 446 U.S. 643 (1980) (holding that "an agreement among competing whole-
salers to refuse to sell unless the retailer makes payment in cash either in advance
or upon delivery is 'plainly anticompetitive.' ").
,..., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) (holding arrangement between motion picture distribu-
tors in conflict with the Sherman Act).
.i... 816 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
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ground services available at a terminal at Logan Airport.
The Port Authority refused to allow Interface Group to
operate out of the terminal because it required all non-
tenant charter carriers to operate out of a different termi-
nal. Interface Group contended this was in violation of
the federal antitrust laws.603
Interface Group had to show that the anticompetitive
consequences of the terminal requirement outweighed
the Port Authority's legitimate business purposes. How-
ever, the complaint was insufficient because Interface
Group did not claim that the policy made it easier for the
Port Authority to abuse its market power.60 4 The court
stated that the Port was a public, rather than a private,
entity. The Port did not directly profit from its ownership
of Logan Airport. Under Parker v. Brown,6 ° 5 the Port Au-
thority was, therefore, immune from antitrust liability be-
cause antitrust laws did not reach restraints of trade
imposed by the state.60 6 The court held that the com-
plaint was properly dismissed.
Interface also alleged that the Port violated the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1349(a), 1513, and 2210.607
The court held that sections 1349(a) and 2210 did not
create a private right of action. 60 8 The court concluded
,1,-1 Interface alleged that the Port;s refusal was a violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Id. at 10. Section 1 states: "Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 11.
" 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker held that antitrust laws are not applicable to
state actions. Id. at 350-52.
- Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 12-13.
6117 Id. at 10. Section 1349(a) involves the use of federal funds in airports and
air navigation facilities and provides, in part, that "there shall be no exclusive
right for the use of any landing area or air navigation facility upon which federal
funds have been expended." 49 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (1982). Section 1513 involves
the prohibition of state taxation of air commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1982). Sec-
tion 2210 involves airport development projects, a condition precedent of which
is non-discriminatory rates, fees, rentals, and other changes as well as rules, regu-
lations, and conditions applicable to all carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 2210(a)(l)(A)
(1982).
.- Interface Group, 816 F.2d at 14-15.
1988]
116 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [54
that Congress did, however, intend to create a private
right of action in 49 U.S.C. § 1513.60
XV. DEBTOR-CREDITOR
A. Bankruptcy
In In rejet Florida System, Inc. ,610 the court held that cer-
tain payments made to the Airlines Clearing House
(ACH) did not constitute preferential payments recover-
able from ACH under statutory bankruptcy provisions.61 1
ACH is an organization that facilitates the interline settle-
ment of accounts between air carriers. In May and June of
1984, Jet Florida was an associate member of ACH. The
funds paid to settle the accounts of Jet Florida, then
known as Air Florida, did not inure to the benefit of ACH.
If a carrier did not meet its obligation, ACH's only re-
course was to suspend the carrier.
The court held that ACH was not an initial transferee
under section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. 6 12 ACH was.a
mutual agent, a "mere conduit", employed by the carriers
to effectuate settlement and was not liable for payments
made by a debtor carrier to satisfy its obligations to other
613carriers.
In Re Arrow Air, Inc.,, a bankruptcy proceeding, in-
volved a claim by a representative of a class of consumers
who had purchased a European vacation tour package
from a tour operator. The court held that the representa-
tive was not entitled to an order certifying the class claim,
permitting the filing of a previously filed proof of claim,
,'R Id. at 15-16.
69 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987).
Id. at 84. The trustee alleges that the payments were preferences under sec-
tion 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982).
612 In rejet Fla. Sys., 69 Bankr. at 84. Section 550 covers the liability of a trans-
feree of a fraudulent transfer or preferential transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (1982).
Section 550(a) provides that the trustee may recover the value of property trans-
ferred from "the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made . I..." d  § 550(a).
In rejet Fla. Sys., 69 Bankr. at 85.
76 Bankr. 372, 3 Av. L. Rep. (CCH) (20 Av. Cas.) 18,060 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
June 5, 1987).
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and determining the non-dischargeability and priority of
the claim.61 5 Overwhelming case authority established
that class proofs of claim were not permissible in bank-
ruptcy proceedings.
B. FAA Recordation
Aircraft Trading and Services, Inc. v. Braniff, Inc. ,616 held
that the seller of an aircraft engine, who failed to record
the chattel mortgage securing the payment of the
purchase price, did not lose its security interest upon the
subsequent sale of the engine. However, three years
later, when the seller finally did perfect its interest with
the FAA, the seller's security interest became subject to
state priority rules, and thus, subordinate to those of two
intervening buyers.
Aircraft Trading and Services, Inc. (ATASCO) sold ajet
aircraft engine subject to a chattel mortgage that secured
the purchase price payment to Northeastern Airlines.
ATASCO failed to record the chattel mortgage with the
FAA, as required for perfection of its security interest.
Meanwhile, the engine was sold to Braniff, which in turn
sold it to another buyer, Condren. Condren then leased
the engine, with an option to purchase, to International
Air Leases, Inc. (IAL). In March of 1985, ATASCO finally
recorded the chattel mortgage with the FAA. In July,
1985, IAL, with notice of the chattel mortgage, exercised
its option to buy the engine. ATASCO brought suit for
conversion, replevin, and forfeiture against all of the par-
ties involved in the transaction.
Relying on Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket,617 the Second
Circuit stated that state law determines priority, but all in-
terests must be federally recorded before they can obtain
the priority to which they are entitled. Although Braniff
and Condren had filed with the FAA prior to ATASCO's
filing, ATASCO did finally perfect its interest. Therefore,
' 3 Av. L. REP. at 18,063.
819 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 163 (1987).
617 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
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state law determined the priority of the interests.61 8
In this case, New York's Uniform Commercial Code,
Article 9 applied. Section 9-307(1) provided:
A buyer in ordinary course of business ... takes free of a
security interest created by his seller even though the se-
curity interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence.61 9
The engine was found to be capital equipment rather than
inventory. Braniff was not a buyer in ordinary course of
business when it purchased capital goods. Therefore, the
court held that the sale to Braniff was not in the ordinary
course of business and section 9-307(1) did not extin-
guish ATASCO's security interest. Condren and IAL did
not attempt to establish that they were buyers in the ordi-
nary course of business.
To determine the priority between ATASCO, Braniff,
and Condren, the court relied on section 9-301 (1), which
stated that an unperfected security interest is subordinate
to the rights of a buyer not in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, if the collateral is received without knowledge of the
security interest and before the security interest is per-
fected. Both Condren and Braniff bought without knowl-
edge of ATASCO's security interest and before it was
perfected. Therefore, the court held, as buyers not in the
ordinary course of business, their respective rights to the
engine were superior to ATASCO's.
Finally, the court addressed the priority between
ATASCO and IAL, who had competing perfected inter-
ests in the engine. Section 9-312(5)(a) governs conflicts
between competing perfected interests. 620 Relying on this
section, the court held that the first to file with the FAA
ranked first in priority. ATASCO filed in March, 1985
and IAL filed in August, 1985. Therefore, ATASCO had
priority over IAL.
Aircraft Trading, 819 F.2d at 1232.
N.Y. U.C.C. LAw § 9-307(l) (McKinney 1964).
Id. § 9-312(5)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1987); Aircraft Trading, 819 F.2d at 1236.
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Shacket v. Roger Smith Aircraft Sales, Inc. ,621 a case on re-
mand from the United States Supreme Court,6 22 resolved
a priority dispute between subsequent purchasers of an
aircraft. The first purchaser failed to record its interest
with the FAA, but attempted to do so by leaving the bill of
sale with the aircraft dealer to have it recorded and mak-
ing several phone calls to check on the progress of the
recording. The second purchaser was deemed to have ac-
quired the aircraft with actual notice of the first purchase.
It paid "grossly inadequate" consideration for the
purchase of the aircraft, because it knew of problems con-
cerning ownership of the aircraft at the time it sought to
record its own interest.623 Therefore, the first purchaser
was entitled to priority, despite failing to record the secur-
ity interest.
In Compass Insurance Co. v. Moore,624 an aircraft priority
dispute between a judgment creditor and an antecedent
purchaser, the appellate court reversed the district court
and accorded priority to the antecedent purchaser. In De-
cember, 1981, Compass obtained a judgment in the
amount of $111,088. On June 8, 1982, the FAA recorded
Compass' interest on the FAA register. In November
1979, the aircraft was sold to Mid-South Aircraft Sales,
which in turn sold the aircraft to H.P. Moore in May,
1981. These sales were not recorded with the FAA until
June 30, 1983. The district court entered summary judg-
ment in favor of Compass because Compass perfected its
lien prior to Moore's perfection of its purchase of the
aircraft.625
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's holding,
because the judgment lien obtained by Compass could
not attach to property which was no longer owned by, or
in the possession of, the judgment debtor and was no
62, 651 F. Supp. 675 (N.D. I!!. 1986), aff'd, 841 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1988).
1;22 Shacket, 462 U.S. at 406.
623 Shacket v. Roger Smith, 651 F. Supp. at 686.
,..., 806 F.2d 796 (8th Cir. 1986).
625 Compass Ins. Co. v. Moore, 621 F. Supp. 125, 127 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
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longer in the jurisdiction of the Florida state court.626
The court justified its decision by stating that this result
did not frustrate the purpose of the Federal Aviation Act,
because a judgment creditor is not the kind of innocent
party who engages in transactions in reliance on the FAA
registry.627
XVI. MISREPRESENTATION
In Crigler v. Cessna Aircraft Co. ,628 the plaintiff purchased
a 1977 Cessna 172 Skyhawk with a 0-320-H2AD engine in
1979. On February 8, 1980, the FAA issued an airworthi-
ness directive (AD)6 29 which set forth immediate and re-
curring maintenance procedures in response to problems
with bent pushrods and spalling hydraulic valve tappets in
the 0-320-H2AD engine. In August 1980, the plaintiff
traded in his 1977 Skyhawk for a new 1980 Skyhawk. The
dealer who sold the plaintiff the new Skyhawk offered only
$18,000 for the 1977 Skyhawk trade-in because it had "a
bad engine. ' 630 Nevertheless, the plaintiff went ahead
with the trade-in after the dealer informed the plaintiff
that the 1980 model had "a completely different en-
gine."' 631 The service manager informed the plaintiff that
the engine problem had been solved. More than five
years and 480 flight hours later, the 1980 Skyhawk's en-
gine failed and had to be replaced.
The plaintiff brought suit, alleging Cessna Aircraft
Company and Avco-Lycoming conspired to defraud him.
The district court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendants concluding that the AD put the plaintiff on legal
notice of the engine problem. Therefore, the plaintiff
626 Compass Ins. Co. v. Moore, 806 F.2d at 799.
627 Id.
62m 830 F.2d 169 (11 th Cir. 1987).
62!. Federal Airworthiness Directives, 14 C.F.R. § 39 (1988). Airworthiness Di-
rectives are mandatory regulations promulgated by the FAA and are binding on
owners, operators, and manufacturers. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 39.1, 39.3 (1988).
.. Crigler, 830 F.2d at 170 n.4. The plaintiff testified that he never asked why
the engine was "bad." Id.
w Id.
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could not prove that he justifiably relied on any
misrepresentation.
The court of appeals affirmed. Airworthiness direc-
tives632 are published in the Federal Register. Publication
acts as legal notice to owners and operators.6 33 The court
concluded that the AD was sufficient to put the plaintiff on
notice that such engines were susceptible to stalling.6 34
XVII. CHOICE OF LAw
In Emmart v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,635 the court held that
Indiana law applied to the case of a plane crash occurring
in Indiana in which three Indiana residents, employed by
a Piper distributor, were killed. Plaintiffs sued in Florida
and sought to gain the benefit of Florida's more liberal
punitive damages law, on the ground that Piper's princi-
pal place of business was in Florida.
Relying on the Restatement of Conflicts §§ 145 and
146,636 the court determined that Indiana had more sig-
nificant relationships to the issues presented. The crash
in Indiana was not a fortuitous event, because the dece-
dents were all residents of Indiana, the aircraft was han-
gared in Indiana for use by the Piper distributor, and the
aircraft was carrying employees of the distributor at the
time of the crash. The only contact with Florida was that
the defendant had its principal place of business there.
642 See supra note 628.
w- See generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 421, 1423 (1982).
6.14 Crigler, 830 F.2d at 172.
'" 659 F. Supp. 843 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 145-46 (1971).
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